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WORLDWIDE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN 1954

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WORLDWIDE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN 1954

AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This report by the Office of Research and Intelligence, U. S. Information Agency, is designed to provide a comprehensive summary of recent Communist propaganda activities.

It is realized that the report, as an initial effort in this direction by the recently established Office of Research and Intelligence (IRI), has certain limitations. It is intended to establish a pattern for subsequent annual summaries, in which it is expected that a more complete and balanced treatment of certain subjects will be possible.

The ordering of topics in the report was planned with a view to meeting the particular needs of the various policy, area and media elements of the Agency. Accordingly, IRI will welcome comments on the format, organization, and contents of the report and suggestions as to the preparation of future editions.

The report was planned, coordinated, and edited by F. Bowen Evans of IRI, who also contributed the first six chapters.

USIA/IRI is indebted to the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, for invaluable assistance in the preparation of this report by providing special materials and intelligence reports.

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WORLDWIDE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN 1954

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Purpose of This Report

This report is designed to provide a general account of Communist propaganda activities during 1954 in all parts of the world. It also seeks to provide perspective by putting the account within the framework of the historical development of Communist propaganda theory and practice, by describing the worldwide organizational network through which Communist propaganda is disseminated, and by relating the strictly propaganda and ideological aspects of the Communist program to broader Communist objectives and strategies in the Cold War.

Chapter II is concerned with the central emphasis on propaganda in Communist theory and practice, particularly since Lenin, and points up the continuous, unremitting use of propaganda as an instrument for the propagation of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and for the promotion of foreign policies of Communist states. In addition, the development and present organization of the worldwide apparatus through which the Communists conduct a globally-coordinated propaganda program is described.

Chapters III, IV, and V examine the volume, themes, and media of Communist propaganda during 1954 on a worldwide basis, and Chapter VI treats briefly some of the activities of the major international Communist-front groups during the year.

Each of the remaining four chapters is devoted to Communist propaganda developments during 1954 in a particular geographic region. In order that Communist propaganda activities may be seen in their proper context, each of these chapters begins with a description of Communist strength, objectives, and strategy in the particular area.

B. Limitations of Scope

The range of this report is largely limited to a description of overt Communist propaganda against the Free World, and has not been extended except incidentally to certain other aspects of Communist propaganda.

It was not the purpose of this report to deal with the domestic or internal propaganda of Communist nations, although that subject receives occasional mention. The report focuses instead on Communist propaganda activities within the Free World and propaganda directed toward the Free World by the Communist countries.

It will be noted also that the report is largely descriptive and expository, rather than analytical and evaluative. The report includes some references to the effectiveness of Communist propaganda, but only incidentally. Similarly, the psychological and social factors which predispose individuals or groups toward Communism, or which make them susceptible to Communist propaganda appeals, were not intended to be covered in this report. Other studies have dealt with these matters, and their inclusion here would have presented problems of a size and complexity too great for the immediate resources of the authors. Accordingly, no attempt has been made here toward systematic treatment.

There is a third aspect of Communist propaganda which lies outside the scope of this report; namely, the complex of covert, clandestine, or "unconventional" activities. Along with propaganda, such measures come under the general rubric of psychological warfare." However, they involve a different field of inquiry, and apart from occasional references to such activities, this report concentrates on the use of overt media.

C. Location of Chapter Summaries

At the beginning of each chapter in this study there appears an introductory "high lights" sheet which provides a one-page summary of the chapter's contents. Taken together, the "high lights" pages from the several chapters constitute a general summary of the complete report.

II. THE OBJECTIVES, THEORY, AND ORGANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

HIGH LIGHTS

The proclaimed goal of Communism is the establishment of a world Communist order. Toward this objective Communists use the propaganda weapon in coordination with military, diplomatic, and economic weapons.

Ever since the Communist Manifesto was written in 1848, propaganda has played a leading role in Communist activities. Communists believe that their doctrine is the only means to world salvation. As a messianic movement, Communism is inherently propagandistic.

An elaborate theory of propaganda has been developed by the Communists. Lenin became the great theorist of Communist strategy and tactics, with Stalin following as his interpreter. Their theoretical works stress the need for constant propaganda. Post-war Communist theory emphasizes that "there can be no breathing space in ideological warfare.

Two related functions are served by Communist international propaganda: (1) it seeks to spread the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and to make ideological converts; and (2) it seeks to promote the immediate foreign policy of Communist states.

The chief immediate aims of Communist propaganda are: to divide the nations of the Free World and, particularly, to isolate the United States; to soften up areas which seem vulnerable to Communist conquest; and, where that is impracticable at present, to foster anti-Americanism and neutralism.

A remarkable consistency is achieved by Communist propaganda around the globe, largely because of the central policy guidance from Agitprop, a section at the top of the Party hierarchy in the Kremlin. Propaganda policy is coordinated with the Communists' global military, political, and economic strategies at the highest level.

By radio, press, film, cultural exchange, and other media propaganda is disseminated from Communist countries into the Free World. Local Communist parties with links to Moscow, local and international Communist "front" organizations, and a myriad of Communist "friendship societies" constitute a vast network for spreading Communist propaganda in the Free World.

II. THE OBJECTIVES, THEORY, AND ORGANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

A. Introduction

From the earliest days of Marxism down to the present, propaganda has played a leading role in Communist strategy. The conquests of Communism, both in Russia and elsewhere, were not won by force alone. They were the product of a skillful mixture of coercion and persuasion.

As a messianic movement, communism is inherently propagandistic. Since Marx and Engels in 1848 issued the Communist Manifesto, itself a propaganda document, the Communist movement has given unremitting attention to propaganda, agitation, ideological warfare.

The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 was prepared by years of activity in which all members of the revolutionary party were expected to be propagandists. After the coup in Russia was achieved, Lenin immediately turned his attention to the problems of propagandizing Bolshevism abroad through an international network of Communist parties governed from Moscow. Thus the present leaders of international Communism have inherited both a revolutionary theory in which propaganda plays a crucial part and a long tradition of propaganda practice which for the most part has been all too successful.

B. The Objectives and Strategy of Communist Propaganda

1. Relation to General Communist Objectives and Strategy.

Communist propaganda cannot be understood apart from the general objectives and strategy of world Communism. The objective of Communists is to overthrow "capitalism" and to establish a world Communist order. Following Marx, the Communists believe that the decay of capitalism and the triumph of Communism is inevitable. But following Lenin, the interpreter of Marx, they also believe that they must devote all their efforts toward achieving the revolution.

The Leninist-Stalinist doctrine abounds with so many discourses on Communist strategy and tactics that it is difficult to treat them in short span. However, among the main concepts are the following:

(1) The chief role in bringing about the revolution is that of the disciplined, dedicated, and ideologically trained Communist Party.

(2) The Party serves as "vanguard" or "general staff" of the revolutionary movement, and one of its tasks is to educate "the masses" to the necessity for revolution.

(3) In the revolutionary struggle, all weapons - military political, economic, and psychological - are to be used, singly or in combination, as circumstances dictate.

(4) Where it is expedient and the time is ripe to use violence, violence should be used.

(5) Where violence would be inexpedient and unproductive, Communists should cooperate and compromise with "bourgeois" parties.

(6) Communists should use both legal and illegal methods, and should have an underground organization parallel to the open organization,

(7) Communists should infiltrate non-Communist organizations.

(8) Communists should not be bothered by "bourgeois" ethical or moral considerations.

(9) Communists should be concerned with the "long view," and be patient in the face of short-run setbacks.

2. Propaganda Objectives and Strategy

Propaganda, agitation, and ideological warfare are viewed by Communists as weapons in the revolutionary struggle. That struggle, in terminology revived by the Communists in 1947, now takes the form of conflict between "the two camps" - the "camp of peace and democracy" which is led by the USSR, and the "camp of reactionary and imperialistic warmongers" which is led by the United States.

Through the propaganda weapon, the Communists seek to promote both the spread of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology or doctrine, and the success of the foreign policy of the USSR.

Some of the specific stratigic aims of Communist international propaganda, as set forth by Lenin and perpetuated by the Party, are:

(1) To take advantage, as Lenin put it, "of the antagonisms and contradictions existing among the imperialists," by inciting one enemy power against another. In pursuit of this aim the Communists today seek to split the Western Alliance and, particularly, to isolate the United States.

(2) To seize upon all points of weakness or tension in the existing society and to exacerbate them through inflammatory propaganda. For example, for years Communists have sought to exploit the disputes between labor and capital in non-Communist countries.

(3) To exploit the differences between "imperialist" powers and their colonies, by playing upon the nationalist aspirations of the colonies and representing Communism as a liberating force. Lenin's theory of imperialism as the last stage of capitalism, and his early attention to exploiting the grievances in colonial and semi-colonial areas, gave Communism an initial advantage in the conflict for men's loyalties in the underdeveloped areas.

If Communist propaganda could have perfect success in these aims, which is not likely, the Soviets could take the world without resorting to military weapons at all. If Communist propaganda could have partial success in these aims, which is already the case, the need for Communist military measures is reduced and accordingly the material costs of the Communists are cut down. This leads Harold Lasswell, one of the most noted authorities in the analysis of propaganda, to the theory that the Communists view propaganda strategically as a way of economizing in their struggle to gain world dominance: 1/

1/ "The Strategy of Soviet Propaganda," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, January, 1951, p. 214.

"I suggest that there is unity of strategic aim: to maximize the power at home and abroad of the ruling individuals and groups in Russia. Propaganda is an instrument of total policy, together with diplomacy, economic arrangements and armed forces. Political propaganda is the management of mass communications for power purposes. In the long run the aim is to economize the material cost of power. Even more specifically, the aim is to economize the material cost of world dominance."

Certainly the Communists view propaganda as a weapon to be used constantly, and as a weapon to be closely coordinated with other weapons. It is used both to supplement military, economic, or diplomatic measures - and to substitute for them when those measures are impossible, impractical, unproductive, or uneconomical.

Further references to the objectives and strategy of Communist propaganda occur in the discussion of Communist propaganda theory and organization below. In later chapters of this study current Communist propaganda strategy is treated specifically as it pertains to each geographic area.

C. Propaganda in Communist Theory

The Communists have not been secretive about the stress they place on propaganda. From Lenin down to Malenkov, the Bolshevik leaders have been not only practicioners of propaganda but also theoreticians of propaganda. Communist theory - that is, the great body of doctrinal statements alleged by the Communists to be "scientific" and used by them as guides to action - abounds with exhortations on the need for constant propaganda.

1. The Role of Propaganda in Lenin's Theory

George Plekhanov, who founded the first Marxist party in Russia in 1883 and who was Lenin's teacher, attached great importance to propaganda. 2/ He drew a distinction between the nature of

2/ Plekhanov's Defence of Materialism (1894) converted Lenin to Marxism and was Lenin said, "reared a whole generation of Russian Marxists." Russian was the first language into which Marx's Das Kapital had been translated from the original German (in 1872), and the Communist Manifesto had been translated into Russian in 1882.

propaganda, which he said served to present many ideas to one or a few people, and agitation, which he said served to present only one or a few ideas to a large mass of people.

Lenin perpetuated this distinction, saying that the agitator is to fasten his attention on a particular, concrete injustice arising from the "contradictions of capitalism," and is to "endeavor to rouse mass discontent and indignation against the crying injustice, leaving to the propagandist the responsibility of giving a complete explanation for the contradiction. That is why the propagandist works principally through the written word and the agitator through the spoken word."3/ This distinction is still a part of Communist propaganda theory, and is reflected today in the organization and functions of the Section of propaganda and Agitation (the Agitprop) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the USSR.

Lenin was the first to develop thoroughly those aspects of Communist theory which led to such stress on propaganda. Marx had emphasized the determinist aspects of history, the theory that capitalism inevitably was to disintegrate and be overthrown by Communism, and had provided little in the way of concrete guidance and strategy. By contrast, Lenin emphasized that if there was to be a revolution, it had to be planned and organized. He held that revolutionary consciousness would not develop automatically within the working classes, but had to be brought to them from without by the ideologically trained and dedicated Marxists. There had to be a tightly disciplined party, both to provide the needed organization and leadership, and to indoctrinate the masses.

Lenin wrote and spoke extensively on the role of the tightly disciplined Communist party as the "general staff" of the revolutionary movement, and on the strategy and tactics by which revolution was to be accomplished. From these concepts there followed naturally his theory on the role of propaganda in the Communist movement. Propaganda and agitation were to be the tools by which intellectual converts were made, and by which the minds of the masses would be prepared for revolution. There was to be not only verbal propaganda, in the form of slogans, doctrines, revelations,

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3/Lenin, Selected Works, (Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., London, 1936), Vol. II, pp. 85-86.

and denunciations; but also propaganda of the deed, in the form of organization and action programs.

Thus, long before Lenin led the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, in 1901 he wrote an article called "Where to Begin,"4/ in which he stressed the necessity for propaganda. In 1902, in a more extended treatment called What Is To Be Done, he gave detailed attention to the role of propaganda and agitation. One passage in that work says:

> "We must go among all classes of the people as theoreticians, as propagandists, as agitators and as organisers... The principle thing, of course, is propaganda and agitation among all strata of the people."5/

The same emphasis on propaganda occurred later when in 1920 Lenin wrote Left Wing Communism,6/in which he was admonishing the foreign Communist parties affiliated with the Communist International as to their responsibilities. He emphasized that constant, patient propaganda was one of the foremost responsibilities of these parties.7/

2. The Role of Propaganda in Stalin's Theory

With some adaptations, Stalin carried forward the main lines of Lenin's theory on the strategy and tactics of revolution on the party as "vanguard" and "general staff," and on the party's role in propagandizing the masses. For example, the following is an excerpt from Stalin's lectures on The Foundations of Leninism (1924):8/

4/Reprinted in Lenin's Selected Works. (International Publishers, New York, 1935), Vol. I.

5/Ibid., Vol. II, p. 101. The italics are Lenin s.

6/Reprinted in Selected Works (International Publishers, New York, 1943), Vol. X, p. 94.

7/For a more extended discussion of Lenin's theory as it applies to propaganda, see Chapter II in Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1950.

8/Reprinted in The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism (House Document No. 619, 80th Congress, 1948), pp. 77-119.

"It does not suffice that the vanguard should realize the impossibility of maintaining the old order and the need for its overthrow. The masses, likewise the millionfold masses, must come to understand this need... Our task is to see that the masses shall be provided with opportunities for the acquirement of such an understanding..."

In his report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party, Stalin defined political leadership as "the ability to convince the masses of the correctness of the Party's policy," and said that "if our Party propaganda for some reason goes lame, . . . then our entire State and Party work must inevitably languish." 9/

Similarly, in the Stalin era the World Congresses of the Communist International preached the need for propaganda. The following, for example, are from the Programme of the Communist International adopted at the Sixth World Congress in 1928: 10/

"The Communist Parties in the colonial and semi-colonial countries must carry on a bold and consistent struggle against foreign imperialism and unfailingly conduct propaganda in favor of friendship and unity with the proletariat of the imperialist countries."

"When the revolutionary tide is rising... the Party of the proletariat is confronted with the task of leading the masses to a direct attack upon the bourgeois State. This it does by carrying on propaganda in favor of increasingly radical transitional slogans... and by organizing mass action, upon which all branches of Party agitation and propaganda, including parliamentary activity, must be concentrated."

The Parties of the Communist International must utilize "the bourgeois parliament as a platform for revolutionary agitation and propaganda..."

9/ Problems of Leninism, p. 653. Quoted in Louis Nemzer, "The Kremlin's Professional Staff," American Political Science Review, March 1950, p. 72.

10/ Ibid., pp. 136-138.

The same emphasis on the need for propaganda and agitation appears throughout the speeches and resolutions of the Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and throughout the official party and government journals of the U. S. S. R.

3. The Role of Propaganda in Communist Theory since World War II

During the period of the Popular Front, from 1935 to 1939, and again during the years 1941-1945 when the USSR was allied with the United Nations against the Axis Powers, the Communists of course did not press their doctrines of revolution in the capitalist nations. The revolutionary motif was muted and the Comintern was dissolved.

But as Professor Merle Fainsod points out, "with the approach of victory, there was increasing evidence of a Marxist revival on the ideological front... Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which had been neglected during the early phases of the war, again began to be stressed." 11/

It soon became clear that the alliances which the USSR had formed with capitalist states after 1941 were regarded by the Soviets as "tactical deviations only; and thus, as soon as the War was over, there was an immediate return to the traditional attitude of hositlity..." 12/ By 1947, with the organization of the Cominform, the revived emphasis on the old revolutionary doctrines was full-blown and the notion of two implacably hostile camps, "the camp of socialism and the camp of capitalism," was resurrected and made a prime ingredient of Communist post-war theory.

In post-war theoretical pronouncements, Communist leaders have used the terms "propaganda" and "agitation" less, and there has been a greater use of terms relating to "ideological warfare." But all of the old emphasis on the need for constant propagation of Communist ideas has returned. The following, for example, are typical post-war statements from Litraturnaya Gazeta, Pravda, Bolshevik, and from a 1952 speech by Malenkov.

11/ "Postwar Role of the Communist Party," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May, 1949, p. 23.

12/ R. N. Carew Hunt, The theory and Practice of Communism (Macmillan, 1951), p. 194.

"An ideological war on a world scale is now being waged with unexampled ferocity... There can be no respite in the ideological war. Any position which we abandon today will not remain empty - tomorrow the enemy will occupy it..."13/

"There can be no breathing space in ideological warfare. On the ideological front, we must and we shall fight not by passive resistance but by an active and unceasing attack on our enemies. This is what the Party of Lenin and Stalin teaches. This is in accordance with our traditions... Let the enemy consider us nasty people. From the mouth of the enemy this is praise. 14/

"The propaganda of the concepts of Marxist-Leninist theory must be conducted in a constant struggle against bourgeois ideology."15/

"Wherever there is relaxation of attention to ideological questions, favorable soil is created for the revival of views and concepts hostile to us."16/

D. Organization of the Communist International Propaganda System

1. Introduction: Global Coordination of Communist Propaganda

The international Communist propaganda program is carefully coordinated. This becomes obvious to anyone who observes the remarkable degree of similarity at any given moment in the "line" being preached by Communists in such widely separated countries as the USSR, Japan, Mexico, France, Sweden, Egypt, Chile, India, or the United States. Although the emphasis may differ according to local conditions, the international themes heard from Moscow are reflected with notable faithfulness by Communists everywhere. When there is a switch or reversal in a given Moscow line, there may be a few lags in the corresponding switch or reversal by Communists

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13/Litraturnaya Gazeta, November 23, 1946.
14/Pravda, November 22, 1946.
15/Bolshevik, No. 5, 1947, p. 7
16/Malenkov, "Report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party," reported in Pravda, October 6, 1952.

elsewhere, but before long most Communists are in step to the new tune. Barghoorn has put it aptly by saying that "inconsistent though the propaganda may be in time, it is usually consistent in space."17/

To achieve such disciplined consistency on a world scale there must be (1) a central directing unit, high enough in the Communist hierarchy to enjoy unquestioned authority; and (2) channels by which the central directing unit can communicate its orders or "line" to the great variety of administrative and operational arms which actually conduct its foreign propaganda.

A discussion of how the Communists' global propaganda effort is organized to achieve such coordination and consistency must begin with the world seat of Communist power, the Soviet Union. It is here that Agitprop, the "brains trust" of Communist propaganda, plans the strategy not only for domestic Soviet propaganda but also for global propaganda. The discussion must also take account of those areas in Eastern Europe and in the Far East which Communism has taken over since World War II, and which now constitute additional centers from which propaganda flows. And finally, it must take account of those organizations whose physical existence is extended beyond the Communist orbit and into the Free World: the foreign Communist parties, the international Communist-front groups, and the Communist "friendship societies."

2. Top Direction and Coordination from the USSR: The "Agitprop"

The central directing unit is the Section of Propaganda and Agitation, or Agitprop, which, since it is an organ of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the USSR, is in the very pinnacle of the hierarchy. The Presidium (known as the Politburo until a change of names in the administrative reorganization of 1953) is the small group which rules the Communist Party of the USSR and, through it, the Government of the USSR and the world Bolshevik network.

Thus, propaganda policies and decisions of the Communists are established at the very highest level. This attests not only to the importance of propaganda operations in the Communist scheme, but also to their recognition of the need for integrating propaganda

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17/Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Ideological Weapon in Soviet Strategy," in The Threat of Soviet Imperialism (C. Grove Haines, ed., (Baltimore, 1954) p. 95.

policy with total policy. The decisions reached by the top Kremlin leaders are obviously taken with propaganda considerations in mind, and "the Party's Central Committee makes the basic policies which guide the entire propaganda organization, "18/ according to Louis Nemzer. The responsibility for implementing top propaganda decisions is then turned over to the Agitprop, a chief section (formerly called "department") of the apparatus of the Central Committee which Nemzer has called "the Kremlin's professional staff."

Agitprop has an elaborate organization with about a dozen sub-sections. There are sections for the Central (Moscow) Press, for the Local (Provincial) Press, for Publishing Houses, for Films, for Radio, for Fictional Literature, for Art Affairs (theatre, music, painting, etc.), for Cultural Enlightenment, for Schools, for Science, for Party Propaganda, for Agitation, (administrative), and for Propaganda (administrative). 19/

As a Party organ, rather than a Government organ, Agitprop for the most part does not itself engage in propaganda operations. Its primary role is that of planner, guide, supervisor, and policeman over the Government agencies which actually do the publishing, filming, broadcasting, etc.

A great part of Agitprop's effort is directed toward the internal propaganda which permeates all aspects of Soviet life. However, it is Agitprop which is also the "brain center" for the foreign propaganda of the Soviet Union. 20/ Agitprop works in coordination with the Foreign Section of the Party Central Committee's Apparatus, which in turn supervises the Government's Foreign Ministry.

The policy directives of Agitprop thus become the working orders of Radio Moscow, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), the International Book Publishing Corporation, the Telegraphic News Agency (TASS), and other communications and cultural media both as to their domestic output and as to their international activities.

18/ "The Kremlin's Professional Staff," American Political Science Review, March, 1950, p. 76.

19/ Ibid., pp. 73-76. See also Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, op. cit., Chapter III.

20/ See Staff Study No. 3, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 2; Alan M. G. Little, "The Soviet Propaganda Machine," Department of State Bulletin, September 3, 1951, p. 368; and Ladislas Farago, "Soviet Propaganda," United Nations World, September 1948, p. 21.

Furthermore, through Agitprop and the Foreign Section of the Central Committee, which oversees the work of the Foreign Ministry and the Cominform, propaganda policy is transmitted to the Soviet Diplomatic Corps around the world, to the network of foreign Communist parties, and to international Communist-front groups such as the World Peace Council. Largely through VOKS, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, propaganda policy is transmitted to the hundreds of foreign "friendship societies" sponsored abroad by the USSR and its satellites. These foreign arms of the Soviet propaganda apparatus of course also take their cue from TASS transmissions and Radio Moscow, which quickly convey any new propaganda line.

3. Soviet International Media Organization and Operations

a. Broadcasting, Publishing, Press, and Motion Pictures. The USSR carries on large-scale operations in international broadcasting, publishing and book distribution, and telegraphic press transmissions. On a somewhat lesser scale, because of production difficulties, it is in the business of motion picture production and distribution abroad.

About the precise organization of some of these activities in the USSR little information is available. Their current operations, together with some information as to their organization, is presented in Chapter IV of this report, entitled "Communist Use of International Media in 1954."

b. Foreign Cultural Relations and Exchange of Persons. On an increasingly impressive scale the USSR is conducting a program of foreign cultural relations, largely through sending delegations abroad and inviting foreign delegations to the USSR.

The organization in Moscow which handles Russia's external cultural relations is the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, generally called VOKS from the initials of its Russian name. 21/ VOKS was established in 1925, ostensibly as a public society. However, official Soviet sources have indicated that it is in actuality an arm of the government and that its operating funds come from the government treasury.

21/For an excellent description of VOKS, reflecting much patient research, see the account by Louis Nemzer in the Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer, 1949, pp. 271-275. The present discussion is based largely on his article.

VOKS is both the planning and operational headquarters for the Soviets' international cultural effort. It has two primary responsibilities: (1) to receive foreign delegations coming to the USSR and see that they form a favorable impression of the culture of Russia; and (2) to send Russian cultural delegations abroad for the purpose of appealing to groups which might be immune to straight propaganda but which will take it in the form of music, ballet, or theatre.

VOKS has a staff of full time regional experts acquainted with the languages and cultural interests of foreign audiences. Press reports have identified an Anglo-American Division, a Slavonic Countries Division, a Scandinavian Countries Section, and an Oriental Division. VOKS has sent its specialists also to the Middle East and to Tehran, where it maintains a House of Culture.

For each field of interest--such as theater or music--VOKS maintains a special committee made up of noted Soviet artists or specialists. For example the Cinema Committee, made up of leading directors, actors, and writers, is concerned with disseminating information abroad on the merits of Soviet films, organizing film exchanges, and arranging for the showing of Soviet films in international festivals. Other committees are maintained in the natural sciences and mathematics, economics, history, literature, theatre, architecture, music, sports etc.

With the advice of these committees, VOKS selects the top-flight artists in ballet, music, or theatre who go abroad to represent the USSR, and arranges for their journeys.

VOKS also cooperates with Soviet youth organizations, women's organizations, "peace" organizations, sports organizations, etc., in arranging delegations for particular purposes.

In the field of sports, for example, it works through the All-Union Committee on Physical Education and Sports. This committee has sections in charge of particular sports such as soccer, swimming, and track,--and also has a section in charge of chess. In coordination with the Central Trade Unions Council, the All-Union Sports Committee directs a hierarchy of similar sports committees which operate at the republic level, the provincial level, and down to the individual city level. Through this mechanism the best athletes are selected and subsidized for entry into international competitions.

VOKS has its own extensive publishing program, issuing a monthly magazine (with beautiful color plates) in several foreign languages, and also a variety of newsletters and bulletins. It arranges exhibits of art and literature for showings abroad.

One of the chief functions of VOKS is to maintain contact with, and give assistance to, the Soviet friendship societies abroad. VOKS is engaged in continuous negotiations with the foreign friendship societies on matters involving the reception of Soviet delegations abroad; arranging their tours and performances; issuing invitations for the friendship societies to send cultural delegations to the Soviet Union; arranging for the activities of such delegations while in the Soviet Union; etc. The foreign Soviet friendship societies are described below.

4. Propaganda Organization in Other Communist Nations

a. The East European Satellites. The satellites have large-scale propaganda programs in international broadcasting, publications, cultural exchanges with foreign countries, etc. The organization in the satellites is generally a minature counterpart of the USSR propaganda organization, though with some local variations. Generally the "People's Democracies" have ministries of propaganda or culture, and have organizations which are the counterparts of VOKS. A proliferation of "friendship societies" with the USSR keep the cultural effort closely tied to the Soviets, and each satellite also maintains numerous "friendship societies" in countries outside of the Communist orbit.

b. Communist China. The Communization of the Chinese mainland has given Communist propaganda activities in the Far East a strong and stabilized base. Communist China conducts a larger propaganda operation in the Far East than does any other Communist nation. /The USSR has a heavy schedule of international broadcasting to the Far East and directs other forms of propaganda to that area as well. The East European satellites do not broadcast to the Far East, but do conduct exchanges of persons programs, occasional exhibits, etc./ Peiping seeks to influence the people in Asia through a wide variety of media, and its propaganda has particular opportunities with the overseas Chinese who constitute large communities in many parts of the Far East.

The Chinese Communist propaganda apparatus operates under the general guidance of the Party's Propaganda Department and of the appropriate ministries of the State Council. There is no propaganda ministry as such. The ministries and commissions which have particular responsibilities in the field of foreign propaganda are those for culture, education, foreign affairs, and overseas Chinese affairs.

Although there may have been administrative changes, until recently the international broadcasting activities came under the Bureau of Radio Broadcasting of the Press Administration, the distribution of publications came under the Publications Administration, and the many activities carried on with overseas Chinese came under the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission.

Close cultural ties with the Soviet Union are maintained through the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society, which claims to have 68 million members, 1955 chapters, and 613, 160 local branches. (These figures were announced on October 6, 1953 at the fourth birthday celebration of the Society.)

c. North Korea. Foreign propaganda of the North Korean Communist regime is almost exclusively by radio. Broadcasts from Radio Pyongyang have closely paralleled the content of Radio Peiping's transmissions on major issues, which seems to indicate close coordination with Peiping.

c. The Viet Minh. The propaganda of the Viet Minh of course plays a crucial role in Indochina. There is a close linkage with the USSR and Communist China, as evidenced by the wide utilization of publications and films from these two countries in the Viet Minh zones of Vietnam. In addition to the clandestine propaganda of the Viet Minh, the "Voice of Vietnam" in Hanoi beams regular transmissions to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Little is known of the organization and administration of these activities.

5. The Role of Foreign Communist Parties in Soviet Propaganda

a. The Comintern. After the successful Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Lenin began to turn his attention to the organization of Bolshevik activities on an international scale. On March 2, 1919 at a meeting in Moscow, he and his associates formed the Third, or Communist, International. /The First International, established by Marx and Engels in 1864, had suffered from internal dissensions

and expired after its 1876 meeting. The Second, or Socialist, International, founded in 1889, was distasteful to Lenin because it had taken on a "reformist" or "gradualist" character, espoused parliamentary methods of reform rather than the violent revolutionary methods advocated by Lenin, and had been badly split over the question of "proper" Socialist policies regarding the World War./

The Third International, or Comintern as it came to be called, was an organization for propagating Bolshevik doctrine internationally for the purpose of bringing about world revolution. Lenin was determined to make the national Communist parties, who comprised the membership of the Comintern, into disciplined revolutionary organizations whose activities would be coordinated through the mechanism of the Comintern.

Lenin immediately made it clear that propaganda was to be one of the chief functions of the Comintern. As he already been noted, his work Left Wing Communism was addressed to these parties, and in that work he said:

> "Every sacrifice must be made, the greatest obstacles must be overcome, in order to carry on agitation and propaganda systematically, perseveringly, persistently, and patiently, precisely in those institutions, societies, and associations - even the most reactionary - to which proletarian or semi-proletarian masses belong."22/

At the Second World Congress of the Comintern, in July and August of 1920, a statement was adopted setting forth the "Twenty-One Conditions for admission of foreign Communist parties into the Comintern. The very first condition related to propaganda, as did some of the others:

> "The Second Congress of the Communist International rules that the conditions for joining the Communist International shall be as follows:

22/ Reprinted in Lenin's Selected Works, International Publishers, New York, 1943, Vol. X, p. 94.

"1. The general propaganda and agitation should bear a really Communist character and should correspond to the program and decisions of the Third International . . .

"Wherever the followers of the Third International have access, and whatever means of propaganda are at their disposal, whether the columns of newspapers, popular meetings, labor unions or cooperatives - it is indispensable for them to denounce the bourgeoisie . . .

"Persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation must be carried on in the Army . . .

"A systematic and regular propaganda is necessary in the rural districts . . .

"The Communist parties should carry on a precise and definite propaganda to induce the workers to refuse to transport any kind of military equipment intended for fighting against the Soviet Republics, and should also by legal or illegal means carry on a propaganda amongst the troops sent against the workers republics . . ."23/

The Comintern began as an organization in which the Russian Communist Party played a leading but not a dominant part, in the sense that the other Communist parties participated in the making of policy. The next step was to transform the Comintern into an instrument of the USSR's foreign policy. This was one of the tasks which Stalin inherited from Lenin (who died in 1924), and, as R. N. Carew Hunt explains, Stalin wasted little time:

"The 6th Congress of 1928 was the last at which any variety of opinion was permitted. In 1929 Stalin's nominees, Molotov, Manuilsky and Kuusinen, assumed control of the Comintern apparatus, and thereafter it became exclusively the instrument of the Russian State. Public discussion played no part in the formulation of the policy of the 7th and last Congress of 1935, which was called to

23/These and other excerpts from the "Twenty-One Conditions" are reprinted in Strength of the International Communist Movement, May 1954, a report printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

explain and publicize a change of policy which had already been decided, and in certain cases put into operation."24/

b. The Underground Communist Network. As already noted, after the U. S. S. R. became allied with the democracies against the Axis Powers, it could hardly maintain the Comintern as an organization openly dedicated to the eventual overthrow of those democracies. Accordingly, in 1943 the Comintern was formally dissolved. However, what was not dissolved was the Communist underground and illigal apparatus which had been created parallel with the Comintern and its national affiliates.

"Ever since the Twenty-One Conditions of the Second Comintern Congress of 1920, all communist parties operating in democratic states have been bound to maintain a clandestine organization, parallel with the legal party which functions normally under the law," writes Hugh Seton-Watson, a leading British authority on the Communist movement. 25/ One of the twenty-one conditions, to quote Seton-Watson again, specified that "in countries where a communist party is permitted by the laws to function legally, it must nevertheless maintain, parallel with the legal organization, a 'clandestine organization capable at the decisive moment of fulfilling its duty towards the revolution.'"26/

One of Lenin's "Theses on Fundamental Tasks of Second Congress" (1920) said in part that "The time has fully matured when it is absolutely necessary for every Communist party systematically to combine legal with illegal work... legal with illegal organization... it is necessary immediately for all legal Communist Parties to form illegal organizations for the purpose of systematically carrying on illegal work, and of fully preparing for the moment when the bourgeoisie resorts to persecution."27/

24/The Theory and Practice of Communism (Macmillan, 1951), p. 180.

25/From Lenin To Malenkov: The History of World Communism (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1953) p. 349.

26/Ibid., pp. 73-74.

27/Lenin's Selected Works, (International Publishers, New York, 1943), Vol. X., p. 172-173.

As for its propaganda aspects, for purposes of conducting propaganda centrally directed from Moscow, the advantages of this dual channel are fairly obvious. Harold Lasswell has described it as "the use of an open channel of propaganda which is closely paralleled by a closed, secret channel. If the upper corridor is closed for reasons of expediency, the basement is kept in operation (as when the Comintern was publicly extinguished in 1943)." 28/

Thus in the period between the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 and the establishment of the Cominform in 1947, a covert network was available to Moscow for communicating to the foreign Communist parties any messages or "lines" which were not appropriate to visible channels such as TASS.

c. The Establishment of the Cominform. By September of 1947 the Communists had decided that an open international organization was again needed, even if on a more limited scale than the Comintern. Delegates from the Communist Parties of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy met in Warsaw to establish the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). The two delegates from the Soviet Union were Zhdanov and Malenkov.

Zhdanov's speech to the conference was a landmark in post-war enunciations of Soviet policy. It accused the "American imperialists" of initiating an "ideological struggle" against the USSR, devoted a lengthy section to "The American Plan for the Enthrallment of Europe," damned the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and accused America of "preparing for new military adventures.

Zhdanov's speech, and the manifesto adopted by the conference, propounded the doctrine of the "two camps" which ever since has been a staple of Communist rhetoric. Zhdanov said:

> "A new alignment of political forces has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct become two major trends in post-war international policy,

28/The Strategy of Soviet Propaganda, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, January 1951, p. 76.

corresponding to the division of the political forces operating on the international arena into two major camps; the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other. The principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the U. S. A. . . . The anti-fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the U. S. S. R. and the new democracies. "29/

The resolution setting up the Cominform included the following explanation:

"The conference states that the absence of connections between Communist parties who have taken part in this conference is in the present situation a serious shortcoming. Experience has shown that such division between Communist parties is incorrect and harmful. The requirement for an exchange of experience and voluntary coordination of actions of the separate parties has become particularly necessary. . . "30/

One of the purposes of the new Cominform was to aid in conducting, for the Soviet side, the "ideological warfare" which it accused the West of starting. The second meeting of the Cominform devoted itself exclusively to problems of press and propaganda activities. 31/

Although only eight national Communist parties are formally members of the Cominform (Yugoslavia withdrew as part of its break with Russia in 1948), it should not be assumed that the influence of the Cominform is confined to those countries. The clearest evidence to the contrary is the fact that the Cominform's weekly journal, called For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy, is published in 18 different languages, including English, German, Spanish, French, Italian, Swedish, Dutch, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and Arabic.

29/Reprinted in The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism (House Document No. 619, 80th Congress, 1948), pp. 216-217.

30/Ibid., p. 208

31/Staff Study No. 3 of the "Hickenlooper Report" (Senate Report No. 406, 83rd Congress, 1953), p. 112.

The first editor of the journal was P. F. Yudin, the USSR's delegate to the second meeting of the Cominform, a professor of Marxist philosophy and the chief editor of the Soviet publishing houses. (Yudin is currently the Soviet ambassador to Peiping.) Yudin's appointment, and the fact that most member parties of the Cominform were the official parties of the Moscow-dominated satellites, made it clear that the Cominform, like its predecessor the Comintern, was to first and foremost an instrument of USSR foreign policy. The Cominform journal, as an authoritative Soviet mouthpiece, carries the Soviet ideological and political line to Communists in all parts of the world. 32/

d. Moscow Training of Foreign Communist Leaders. For many years the Bolsheviks have brought potential Communist leaders from foreign countries to the USSR for indoctrination in Communist theory and tactics. The Moscow-trained foreigners have then returned to their native countries to assume places of importance in the local Communist movements. This process has gone on constantly, still continues, and has been most successful.

On May 18, 1925, in a speech on the fourth anniversary of Moscow's University of the Peoples of the East, Stalin said that students at the University represented not less than fifty nationalities of the Orient.

The Moscow-trained personnel in many cases have now become heads of governments or important political leaders in their own countries. In the Far East, for example, among the present Communist leaders who had training in Russia are Chou En-lai of China, Nam Il of North Korea, and Ho Chi Minh of Indochina. There are countless others.

Many of the leaders of Western Communist parties have had training in the USSR, and a great many of the present political and military leaders in the East European satellites are Moscow trained.

6. International Communist Front Organizations

As part of their effort to conceal the real source and direction of propaganda activities, Communists have established a great many

32/Ibid., p. 113.

"front" organizations which are intended to have no ostensible connection with Moscow or with Communism.

a. Communism in Disguise. These organizations are called "fronts" because their purpose is to mask the fact of Communist sponsorship, so that well-meaning people who normally would not participate in openly Communist-led activities can be drawn into them.

The efforts of such groups to disguise their sponsorship was clearly revealed, for example, in the speech of di Vittorio, president of the World Federation of Trade Unions, at the WFTU's Congress in Vienna in October 1953.

> "The WFTU aims at winning over people of all political beliefs. But if it is to enlist the support of artisans, the middle classes, peasants and intellectuals, it must not be officially labelled Communist or Soviet-run."

In many cases, of course, the mask has now become transparent. The fronts have followed the line of Moscow's foreign policy so closely and so consistently that there is now a fairly general recognition of their true nature. However, many non-Communists continue to participate in these groups, either through blindness as to their true nature, or in the mistaken belief that communism can be used for non-communist purposes.

b. International Organizations. The fronts organized locally by Communists in various countries exist by the hundreds if not the thousands. Some of them are discussed in the area chapters of this study. In addition, however, the Communists have also organized a number of fronts on an international scale. The chief international front organizations are the following:

	Organization	Abbreviation	Headquarters
1.	World Peace Council	WPC	Vienna
2.	World Federation of Trade Unions	WFTU	Vienna
3.	International Union of Students	IUS	Prague
4.	World Federation of Democratic Youth	WFDY	Prague
5.	Women's International Democratic Federation	WIDF	East Berlin

Organization	Abbreviation	Headquarters
6. World Federation of Scientific Workers	WFSW	London
7. International Association of Democratic Lawyers	IADL	Brussels
8. World Federation of Teachers Unions	FISE	Vienna
9. International Organization Journalists	IOJ	Prague
10. International Broadcasting Organization	OIR	Prague
11. International Federation of Resistence Fighters, of Victims and Prisoners of Fascism	FIR	Vienna

c. Interlocking Directorates and Programs. It is not at all unusual for the leadership of one of the international front organizations to be made up in large part of leaders from the other fronts. In other words, there is a system of interlocking directorates. For example, the WPC's Executive Bureau, or governing body, includes senior officers of the WFTU, the WIDF, the WFSW, and the IADL; the president of the WPC, Professor Joliet-Curie, is also president of the WFSW; the president of the WIDF is vice-president of WPC, and so forth.

There is also considerable overlapping of officers in the local affiliates of these various international fronts. An active Communist in a given country may very well be on the governing bureaus of three or four fronts. The same applies to rank and file membership.

"World Congresses" of the WPC or WFTU are attended invariably by representatives of some of the other fronts.

This unity of organization and purpose is clearly reflected in the activities of the various groups. An international meeting of the lawyers' group, for example, spends little time on legal issues but a great deal of time in damning the United States and praising the USSR. An international meeting of the WFTU features in its speeches all of the themes which constitute the current line of the WPC. When the Scientific Workers gather, the attention on science must be shared with an equal attention on politics, and again the same themes are sounded. The primary purpose of all of

these groups is to conduct political propaganda for Communism and the USSR, notwithstanding the ostensible interest in problems of the particular trades and professions.

d. Publications of the International Front Organizations. Many of these international fronts have their own publications, several of which are published in a number of different languages for distribution to countries both in and out of the Communist orbit. The names of the publications and the languages, where known, are as follows:

(1) WPC - Defense de la Paix (Monthly). English, French, German, Russian, and Spanish editions.

(2) WFTU - World Trade Union Movement (Fortnightly), in English, French, German, Russian, Spanish, and five other languages.

(3) IUS - World Student News (Monthly), in English, Russian, French, German, and Spanish editions.

(4) WFDY - World Youth (Monthly), in English, Russian, Spanish, German, Danish, Chinese, Italian, Polish, Hungarian, and Rumanian editions.

(5) WIDF - Women of the World (Monthl y), in English, French, Spanish, German, and Russian editions.

(6) WFSW - Science and Mankind (Twice Yearly), in English, French, Russian, and Chinese editions.

(7) IOJ - Democratic Journalist (Monthly), in English, French, German, Russian, and Spanish editions.

(8) FIR - Resistance Unie (Bimonthly) in French and German editions.

In addition to the above, subordinate organizations, such as the various "trade departments" of the WFTU, have their own international publications in various languages. Many of the organizations issue special bulletins, reports, and resolutions which are

translated into a number of languages for world distribution.

The quality of these publications ranges all the way from mimeographed bulletins to "slick" journals with color printing.

e. Activities of International Fronts in 1954. A discussion of some of the activities of these international front groups in 1954 will be found in Chapter VI of this study.

5. The Communist "Friendship" Societies

Of considerable importance in the Communist world propaganda network are the so-called "friendship" societies outside of the Communist orbit, which have as their ostensible goal the development of peaceful and friendly relations with the USSR and its satellites. Like the "fronts" discussed above, they are designed to reach audiences which would normally be unreceptive to direct Communist propaganda, but which can be influenced by appeals for peace and international cultural relations. While many of these groups use the term "friendship society" in their official titles, others use terms such as "council," "league," or "association" coupled with adjectives such as "friendship" or "cultural."

/The societies with which we are concerned here are those which are dominated by Communists or "fellow-travellers" and which follow the Moscow propaganda line. It should be emphasized that there also exist in the Free World a great variety of non-Communist societies for relations with foreign peoples, including relations with foreign peoples under Communist governments; some of these non-Communist societies are non-political, others are strongly anti-Communist. It should be cautioned that it is not possible to judge from the mere titles of international associations whether they are Communist or anti-Communist, since the Communists have sought to appropriate verbal symbols such as peace, freedom, and democracy while the same symbols continue to be honored and used by anti-Communists. Thus an organization with a title such as "The Committee for Freedom in Bulgonia" might be either Communist or anti-Communist, and its political complexion would have to be determined by knowledge of its connections and activities./

a. History of Communist Friendship Societies. Although a number of Soviet friendship societies existed in foreign countries prior to 1927, it was not until that year that the Communists made a concerted effort to organize them on an international scale and

to intensify their activities. At the Sixth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1927, Kuusinen spoke of the need for building up not only Communist organizations, but also non-Party mass organizatinns which would sympathize with Communist aims and be of use for special purposes. He said:

> "We must create a whole solar system of organizations and small committees around the Communist Party - smaller committees which work under the actual influence of our Party, although not under its mechanical guidance."33/

Also in 1927, on the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, a world congress of friendship societies was convened in Moscow, where delegates from 43 countries formed the International Association of Friends of the Soviet Union (FSU). Through the Comintern, Communist parties around the world were directed to take the lead in organizing and propagandizing for the FSU. An international secretariat was set up by the Communists to direct the work of the various national sections.

Until 1933, the friendship societies were openly Communist and were proud to proclaim their link with Moscow. But in 1933, with Hitler's rise to power and with Moscow's shift to Popular Front tactics, a new line was taken. The heads of the national sections of FSU were called to a world conference and told that they had worked too closely and publicly with the Communist organizations in their areas, and that the activity should strive to take on a non-Party character. Many of the national sections were not able to handle this reversal effectively. By 1941 most national sections were dissolved or dormant, and the International Secretariat had disappeared.

However, during the period of the wartime alliance with Russia, the friendship societies bloomed and prospered again. By 1946 Radio Moscow could claim that there were Soviet friendship societies in some sixty countries. And following Russia's conquest of the Eastern European countries, there came also a multiplying proliferation of satellite friendship societies. Thus, in many a free-world country today, there exists not only a USSR friendship society, but also Communist-oriented friendship societies with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Communist China, etc.

In England, for example, the following are all identified as Communist fronts:

33/Quoted in Nemzer, "The Soviet Friendship Societies, op. cit., p. 266. The historical discussion here is based largely on Nemzer's excellent analysis.

The Britain-China Friendship Association
The British Council for German Democracy
The British-Czech Friendship League
The British-Polish Friendship Society
The British-Rumanian Friendship Association
The Committee for Friendship with Bulgaria
The British-Yugoslav Association (Anti-Tito)
The Scottish-USSR Society

To choose another country as an example, in Chile the following groups operate:

The Chilean-Czechoslavakian Cultural Institute
The Chilean-Hungarian Cultural Center
The Center of Friends of Poland
The Chilean-Rumanian Cultural Center
The Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute
The Chilean Committee of Friends of the Soviet Union
The Chilean-Soviet Cultural Institute

From all of this it appears that the "whole solar system of organizations and small committees around the Communist Party" which Kuusinen proposed in 1927 has today certainly become a reality.

b. Present Role of the Soviet Friendship Societies in the Satellites. Within the Soviet orbit the friendship societies are a chief means of cementing the satellites to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Friendship Society in each of the other Communist states is large and active. To take an example from Eastern Europe, in Rumania the Rumanian-Soviet Society (ARLUS) in 1948 had 12,000 branches and 1,500,000 active supporters, according to Moscow claims. Even more impressive are the figures for Communist China, where the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society claims to have 68 million members, 1955 chapters, and 613,160 local branches. (These figures were announced on October 6, 1953 at the fourth birthday celebration of the Society.)

The Soviet friendship societies in the satellites hold national congresses, conduct annual "friendship weeks," maintain bi-national cultural centers and libraries, publish journals, and sponsor radio programs. Through VOKS and its branches they arrange the details of cultural exchanges with the USSR, of visits from Soviet citizens to the satellites, and of visits from satellite citizens to the Soviet Union. In all of these activities they sing the praise of the USSR and glorify the ties that bind the Communist states together.

c. Present Role of Communist Friendship Societies in the Free World. The friendship societies in the Free World remain important and influential instruments of propaganda, particularly in neutralist countires or in countries whose governments do not follow firm anti-Communist policies. A decline in the membership of USSR friendship societies, since about 1946, has been offset by the mushrooming of friendship societies with Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania, China, etc. as these areas came under Communist domination.

Probably the strength, membership, and influence of the USSR friendship societies in non-Communist countries reached a high point in 1945 and 1946. After 1946, as tensions developed between the Soviets and the Free World, the foreign friendship societies ran into difficulties. During the wartime alliance with Russia their appeal was great. But with the beginning of post-war animosities, they took the USSR side on international issues and became increasingly vocal in their opposition to Free World policies. As it became increasingly apparent that their first loyalty was to the USSR and to world Communism, they lost the backing of non-Communist elements which previously had provided a large part of their membership and support. Revealed as instruments of the Soviet Union's foreign policy, their membership shrank to a relatively small core of Communists and fellow-travellers.

Offsetting this development, at least in part, the number of Communist-satellite societies in the Free World was greatly multiplied as China and the nations of Eastern Europe became Communized and each established its own chain of overseas friendship societies.

In addition to maintaining bi-national cultural centers, showing films, conducting exhibits, and publishing cultural news bulletins, the friendship societies in the Free World constitute the most generally used link with VOKS and its satellite counterparts. As such, they select many of the delegations which make pilgrimages to Communist countries and, upon their return, publicize whatever favorable impressions the visitors may have gained. Since most of the delegates are picked because of their known susceptibilities to Communist appeals, upon their return it is easy to publish glowing "eye witness accounts" of the wonders of the Soviet Union, the East European satellites, or Communist China. When occasionally a visitor returns with less enthusiasm for what he has seen, the local friendship society

publicists have been known to distort his report or to embellish it with their own ideas. Often these reports are "slick" publications with pictures, sometimes published in more than one language.

In many cases the friendship societies publish journals such as France-USSR in France, and the monthly Iscus, published in India by the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society.

The operations of friendship societies in particular countries are discussed in the area chapters of this study. The exchange of cultural and other delegations during 1954, in which they played a part, is discussed in Chapter V.

III. NOTES ON THE VOLUME AND EXPENDITURES OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

HIGH LIGHTS

The total volume of Communist propaganda is massive, and almost impossible to measure. All Communist operations, foreign and domestic, are saturated with propaganda.

The volume of propaganda from Communist nations went up during 1954. Communist international broadcasting was increased by 98 hours per week to an all-time high. The number of delegations travelling to and from Iron Curtain countries was almost doubled over 1953. Communist film production and film distribution were increased.

The production and distribution of Communist books, pamphlets periodicals, and newspapers remained at a high level. TASS, the Soviet international news agency, was the major source of international news for roughly one-third of the world's population.

During 1953 Communist nations are estimated to have spent over three billion dollars on propaganda, both internal and external. This total was probably exceeded during 1954, as indicated by increases in broadcasting, film production, and cultural exchange.

Additional sums are spent by international Communist fronts, by the Cominform and the national Communist parties, and by the great variety of local Communist front groups.

Out of a fanatical devotion to the cause, hundreds of thousands of local Communists in Free World countries devote much of their time to propaganda without being paid. This kind of personal effort, which is of great significance in the total Communist propaganda picture, cannot be reckoned in terms of dollar equivalents.

Communist expenditures (on propaganda and other activities) have been estimated at $150,000,000 per year in France, at from $40,000,000 to $48,000,000 per year in Italy, and at $500,000 per year in Great Britain. East Germany's propaganda directed to West Germans is estimated to cost $30,000,000 per year, and the propaganda budget of the Communist Party of India has been estimated to run as high as $2,000,000 per month.

III. NOTES ON THE VOLUME AND EXPENDITURES OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

A. The Volume of Communist Propaganda

No one who observes the Cold War for any length of time can fail to be impressed by the tremendous volume of Communist propaganda. As the preceding chapter has emphasized, the Communists have constructed a worldwide propaganda network which is so vast and intricate that it is hard to comprehend.

Internally, the Communist nations constantly use propaganda as a means of political control. Wherever he goes and whatever he does, the citizen of a Communist state is assailed by incessant propaganda. The propaganda-saturated operations of the monolithic party and state, where all things are interpreted, explained, or justified by reference to a standardized ideology, are in such contrast to the tradition and experience of free countries that it is difficult for the 'unconditioned' to fully comprehend the extent, diversity and intensity of the propaganda operation.

The same emphasis on propaganda extends to Communist activities outside of the countries they dominate. No area of the Free World is overlooked in the flood of propaganda which pours out of Communist states and Communist international organizations by radio, printed material, films, and human carriers, and which is supplemente locally by the activities of native Communist parties, front groups, and friendship societies. For some of these latter organizations, particularly the network of local Communist parties and front groups, there is no Free World counterpart. For others Free World counterparts do exist, but they lack the cohesion and singleness of purpose which mark the Communist effort.

Quantitative measurements are available concerning some aspects of Communist propaganda activities which are discussed particularly in Chapter V of this study. Most striking among them are the following:

(1) At the end of 1954 Communist radio stations, official and clandestine, were broadcasting 1675 hours per week of international transmissions. There has been a steady and continuous growth in Communist international broadcasting since 1948, when the comparable figure was 528 hours per week.

(2) In addition to the above voice broadcasting, the Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) broadcasts in Morse code or radio teletype in Russian, French, German, Spanish, and English for a total of 121 hours daily. According to a recent UNESCO report, TASS is the chief source of world news in an area which embraces 745,396,000 people, or 30.9 per cent of the world's population.

(3) During 1954 at least 683 delegations entered the USSR and at least 363 delegations went from the USSR to other countries. The overall number of delegations to and from the USSR had jumped an estimated 60 per cent between 1950 and 1953, and the number in 1954 almost doubled that of 1953. The average size of the delegations is estimated to be from 15 to 20 persons.

(4) According to a TASS review of December 31, 1954, the USSR is exchanging scientific literature with research establishments in 84 countries, and during 1954 the USSR sent more than 350,000 copies of books and periodicals abroad under these exchange arrangements alone.

(5) The Soviets have not released figures on the total distribution of their publications abroad since 1937. In that year, it was announced that the USSR had distributed abroad 11 million newspapers, 3.5 million books, and one million magazines. A very conservative estimate is that the present amounts are greater.

(6) Communist films have been achieving increasing success in international competitions. Entries from Communist Czechoslovakia won five out of the eight grand prizes at the Montevideo Festival of Documentary and Experimental Films in 1954.

It is a virtual impossibility to measure the total volume of Communist propaganda directed at the Free World. The Soviets and other Communist governments do not publish current data on many aspects of their propaganda program, and even the figures available must be used with caution in the absence of independent corroboration. Whereas the hours of propaganda broadcasting are susceptible to precise measurement, activities in most other media -- such as press, libraries, and cultural exchange -- can be measured

only roughly at best. The activities of Communist nations, Communist local parties, and national and international front groups in these media are too voluminous and widespread to permit any ready counting in terms of number of products or number of man-hours expended.

In addition, every individual Communist is a propagandist. In almost every country of the Free World there are local Communists, few in number in some countries but running up into the thousands in most countries and even into the millions in Italy and France. These individuals, out of a fanatical devotion to the cause, give much of their time free of charge to party and front activities. It is impossible to measure their efforts in terms of dollar equivalents, yet in the aggregate they constitute one of the most formidable weapons in the Communist propaganda arsenal.

B. Estimates of Communist Propaganda Expenditures

1. Difficulty of Calculating Expenditures

The factors noted above apply even more strongly in any attempt to estimate Communist propaganda expenditures, and there is the added problem of trying to find comparable monetary terms. Thus even if a sound estimate of Soviet expenditures is possible in terms of rubles, it is difficult to translate this into a dollar equivalent. The official rate of exchange is one thing, the unofficial rate is another, and the comparable purchasing power or "real value" of the two currencies is still another.

Among the Communist states, only Communist China includes in its published budget an item labelled for propaganda and education. The other Communist budgets offer almost no clue as to propaganda expenditures, so that an estimate must be built from the ground up, by estimating activities and then estimating costs. (This has been done in the past on the USSR and the East European satellites. See the tables below.)

The next step, of determining what proportion of the propaganda budget is devoted to internal propaganda and what proportion to external propaganda, is extremely difficult. (The published budget of Communist China mentionned above does not provide such a breakdown.) External propaganda of Communist Governments in the form of broadcasts or publications in foreign languages can be fairly well distinguishe from strictly domestic activities. However, in other categories such as film production, TASS activities, publishing, and propaganda training

an attempt to segregate expenditures devoted to external and internal propaganda becomes largely guess work. Accordingly, an estimate presenting a total breakdown of propaganda costs in the internal and external categories is hardly possible.

Even if the budgets of all Communist nations for external propaganda could be determined, less than half of the ground would be covered. There would remain the expenditures of the important World Peace Council, World Federation of Trade Unions, and other international Communist fronts; the expenditures of the Cominform and the national Communist parties; and the expenditures of the proliferation of focal front groups, friendship societies as well as the individuals who devote the bulk of their time to propaganda activities.

2. Estimates of Propaganda Expenditures by Communist Countries

Within the limitations noted above, analysts in the past have prepared estimates on overall propaganda expenditures of the Soviet Union and the East European satellites. The last such estimate covered the year 1953, in which it was estimated that the USSR spent $1,167,200,000 and the satellites spent $529,000,000 on direct propaganda activities. (See the tables below.) The propaganda figure of $1,500,000,000 in the budget of Communist China brought the total estimated 1953 budget of the Communist nations for direct propaganda to $3,196,200,000.

The 1953 estimate emphasized that since many other Communist activities are undertaken which are either wholly or in part for propaganda purposes, the addition of these indirect expenditures would raise the total considerably. As noted above, not all of the items in the 1953 estimates are identifiable as expenditures for external propaganda as distinct from internal propaganda. Accordingly, no estimate on the total of USSR and Satellite expenditures for purely external propaganda was attempted.

No comparable estimate for the USSR and the East European satellites has been prepared for 1954. However, the 1953 level of operations certainly has been maintained; and the continuous upward trend of Communist propaganda activities throughout the postwar years, coupled with the substantial increases during 1954 in Communist international broadcasting, film production, and exchange of persons programs, would seem to indicate that the level of expenditures was slightly greater in 1954 than in 1953.

Communist China currently allocates about $1,500,000,000 of its national budget for propaganda and education.

ESTIMATED SOVIET EXPENDITURES FOR PROPAGANDA, 1953
(in million dollars)

		Itemized	Percent	Subtotal	Percent
I.	Printed Propaganda Material				
	(a) Books and pamphlets (domestic)	50.9	4.4	87.3	7.4
	(b) Newspapers (major only)[1]	34.0	2.8		
	(c) Special propagnada publications for distribution abroad	2.4	.2		
II.	Oral Propaganda				
	(a) Full-time propagandists[2]	337.5	29.0	788.6	67.7
	(b) Part-time propagandists[3]	394.9	34.0		
	(c) Propagandists in training	56.2	4.7		
III.	Radio Propaganda Beamed Abroad[4]	233.0	20.0	233.0	20.0
IV.	Maintainance of TASS	13.5	1.2	13.5	1.2
V.	Use of Films	6.0	.4	6.0	.4
VI.	Cultural Relations, Visitors to and from the USSR	38.8	3.3	38.8	3.3
		1,167.2	100	1,167.2	100

1. *Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, and *Trud*.

2. 375,000 full-time propagandists with an average annual wage of 9,000 rubles.

3. 2,100,000 workers.

4. Does not include expense for jamming incoming foreign broadcasts.

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES IN EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE COUNTRIES, 1953
(in million dollars)

Country	Amount
Albania	12
Bulgaria	38
Czechoslovakia	110
Hungary	73
Poland	200
Rumania	96
TOTAL	529

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3. Estimates of Communist Propaganda Expenditures in Free World Countries

A few estimates have been prepared by various authorities on Communist expenditures in particular countries.

The Italian Government has estimated that the Italian Communist Party has an annual budget of between $40 million and $48 million. This covers all activities of the Party, but in a country like Italy most Communist expenditures are for either direct propaganda or propaganda-related political activities.

A recent estimate by the National Committee for a Free Europe places in "calculable expenditures by and for the Communist Party of Great Britain and its causes" at $500,000 per year, and labels this as a conservative estimate. Again, it can be assumed that the bulk of this outlay is for propaganda and propaganda-related political activity.

It has been estimated that in France a sum of about $150,000,000 per year is spent by the Communists, with $30,000,000 coming from Communist nations and the balance raised by the local Communist Party and its front organizations. 1/

Western officials in Bonn recently estimated that Communist East Germany is spending more than $30,000,000 per year on propaganda designed to influence West Germany. 2/

A writer in Organiser, an Indian publication, has estimated that the propaganda budget of the Communist Party of India runs up to $2,000,000 per month.

1/Overseas Information Programs of the United States, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report No. 406, 1953, p. 114.)

2/Reported in the New York Herald Tribune, January 31, 1955.

IV. THEMES OF COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA IN 1954

HIGH LIGHTS

The cold war was intense during 1954, but fears of a "hot war" were somewhat abated. It was above all a year of international conferences, with Communist propaganda brought to bear heavily in support of Communist diplomacy at the conference table.

"Peaceful Russia, Warlike America" was a strongly emphasized theme. Soviet propaganda sought to picture the USSR as a nation seeking the "relaxation of international tensions," while picturing the United States as bent on obstructing peaceful settlements.

"Peaceful coexistence" slogans received renewed emphasis in Communist propaganda, and after July took on the proportions of a major campaign.

The "carrot and stick" technique was used by both the USSR and Communist China, however. Coupled with the blandishments which appealed to the world's hope for peace, there were threats which appealed to the world's fear of war. Moscow rattled the atom bomb and Peiping repeatedly threatened to attack Formosa. These continued threats, continued vilification of the United States, and the reiteration of the "two camps" doctrine in an official Soviet text book made it clear that any conceivable "coexistence" would still be marked by hostility and intensive rivalry.

The United States was singled out for the Communists' most violent and abusive propaganda, as usual, in the Communist effort to split the United States from her allies.

In colonial and underdeveloped areas, Communist propaganda continued to blame all difficulties on "Western imperialism," and exploited nationalist aspirations by picturing Communism as a liberating movement.

In areas populated by colored peoples, Communist propaganda suffered a severe blow to one of its most cherished themes when the U. S. Supreme Court outlawed racial segregation in U. S. public schools.

Every defensive measure by the free countries was the subject of sustained Communist propaganda. The Western European defense system, the rearming of West Germany, the Manila Pact, and the anti-Communist rebellion in Guatemala were all bitterly attacked.

IV. THEMES OF COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA IN 1954

A. Cold War Background, 1954

The year 1954 was one in which the cold war was intense, but in which fears of a "hot war" were somewhat quieted. It was above all a year of international conferences in which both sides sought to coordinate the instruments of diplomacy and propaganda.

In Western Europe, the year's issues centered around the problem of Germany and the attempt to build an integrated Western defense. The Berlin Conference got nowhere on questions of German unification and an Austrian peace treaty. Western moves to integrate West Germany into the European Defense system appeared to have collapsed when the French rejected EDC on August 30, but succeeded just before the year's end when the French National Assembly approved treaties admitting a rearmed West German Republic into the North Atlantic Alliance. Moscow fought these moves bitterly, threatened that they would bring dire consequences, and announced its intention to form a united military bloc of its own with the East European satellites.

In the Far East, the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the Indochina Truce were the biggest single news events, and an intensification of Communist techniques of penetration appeared likely in Southeast Asia. On September 8 the United States and seven other nations meeting at Manila signed a pact for the defense of Southeast Asia. At the beginning of the year in Korea, war prisoners from both sides who had refused repatriation were released, and the truce continued. Attempts toward a political settlement for Korea failed at the Geneva Conference. The "vest-pocket" war between Nationalist and Communist China continued sporadically in the Formosa Straits, and was viewed by many as a potential tinder-box, particularly in view of Peiping's reiterated threats to "liberate" Formosa. The US formalized its commitment to Nationalist China by signing a defense pact with Chiang Kai-shek. In Japan, where strong political pressures were building up in favor of trade with the Communists, the newly installed conservative government seemed quite interested in Communist overtures for normalization of Japan's relations with the USSR and Communist China.

In Latin America, the chief news concerned the successful revolution against the Communist-dominated Arbenz Government. This removed a Communist "beachhead" in the American hemisphere, but Communist propaganda on the event scored a success as many non-Communist newspapers seemed to swallow the Soviet version of developments. The other major occurrence in this area was the holding of the Rio Conference, where delegates of the American republics met to discuss primarily trade and economic problems.

In the Mediterranean and Near East areas, three long-festering problems which had troubled the West were resolved: a pact was signed for partitioning the Trieste area, settling the dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia; Britain and Iran reached agreement on the Iranian oil issue; and Egypt and Britain signed an agreement for British evacuation of the Suez canal zone. Yugoslavia signed a mutual defense pact with Greece and Turkey, but also seemed somewhat amenable to appeals which the Soviets made for reestablishment of friendly relations with the USSR. There was little change in the deep-seated animosity between Israel and the Arab States.

"Neutral" nations generally became more confident of their position and more assertive of their independence from both power blocs. This was dramatized by the meeting in New Delhi between Tito and Nehru, and at year's end when the Colombo Powers met and convoked a 30-nation Afro-Asian Conference to be held in April, 1955.

"Peaceful coexistence" talk was increased by the Communists beginning in July, and it remained a major campaign throughout the year. Western commentators speculated that the USSR might really want a breathing spell, but few regarded the Soviet move as more than a temporary maneuver. Continuing threats from Russian and Red China, continuing vilification of the United States, and the publication of an official Soviet textbook which reiterated the Communist post-war doctrine of "the two camps" made it clear that any new developments in the already prevailing "coexistence" would be marked by continuing rivalry and hostility, even in the absence of military conflict.

The year did end, however, on a peaceful note. On December 31, John Foster Dulles declared that "the danger of general war recedes," and Marshal Voroshilov said in a Moscow broadcast that he believed 1955 would be a year of peace.

B. The Global Themes of Communist Propaganda in 1954

The objectives and themes of Communist propaganda in particular regions and countries are described in the area chapters of this study. However, certain propaganda objectives were obviously held by Communists everywhere, and certain propaganda themes had global currency.

The general objectives of Communist propaganda in 1954 underwent no basic change from those made obvious earlier in the cold war. The chief goal of Communist propaganda is to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, isolating the United States and destroying Western unity. Communist propaganda seeks to pave the way for Communist conquest in vulnerable areas. In areas where Communist take-over is impossible in the short run, Communist propaganda seeks to create neutralism and anti-American sentiment.

In support of these objectives, Communists everywhere made use of certain common themes in 1954: (1) the Communist nations seek peaceful settlements of international issues and a relaxation of tensions; (2) the Western nations, and particularly the United States, seek to block such settlements; (3) the troubles of colonial and underdeveloped areas are all caused by Western "imperialism"; (4) such areas can free themselves of "imperialism" and realize their nationalist aspirations if they will follow Communism; (5) since a war with super-weapons would wreak terrible devastation, we should "ban the bomb"; (6) the Communist nations are mighty and, in the event of war, could strike with great force.

Thus, the Communists redefined every issue of international life as a conflict between the Communist "camp of peace" and the Western "camp of imperialism." By blandishments they appealed to the world's hope for peace, and by threats they appealed to the world's fear of war. Beginning in July a strategic shift became noticeable as Communist propagandists, led by Moscow, placed greater and greater emphasis on the possibility of "peaceful coexistence."

Toward its goal of isolating the United States, Communist propaganda takes a "harder" line against the United States than against other free countries. The "hard" line seeks to create an image of the United States as a nation of "decadent capitalism" dominated by Wall Street, a nation of "imperialists," a nation

of "warmongers," a nation using its power to "dominate" and "exploit" smaller and weaker states, a nation which is bent on "world conquest" and therefore seeks to block peaceful settlements. The most violent and abusive language is always reserved for the United States, and United States leaders are singled out for particular vituperation. Even when Communist propaganda attacks other governments of the Free World, it generally includes the anti-American theme by explaining in the same breath that such nations are "puppets" or "lackeys" of the United States.

Many voices were heard in the chorus of Communist international propaganda, but the loudest were those of Moscow and Peiping. Both used the "carrot and stick" technique. Moscow offered the carrot of "peaceful coexistence," but waved the stick of Russia's armed might and the devastations which nuclear war would bring. Peiping spoke alluringly to Asians, but in 1954 was even more truculent than usual toward the United States.

C. Moscow's Propaganda in 1954

1. General Themes

Apart from propaganda related to specific situations and events, the general aim of Moscow's recent propaganda has been to portray Russia, now that Stalin is dead, as a nation seeking peace and the relaxation of tensions, and to portray the United States as a nation bent on obstructing peaceful settlements. Concurrently, Moscow threats have exploited the general fear of war. This propaganda has been dominated by three interrelated themes:

a. "Peaceful Russia, Warlike America" Since Stalin's death in March 1953 the Kremlin rulers generally have employed a more subtle and perhaps more effective strategy of seeking to clothe their plans and actions with the outward appearance of sweet reasonableness. They have made numerous minor diplomatic concessions. They have joined United Nations affiliates such as UNESCO and the ILO. By making trade overtures, the USSR has sought to picture itself as an advocate of normal economic relations between nations. By increasing the travel -- particularly of trade and "cultural" delegations -- between Communist and Free World countries, they have sought to rid the USSR of the "Iron Curtain" onus. In numerous countries the local Communist have sought "united fronts" with democratic

parties, instead of the previous belligerency toward such parties. Thus through "propaganda of the deed" the Communist gestures have sought to create the picture of a peaceful Russia. Verbal propaganda by all media has been coordinated with these efforts, employing slogans such as the "camp of peace," "peaceful coexistence," and "ban the bomb."

By contrast, the Soviets seek to create an image of the United States and its leaders as "imperialists," "warmongers," and "Wall Street lackeys" who seek to exacerbate international tensions and to block efforts toward peaceful settlements. Particularly in commentaries concurrent with the Berlin Conference, the Geneva Conference, and the Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly, the USSR coordinated its propaganda with its diplomacy and sought to place on the United States the onus for all international tensions.

b. "Peaceful Coexistence" Realizing that fear of Soviet aggression provides the impetus and rationale behind Western collective security measures and the major obstacle to Soviet proposals, Moscow made what appeared to be an even more concentrated effort than in previous years to reassure Western public opinion concerning its intentions. This effort took the familiar form of emphasizing Soviet belief in the "possibility of coexistence."

"A further easing of international tensions" was established in January 1954 as the major goal of Soviet policy for the year. Subsequent developments were interpreted in the light of this objective. Beginning in July, developments began increasingly to be measured in Soviet propaganda by the yardstick of their contribution to "peaceful coexistence." Moscow centered its attack throughout the year on the "vicious theory of peace through a 'policy of positions of strength,' " said to be the foundation of Western policy.

c. Soviet Propaganda Threats The Soviet leaders appeared to believe that, as a result of their acquisition of the hydrogen bomb, they were in a better position than previously to paralyze Western action and make a mockery of this "policy of strength" by playing on the popular dread of war. The accidental fall-out in connection with the US hydrogen bomb test at Bikini in March dramatized such fears. The two peak periods of Soviet threats occurred in the early weeks of the Geneva Conference,

when US intervention in Indo-China appeared possible, and at the end of the year just prior to the French Assembly vote on German rearmament.

These threats took several forms: the Soviet press and radio played up the total devastation of modern war generally in the context of the dangers which war posed to the US and its allies; Moscow sought particularly to stress its ability to retaliate against any attacks; and by successive stages Moscow merged the two scare themes of nuclear devastation and German revanchism. Molotov's warnings of Soviet counter-measures if German rearmament occurred fell into this same category. The moral which Moscow preached was that Western force only provokes greater resistance, not peace.

2. Soviet Propaganda in Support of Diplomacy

a. The Berlin Conference As January 25, the date for the convening of the Berlin Conference, neared Soviet comment increased in volume. Generalizations regarding the "need to reduce international tensions" were repeated, but reported Western solutions continued to be uniformly attacked and the Western powers, particularly the US, were accused of intentions to "torpedo" the conference. There was continued insistence on the need for eliminating the Western defense system and the substitution of a "European solution" based on "friendly cooperation" between East and West Europe.

With the conference under way, Communist propaganda concentrated on (1) claiming credit for procedural agreements and (2) preparing to blame the West for lack of agreement. Extensive coverage centered on Molotov's statement alleging that there had been favorable Western press reaction to his presentation of "a program that might really insure a relaxation of international tension and consolidate peace." Opening Western statements were reported in such a way as to make it appear that the West aimed to cling to old unacceptable positions and thus to block progress.

Soviet bloc propaganda adhered closely to Molotov's statements at the conference table. Western agreement to the Soviet-proposed agenda was pictured as the result of popular pressure and French-British pressure on the US. Soviet "initiative" regarding a five-power conference and a world

disarmament conference was claimed to have placed US diplomacy in "difficulties." The charge that the US was seeking to "torpedo" the conference became muted. However, a basis for revival of such charges was provided in continued descriptions of US "intransigeance" toward Soviet proposals and the "ganging up" of the Western ministers against the USSR under US pressure.

As the third week of the conference commenced and it appeared that the Soviet Union might be preparing to break off discussions, Soviet propaganda revived its stress on alleged Western, particularly US, plans to disrupt the negotiations.

With the end of the conference, Soviet propaganda treated the results in terms of a gain for the Soviet policy of "easing tension." The US was said to have failed in its attempt to disrupt the meeting. Agreement on a Far Eastern Conference in Geneva in April was handled by "explaining" that the Western Powers, under pressure of public opinion, were unable to turn down "completely" the Soviet proposal for a five-power conference.

b. The Geneva Conference With the Berlin Conference out of the way, the Communist propaganda apparatus began to concentrate on the Geneva Conference. This ran a period from the middle of February through June, with the heaviest propaganda treatment beginning in mid April.

While Moscow skirted around the direct claim that the Geneva Conference represented a "five power conference," the satellite press gave it that name. It was evident that the Communists planned to use the conference as a sounding board for their general charge of US "intervention in Asia." Also, from the start, Korea was played down in favor of the Indochina issue. It was charged that the US was increasing its active participation in the Indochina conflict deliberately to forestall a peaceful solution there.

Moscow used a WPC resolution of March 31 as a definitive statement of the Communist position regarding issues to be brought up at Geneva. The resolution was printed in Pravda on April 1 and subsequently was given extensive dissemination by both Moscow and Peiping.

Emphasis on alleged US aggressive intentions in Indochina and elsewhere in Asia was juxtaposed with charges that the US was

seeking to prevent a successful conference at Geneva. Soviet propaganda increasingly pictured the conference as representing a conflict between the United States, as the number one colonial power, against the "inevitable" forces of nationalism and anti-colonialism in Asia purportedly represented by the Communists.

As the conference opened, the tenor of Soviet propaganda was one of boastful confidence and strength. Heavy Communist coverage interpreted the first week of the conference as a Communist triumph and Secretary Dulles' departure as an "admission of failure" of US diplomacy. Soviet propaganda on Secretary Dulles' May 7 speech emphasized again that the US had suffered a "very serious and important" defeat at the conference, but had not given up its "plans" to thwart the conference.

Communist propaganda claimed credit for the "initial success" of the Geneva Conference in reaching agreement on May 29 to submit the problem of regrouping areas, beginning with Vietnam, to bilateral discussions between the belligerents which started on June 1. On Korea, the Communists continued to call their proposals the only constructive ones and increasingly warned that the US was seeking to break off talks.

Soviet propaganda interpreted Secretary Dulles' speech of June 11 as evidence that "open military intervention" by the US immediately in Indochina was "unlikely." At the same time, Soviet propagandists warned that the US still sought to prevent any agreement at Geneva.

The breaking off of discussions on Korea on June 15 was followed by a Communist propaganda barrage putting primary blame on the US. For the first time since the Geneva Conference began, Radio Moscow devoted more attention to Korea than to Indochina. Communist propaganda refused to recognize the finality of the breakoff on Korea, and with the rise of Mendes-France it became sanguine about prospects for an Indochina settlement.

During July, in the last phase of the negotiations over Indochina, the Communists portrayed the US as the main obstacle to progress and sought to promote Allied disunity. Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda indicated a certain degree of discomfiture with Secretary Dulles' visit to Paris on July 13 and the subsequent US decision to send Undersecretary Smith as the

principal US delegate in the closing days of the conference. Moscow was quick to exploit the Indochina settlement as a victory for the "forces of peace" and a "serious defeat" for the US.

c. UN General Assembly At the Ninth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviets again sought to use the UN as a forum for their standard propaganda lines. However, in general they found themselves on the propaganda defensive and suffered some notable defeats.

On September 30 Vyshinsky introduced a resolution for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, substantial reduction in armaments, and the establishment of international controls to enforce such measures. Soviet media supported this resolution with much fanfare. However, since the most newsworthy feature of the Soviet resolution was its hint that the Soviets might belatedly accept provisions for which the West had long argued, its immediate propaganda advantages to the Communists were debatable. As part of the general Communist stress on the "peaceful coexistence" theme, it undoubtedly had some impact.

The United States, joined by six other nations, offered a resolution calling for the establishment of an international agency to promote peaceful uses of the atom. During the previous year, extensive publicity for President Eisenhower's "atoms for peace" proposal in the 8th General Assembly had created a tide of world opinion favoring such a step. Accordingly, although the Russians haggled, they grudgingly conceded. Then the UNGA voted unanimously for conferences looking toward the establishment of such a body.

The Soviets suffered another defeat when the Czech resolution against "international war propaganda" was vigorously attacked by the United States and then amended over the protests of the Soviet bloc. The amended version, sponsored by the West, was passed by an overwhelming majority in the Assembly's final vote.

Another Communist resolution attacking alleged United States "piracy" in the China Seas, offered purely for propaganda purposes, met so much opposition that Soviet delegate Sobolev finally withdrew it.

Despite these voting setbacks in the UN, Communist international propaganda media of course continued to pound away at the same themes.

Near the year's end, in the case of the resolution seeking release of the United States airmen held captive in Red China, neither side could claim a clear-cut propaganda victory. The United States had the moral victory and the satisfaction of seeing the resolution passed. But Communist China had the satisfaction of seeing the Secretary General of the world's international organ, which they had long tried to enter, journeying to their doorstep to negotiate with them.

3. Other Highlights of Soviet Propaganda in 1954

a. European Security, Soviet Style. As one tactic in its opposition to the integration of West Germany into a Western European defense system, the USSR offered its own ideas of a security system. First, Molotov proposed at the Berlin Conference that such a system be constructed without the United States. Later a Soviet note to the Western powers proposed that the USSR be admitted to membership in NATO. In other notes, the Soviets again advanced the notion of their own participation in a security arrangement. On November 13 the USSR issued invitations to all 23 European nations, the United States, and Communist China to attend an all-European security conference in Moscow. The meeting opened on November 29, but all of the Western countries had declined to attend. Moscow's notes and gestures in this gambit were well publicized by all propaganda media.

b. German Militarism. In its efforts to prevent the rearming of Germany, Soviet propaganda repeatedly called forth the vision of a new Wehrmacht. This theme, of course, was designed especially to exploit French fears.

c. "The Five Principles." Beginning in July, the Soviet press began to stress the "five principles" for international peace originally promulgated at the meeting between Chou En-lai and Nehru. Soviet broadcasts took up the theme and repeated some of the press commentary. (For an enumeration of the "five principles," see the discussion of Communist China's propaganda themes on Page IV- 14.

d. Guatemala. Soviet propaganda pictured the anti-Communist Guatemala rebellion as an "invasion" of Guatemala by "mercenaries" of the United States and the United Fruit Company, and achieved some success in that numerous moderate and conservative papers adopted the same analysis. The Soviets' treatment of this subject was particularly intensive, with Radio Moscow broadcasting more than 300 commentaries on Guatemala from June 18 through June 27.

e. SEATO Soviet propagandists strongly attacked the Manila Pact for the defense of Southeast Asia. The United States was accused of forming a new "aggressive bloc." Much was made of the fact that the heavily populated states of India and Indonesia took no part in the alliance, whereas the population of the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan (which did participate) constitutes less than one-fifth the population of Southeast Asia.

f. East-West Trade. Throughout the year Moscow continued to point to the alleged advantages of trade with the Soviet Union, and said that trading nations could not rely on "the unstable American market." As part of the trade promotion program, the USSR and her satellites participated heavily in international trade fairs. (For a listing of trade fairs in 1954 with Communist participation, see Chapter V of this study.)

D. Communist China's Propaganda in 1954

1. Propaganda Targets.

Communist China is interested in impressing the entire world with its message. However, its chief propaganda target is the peoples of Asia on whom, for example, it concentrates all of its 87.5 hours per week of foreign broadcasting. Its secondary targets are the neutral or uncommitted nations outside of the Far Eastern area.

Thus as to audiences Communist China both complements and supplements the USSR propaganda effort. In the Far East its broadcasts complement the 92 hours per week which the USSR beams to that area. Its activities by press, the mails, diplomatic missions, cultural exchange, and of human "carriers" supplement or add to the Soviet effort. Particularly in its relations with the overseas Chinese communities in Asia, Communist China is able to do what the USSR could not do.

The same pattern of complementing and supplementing the USSR's propaganda is true when it comes to themes. The Chinese Communists repeat many of the USSR themes, thereby reinforcing them. But in addition Peiping provides supplementary themes of its own. (See below.) Although the propagandists of Moscow and Peiping may select different themes for emphasis, and although one partner may pursue a given campaign without notable participation by the other, their propaganda is seldom caught at cross-purposes.

2. Propaganda Successes in 1954

During 1954 the prestige and international stature of Communist China were definitely enhanced, and her propagandists must regard it as a most successful year. Chinese Communist diplomacy may well have been the most effective propaganda instrument in both Europe and Asia -- most notably the triumphal tour of Chou En-lai during the Geneva meetings. The Chinese-backed military successes of the Viet Minh in Indochina and the truculence of Peiping toward Chiang Kai-shek and the United States were distasteful in Western eyes, but there is no doubt but what Asians were impressed. Peiping's propagandists have loudly advertised the regime's successes and its growing power.

3. Propaganda Themes

Among the most important of Communist China's propaganda themes to foreign audiences in 1954 were the following:

a. The contrast between the continuing "plotting for war" on the part of the US and its principal "satellites" and the "striving for peace" by the Communist bloc, the Asian neutralists (the Colombo powers), and the "peoples" of the world generally.

b. The need to broaden the "area of peace" -- the buffer of uncommitted states on the fringes of the Communist bloc itself.

c. The possibility of settling all international disputes through negotiations on the model of Panmumjom and Geneva.

d. The desirability, in order to avoid war, of basing the relations between states on the "five principles" (mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression and

non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence) which were first proclaimed in the agreement on Tibet between India and Communist China and were reaffirmed in the Chou En-lai - Nehru and Chou En-lai - U Nu communiques.

e. The inseparability of Formosa from China, the need to drive the US "invaders" from the Formosa area, and the impossibility of any compromise settlement of the Formosa issue.

f. Communist China's "right" to fully-acknowledged "great power" status and to a seat in the UN.

g. The potentialities of unrestricted trade and cultural exchange between Communist China and non-Communist nations.

h. The invincibility of the Sino-Soviet alliance as a "bulkwark of peace."

V. COMMUNIST USE OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIA IN 1954

HIGH LIGHTS

International broadcasting by Communist nations was stepped up by 98 hours per week in 1954, with the largest part of the increase occurring in output to Western Europe. At the end of 1954 Communist stations, official and clandestine, were beaming 1675 hours per week abroad.

TASS, the Soviet news agency, transmits daily for about 121 hours in Morse code and radio teletype, and is the chief source of international news for an area embracing 745,396,000 people, or 30.9 per cent of the world's population.

About a billion books were published in the USSR during 1954, and more of them were made available abroad than in previous years. A flood of periodicals and pamphlets continued to pour out from the Communist nations as well as from the Cominform, the national Communist parties, and international and local front groups. All these items were available in a great variety of foreign languages.

Communist film production was increased, and the USSR signed new film exchange agreements with a number of countries. Communist films achieved ever greater success at international film festivals. Entries by Communist Czechoslovakia took five out of eight grand prizes at the Montevideo festival.

The upward trend in the Communist exchange of persons program was accelerated, with the number of delegations to and from Communist countries almost double the 1953 figure. Particularly notable was the increase in delegations going from the Communist orbit into non-Communist countries.

Communist participation in international trade fairs continued to increase, and is now at a level about seven times as great as that of 1950-51.

International scientific contacts received increasing emphasis by the Communists in their exchange of persons program, in their exchange of publications, and in their attendance at scientific meetings abroad.

V. COMMUNIST USE OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIA IN 1954

A. International Broadcasting by Communist Countries in 1954

1. Summary

During 1954 Communist international broadcasting was increased by 98 hours per week, from 1425 hours per week on December 31, 1953 to 1523 hours per week on December 31, 1954. (See Table II)

In an analysis of Communist post-war international broadcasting, the most striking fact is the steady and continuous climb in total output from 528 hours per week in 1948 to 1523 hours per week in 1954. Stations accounting for the biggest part of this increase are those of the East European satellites, which have increased their international output from 178 hours per week in 1948 to 812 hours per week in 1954. (See Table I.)

In addition to the above figures for 1954, approximately 152 hours per week are broadcast by Communist clandestine stations and by transmitters from the Communist part of a "split" country to the non-Communist part and to other contingent areas. (See Table III.) Thus the grand total of Communist international broadcasting at the end of 1954, both official and clandestine, was 1675 hours per week.

2. Division of Labor between USSR and Satellites

The pattern of orbit broadcasting points clearly to a planned coordination of USSR and satellite broadcasting to foreign audiences, and the division of labor follows a logical and clear-cut pattern. The East European satellites do not broadcast a single hour to Asia, but leave that field to the USSR, Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the clandestine "Radio Free Japan." Conversely, Radio Peiping beams its programs to Far Eastern audiences and not to any other area.

Centralized planning is also evident in the combined shifts of programming. Thus when the USSR decreased its foreign broadcasting hours in 1953, the East European satellites more than offset the decline with a tremendous increase in their output.

Similarly, when one satellite cuts down its programs in a given language, the move is often compensated by an increase in that language from a second satellite. Accordingly, in analyzing the amount of Communist broadcasting to any target area or in any given language, it is the entirety of Communist broadcasting which must be watched, rather than fluctuations in the output of a single Communist country.

Centralized planning also appears in the practice whereby the satellites are called upon to devote their foreign broadcasting facilities part time to the relaying of Moscow's international transmissions. This process has been going on for years. It may be significant, however, that toward the end of 1954, Poland was relieved of this responsibility and now broadcasts its own programs exclusively. It remains to be seen whether this policy will be extended to the other satellites.

3. Intra-Bloc Broadcasting

The USSR broadcasts 84.5 hours per week to the East European satellites, who in turn broadcast 15 hours per week in Russian. This seems to be a planned intra-bloc affair.

The 1954 increases in USSR broadcasts in Albanian and Rumanian consist of additional repeat transmissions, presumably to assure satisfactory recordings by the recipient satellite for later rebroadcast over its home service.

Through this and other broadcasting techniques the USSR has made a strong bid to increase its satellite audience. Late in 1953 a Moscow radio delegation made a tour of the satellites during which agreements were reached to place Moscow programs on the satellite home services, and to place satellite transmissions on the Moscow home service. A satellite listener can now hear Moscow transmissions much more conveniently than heretofore, when he had to tune in to Radio Moscow or its relay transmitters. It is noted, however, that while Moscow broadcasts appear on all the satellite home services daily, satellite broadcasts on the Moscow home service are limited to once a week per satellite.

4. Area Developments

a. Western Europe. Hours of Communist broadcasting to this area are shown in Table II. The hours are repeated, with commentary, in Chapter VII of this study.

b. Near East, Africa, and South Asia. Hours of Communist broadcasting to this area are shown in Table II. The hours are repeated, with commentary, in Chapter VIII of this study.

c. Far East. Hours of Communist broadcasting to this area are shown in Table II. The hours are repeated, with commentary, in Chapter IX of this study.

d. Latin America. Hours of Communist broadcasting to this area are shown in Table II. The hours are repeated, with commentary, in Chapter X of this study.

e. Yugoslavia. Orbit broadcasting to Yugoslavia declined greatly during 1954, from approximately 144 hours per week on December 31, 1953 to approximately 105 hours per week on December 31, 1954. This represents a decisive decrease of approximately 27 percent from the 1953 figure. In addition, a clandestine anti-Tito Communist station called "Radio Free Yugoslavia," controlled by the Cominform, in 1954 suspended operations after five years of continuous activity under various names. This represented a further reduction of approximately 33 hours per week in Communist transmissions to Yugoslavia. These reductions doubtlessly are connected with Moscow's shift to a policy of wooing Tito instead of feuding with him.

f. North America. Broadcasts to North America were increased substantially during 1954, with the increase occurring entirely in satellite output. The increase came in broadcasts aimed at nationals in North America in their native tongues, and in programs of native music. The English-language output of the satellites to North America declined slightly during 1954.

g. Other. Table II concludes with a separate category of "other" broadcasts for which the target area is not specified. Presumably this output is addressed to linguistic groups both in Communist and Free World countries. The only change in these schedules during 1954 was the initiation of a Lithuanian language broadcast.

WEEKLY HOURS OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING BY THE USSR, THE SATELLITES AND COMMUNIST CHINA

August, 1948 - December 31, 1954



TABLE I.

WEEKLY HOURS OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING BY THE USSR, THE SATELLITES AND COMMUNIST CHINA

August, 1948 - December 31, 1954

	August 1948	August 1949	September 1950	Dec. 31 1951	Dec. 31 1952	Dec. 31 1953	Dec. 31 1954
U. S. S. R.	334	434	516	676	695	611	623
EUROPEAN SATELLITES	178	298	404	507	594	721	812
COMMUNIST CHINA	16	53	46	84	89	93	88
TOTAL	528	785	966	1,267	1,378	1,425	1,523

NOTES:

1. Figures represent total transmission time, including repeats, as no exact differentiation between original program hours and repeat transmissions is available.

2. USSR figures include output of Radio Moscow as well as all other USSR stations originating foreign broadcasts.

3. Approximately 152 hours per week of broadcasting by Communist clandestine and other miscellaneous Communist sources are not included in the above totals. (See Table III.)

TABLE II

WEEKLY HOURS OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING BY THE USSR, THE SATELLITES AND COMMUNIST CHINA

(December 31, 1953 compared with December 31, 1954)

Languages	Originating Countries							
EUROPE	U. S. S. R		European Satellites		Communist China		Total U. S. S. R., Sat. & Comm. China	
West. Eur.	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954
English	31:30	31:30	66:05	75:15	-	-	97:35	106:45
French	21:00	21:00	75:40	90:30	-	-	96:40	111:30
German (Aust)	7:00	10:30	5:50	14:00	-	-	12:50	24:30
German (Ger)	35:00	31:30	60:40	68:30	-	-	95:40	100:00
Italian	21:00	21:00	78:15	96:00	-	-	99:15	117:00
Spanish	14:00	14:00	38:30	38:50	-	-	52:30	52:50
Danish	7:00	7:00	11:30	12:00	-	-	18:30	19:00
Dutch	7:00	7:00	-	-	-	-	7:00	7:00
Finnish	20:30	18:00	13:50	22:30	-	-	34:20	40:30
Norwegian	10:00	10:00	3:30	3:30	-	-	13:30	13:30
Portuguese	3:30	3:30	-	-	-	-	3:30	3:30
Swedish	8:30	10:00	21:20	21:50	-	-	29:50	31:50
Other (Yiddish, concerts, etc)	8:00	8:00	5:50	13:30	-	-	13:50	21:30
W. Eur. Tot.	194:00	193:00	381:00	456:25	-	-	575:00	649:25
East. Europe								
Albanian	7:30	14:00	1:45	-	-	-	9:15	14:00
Bulgarian	18:00	18:00	-	-	-	-	18:00	18:00
Czech/Slovak	14:30	12:00	-	-	-	-	14:30	12:00
Hungarian	11:30	8:00	-	-	-	-	11:30	8:00
Polish	10:30	10:30	-	-	-	-	10:30	10:30
Rumanian	16:00	22:00	-	-	-	-	16:00	22:00
Russian	-	-	17:35	15:00	-	-	17:35	15:00
E. Eur. Tot.	78:00	84:30	19:20	15:00	-	-	97:20	99:30
Yugoslavia								
Macedonian	7:00	7:00	19:45	16:15	-	-	26:45	23:15
Serbo-Croat	14:00	14:00	85:35	56:30	-	-	99:35	70:30
Slovene	7:00	7:00	10:05	4:05	-	-	17:05	11:05
Yugo. Total	28:00	28:00	115:25	76:50	-	-	143:25	104:50
EUROPE TOTAL	300:00	305:30	515:45	548:15	-	-	815:45	853:45

See NOTES on page V-8.

TABLE II (CONTINUED)

Languages	Originating Countries							
NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA & AFRICA	U.S.S.R		European Satellites		Communist China		Total U.S.S.R. Sat. & Comm. China	
	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954
Arabic	9:55	14:00	-	10:30	-	-	9:55	24:30
Greek	14:00	14:00	68:50	75:45	-	-	82:50	89:45
Persian	34:25	33:15	-	-	-	-	34:25	33:15
Turkish	25:40	26:15	7:35	18:45	-	-	33:15	45:00
English	12:15	14:00	-	-	-	-	12:15	14:00
Bengali	5:15	5:15	-	-	-	-	5:15	5:15
Hindustani	3:30	3:30	-	-	-	-	3:30	3:30
Yiddish (to Israel)	-	-	3:30	3:30	-	-	3:30	3:30
Tadzhik*	7:00	7:00	-	-	-	-	7:00	7:00
NEA Total	112:00	117:15	79:55	108:30	-	-	191:55	225:45
FAR EAST								
Amoy	-	-	-	-	5:15	7:00	5:15	7:00
Cantonese	5:15	5:15	-	-	8:45	7:00	14:00	12:15
Chaochow	-	-	-	-	5:15	5:15	5:15	5:15
Hakka	-	-	-	-	5:15	5:15	5:15	5:15
Mandarin	21:00	18:30	-	-	3:30	-	24:30	18:30
Mongolian	8:45	8:45	-	-	3:30	3:30	12:15	12:15
Uighur (to Sinkiang)	7:00	7:00	-	-	-	-	7:00	7:00
Tibetan	-	-	-	-	5:30	3:30	5:30	3:30
Burmese	-	-	-	-	7:00	7:00	7:00	7:00
Indonesian	7:00	7:00	-	-	7:00	7:00	14:00	14:00
Thai	-	-	-	-	7:00	7:00	7:00	7:00
Tonkinese	7:00	7:00	-	-	7:00	7:00	14:00	14:00
Japanese	21:00	21:00	-	-	10:30	10:30	31:30	31:30
Korean	17:30	17:30	-	-	7:00	7:00	24:30	24:30
English	-	-	-	-	10:30	10:30	10:30	10:30
F.E. Total	94:30	92:00	-	-	93:00	87:30	187:30	179:30

* This transmission is announced as intended for Tadzhiks abroad, but the speech is carefully chosen from language understandable to Afghans and Persians as well.

See NOTES on page V-8 .

TABLE II (CONTINUED)

Languages	Originating Countries							
	U. S. S. R		European Satellites		Communist China		Total U. S. S. R. Sat. & Comm. China	
	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954
LATIN AMERICA								
Portuguese	7:00	7:00	-	-	-	-	7:00	7:00
Spanish	14:00	14:00	10:30	10:30	-	-	24:30	24:30
Concerts	-	-	-	1:45	-	-	-	1:45
L. A. Total	21:00	21:00	10:30	12:15	-	-	31:30	33:15
NORTH AMERICA								
English	56:00*	56:00*	53:25	48:45	-	-	109:25	104:45
Ukrainian	7:00	7:00	-	-	-	-	7:00	7:00
Satellite Languages	-	-	23:15	39:00	-	-	23:15	39:00
Concerts	-	-	-	17:30	-	-	-	17:30
N. A. Total	63:00	63:00	76:40	105:15	-	-	139:40	168:15
OTHER**								
Armenian	14:00	14:00	-	-	-	-	14:00	14:00
Ukrainian	7:00	7:00	-	-	-	-	7:00	7:00
Lithuanian	-	3:30	-	-	-	-	-	3:30
Albanian	-	-	8:00	8:00	-	-	8:00	8:00
Bulgarian	-	-	1:45	1:45	-	-	1:45	1:45
Polish	-	-	28:00	28:00	-	-	28:00	28:00
Other, Total	21:00	24:30	37:45	37:45	-	-	58:45	62:15
WORLD TOTAL	611:30	623:15	720:35	812:00	93:00	87:30	1425:05	1522:45

* Includes 7:00 hours of English broadcast simultaneously to North America and the Far East. Not included in Far East Total

** Target area not specified

NOTES: 1. Figures represent total transmission time, including repeats, as no exact differentiation between original program hours and repeat transmissions is available.

2. USSR figures include output of Radio Moscow as well as all other USSR stations originating foreign broadcasts.

3. A total of approximately 152 weekly hours of broadcasting by Communist clandestine and other miscellaneous Communist sources is not included in the above totals. (See Table III.)

TABLE III

MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNIST BROADCASTS
(Not included in Tables I & II)

December 31, 1954

CLANDESTINE STATIONS	Language	Weekly Hours	
"Radio Espana Independiente"	Spanish		39:00
"Radio Free Greece"	Greek	13:15	
	Slav-Macedonian	0:30	13:45
"Radio Free Japan"	Japanese		21:00
MISCELLANEOUS			
East Germany to W. Germany	German		15:35
Peiping to Formosa	Amoy	14:00	
	Mandarin	14:00	28:00
Hanoi to Southeast Asia	Cantonese	3:30	
	Mandarin	3:30	
	Thai	3:30	
	French	3:30	
	Cambodian	3:30	
	Laotian	3:30	
	Vietnamese (to S. Vietnam)	3:30	24:30
North Korea to Japan	Japanese	3:30	
North Korea to South Korea	Korean	7:00	10:30
		TOTAL	152:20

B. The Written Word: Communist Publishing, News and Library Activities

1. Introduction

Thousands of tons of Communist propaganda roll off the printing presses each year for distribution in the Free World. Publications run the whole range of quality, from the expensively-prepared, hard-bound and illustrated book to the one-page mimeographed news sheet. There are publications for all types of audiences such as women, youth and labor; for all types of professional groups; for interests ranging all the way from fine arts to forestry.

Much of the Communist printed word seen in non-Communist countries is imported from Communist countries, often already translated into the language of the recipient country. The rest is produced locally by Communist or Communist-front book publishers, newspaper publishers, friendship societies, front organizations, and by the organizational units of the Communist Party itself.

2. Books and Pamphlets

a. Distribution from Communist Countries to the Free World

(1) USSR Activities. During the recent writer's congress in the USSR, Soviet sources said 962,200,000 books were published in the Soviet Union in 1953. Earlier a Literary Gazette article of May 6, 1954 had claimed a round one billion, as compared with 850 million books published in 1952. No figures have been given for 1954, but with the increase in paper supplies and the continued emphasis of raising book publishing goals, it can be estimated conservatively that the 1954 output exceeded that of 1953.

The bulk of Soviet publications distributed abroad are handled by the International Book Publishing Corporation, a semi-autonomous branch of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade. In its monthly advertisement of book outlets in New Times in 1954 are listed 52 bookstores and book agencies in 24 countries, including 7 separate outlets in India and 4 each in Burma and Australia.

The billion books mentioned above include both those for the internal Soviet market and those for export, and no official figures are available on the extent of foreign distribution. The last official figures released by the Soviet Union were in 1937. In that year it was announced that the USSR had distributed abroad 11 million newspapers, 3.5 million books, and one million magazines.

It is safe to say that Soviet distribution today exceeds those amounts. Concomitant with the Soviet stance of increasing cultural exchange, more of what is published in the Soviet Union has been made available abroad, and the trend continues upward. The Soviet-operated Four Continents Bookstore in New York City in its 1955 catalogue shows a 50 percent increase in titles over 1954. The new offerings show a sharp rise in material published in the native languages of the minority republics. The predominance of non-Russian language publications among those added may be intended to demonstrate Moscow's proclaimed solicitude for the development of its minorities' national cultures.

Since 1951 accessibility of outsiders to Soviet publications has been generally upward, augmented annually by roughly 30 to 40 titles. Among periodicals made generally available abroad, those dealing conspicuously with scientific and technical subjects are heavily represented.

In external distribution of their books, the main emphasis continues to be on scientific, technical, and political works. On Soviet Press Day, it was announced that the numbers of people and libraries throughout the world drawing upon the knowledge of the Soviet Union was constantly increasing. The Soviets claimed at the beginning of 1954 to have book exchanges with 74 countries. 30,000 technical books were said to have been sent to China in 1953 and 500 donated to the University of New Delhi.

The Soviet Union apparently relies upon ancillary organizations beyond its borders to print and distribute outright propaganda pamphlets and prefers to pose officially as the distributor of only scientific and cultural enlightenment.

Radio Moscow, in discussing the "development of international relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences" on December 30, 1954, reported that the Academy exchanges scientific literature with the research establishments of 84 countries

of the world. "During 1954, more than 350,000 copies of books and periodicals have been sent abroad by the international book exchange arrangement alone." Also, the broadcast stated: "In 1955, the USSR Academy of Sciences will publish 55 scientific periodicals and will be glad to publish in them, in addition to the work of Soviet research workers, the works of foreign scientists."

The Soviet publication, New Times, advertises lists of new books in Russian and other foreign languages for readers abroad. Issue No. 2 for January 1954, for example, listed as available from the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow grammars, novels, and works by Lenin and Stalin translated into English, Swedish, Spanish, French, German, Bulgarian, Chinese and Korean.

In line with the "cultural exchange" program the Soviets profess to support, Soviet propaganda has given considerable emphasis during the past year to the numbers of western authors translated and made available to the Soviet people. The USSR State Publishing House has announced that during 1955 works to be made available will include those of the following authors: Victor Hugo, Jules Verne, Jack London, Romain Rolland, Dickens, Daudet, Bret Hart, Henry Mann, "and others."

(2) Satellite Activities. The East European satellites distribute some of their publications abroad, though not on such a lavish or highly-organized scale as the Soviet Union. In particular a variety of pamphlets and tracts, put out by friendship societies or satellite sections of the international Communist fronts, are exported from the satellites into the Free World.

(3) Communist China's Activities The Foreign Languages Press in Peiping produces a great variety of books and pamphlets in Asian languages for export. These materials get heavy distribution in Japan and Korea, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, and also get considerable distribution in the Near East.

An important activity is the dissemination by the Publications Administration and the Overseas Chinese Commission of Chinese-language publications to the large Chinese communities in other Asian countries. These publications include books and booklets, pictorial pamphlets, and cartoons.

b. Publishing Activities of Friendship Societies and Front Groups. Pamphlets, tracts, and reports of the many friendship societies on both sides of the Iron Curtain get large distribution in the Free World. Also the many Communist-front organizations, both local and international, produce a steady stream of books, pamphlets, and reports which get general distribution in the Free World. The occasional publications of these front groups (as distinguished from their periodicals, which will be mentioned later) range all the way from hard-cover books, through the very common paper-back slick pictorials, down to brief mimeographed reports or surveys on particular topics.

c. Communist Publishing in the Free World. In most Free World countries where the Communist Party is still legal one or more Communist publishing houses are publicly maintained. For example, a number of Communist publishing houses exist in France, Italy, and England; and the People's Publishing House of India, with headquarters in New Delhi, maintains branches in other Indian cities.

In countries where the Communist Party has been outlawed, the publishing enterprises of the Party generally have been shut down. A notable case in 1954 was the closing of the People's Publishing House in Pakistan, following Pakistan's banning of the Communist Party.

However, even in countries where the Communist Party is illegal, publication activities continue either covertly or under the sponsorship of front groups which are not outlawed. In the Arab states, for example, where the Communist Party is largely outlawed, Beirut is the center of a flourishing Communist publications industry carried on by the front groups, particularly the "Partisans of Peace." As an example of the extent of such activity, it is estimated that 52,000 Communist books were sold in Iraq in 1954.

Communist and Communist-front publishing houses, bookstores, and front groups in the Free World publish a wide variety of books and pamphlets. They also promote the import and translation of large numbers of works from the Communist countries. In a great many areas these activities are subsidized so that Communist books and pamphlets are sold to the public at prices far below the cost of production.

3. International News Services

a. TASS. The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) is the "central information organ of the USSR" and operates both within and outside of the Soviet Union. TASS has existed under one title or another since 1917. The 1935 Soviet decree which prescribed its present organization and functions granted TASS a near monopoly for distributing information about the USSR abroad and for concluding agreements with foreign telegraphic news agencies.

The vast extent of TASS's operations and influence within the Communist world is indicated in a 1953 UNESCO publication which says that in an area embracing 745,396,000 people, or 30.9 percent of the world's population, knowledge of world events is obtained chiefly from TASS. 1/ (The area includes the USSR, the East European satellites, Communist China, Mongolia and North Korea. Presumably North Vietnam, with its population of 14,000,000, should now be added to the UNESCO figures.)

The operations of TASS are not confined to Communist countries, however. TASS is the most complete source of daily information on developments in the USSR available to the foreign press generally. As the official Soviet news agency, TASS also carries the views of the Soviet Government on developments throughout the world in the form of communiques, texts of speeches, or notes and analyses.

TASS broadcasts in Morse code or Hellschreiber (radio teletype) in Russian, French, German, Spanish, and English for a total of 121 hours and 35 minutes daily. 2/ These transmissions presumably are monitored by local Communists and Soviet officials in foreign countries for purposes of information and further dissemination.

1/ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, News Agencies: Their Structure and Operation, Paris, 1953, p. 197.

2/ These press transmissions are in addition to the hours of voice transmission from the USSR reported above under international broadcasting.

There are two TASS offices in North America and one in South America, in addition to a TASS official attached to the Soviet Embassy in Buenos Aires. There are 11 TASS offices operating in 11 capitals of non-Communist Europe (Helsinki, Vienna, Athens, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, Paris and London). The Near East-African area is under TASS observation from Istanbul, Beirut, Tel-Aviv, and Cairo; the Middle East is watched from New Delhi, Karachi, Kabul, and Tehran; since the TASS representatives left Tokyo in 1952 and Australia in 1954, the only TASS office in the Far East is located at Djakarta, Indonesia.

b. NCNA. Peiping's New China News Agency (NCNA), although directing the great bulk of its efforts to the distribution of news within Communist China, also maintains foreign bureaus in Moscow, London, and Hong Kong, in which places it distributes daily bulletins made up of the NCNA short-wave transmissions from Radio Peiping. NCNA is an official government organization coming under the Information Department. It signed an exchange agreement with TASS, the Soviet Union's news agency, in 1950.

4. Communist Newspapers in the Free World

Hundreds of newspapers carry the Communist message in the Free World. The names of some of the largest have now become familiar: the Daily Worker in the United States, the Daily Worker in London, L'Humanite in France, and Unita in Italy might be cited as examples. The Communist provincial press is less well known.

The number and circulation of Communist newspapers in a given country of course depends on the strength of the Communist movement in that country. At one extreme is a country like France, where Communism is strong. There a recent tabulation indicates that 17 daily newspapers and 42 weekly newspapers publish under the Communist label. (These figures on France do not include crypto-Communist publications, nor do they include the news sheets of the Communist-dominated trade unions, the many French Communist periodical magazines which will be discussed below, or the organs of the various Communist fronts and friendship societies, which will also be discussed below.) At the opposite extreme are countries where Communism has been outlawed and where newspapers can be operated only covertly or under the sponsorship of front groups.

To cite some random examples of Communist newspapers elsewhere, India's Communist press includes six dailies, fourteen weeklies, one fortnightly, and three monthlies. Ceylon has three weekly Communist newspapers and one monthly. In Syria and Lebanon combined there are four Communist dailies and four Communist weeklies. Burma has three Communist daily newspapers. In Indonesia there are fifteen Communist or pro-Communist newspapers.

5. Communist Periodicals

a. From the USSR. During 1954 no expansion was noticed in either the number or the languages of Moscow's periodicals specifically designed for propaganda purposes abroad. The following is the current list of these publications:

Title and frequency	Publisher or printer	Languages
Soviet Union, monthly	Printed by Pravda	Russian, English German, French Spanish, Chinese Korean.
Soviet Literature, monthly	Soviet Writers Publishing House	Russian, Polish English, French German, Spanish
Soviet Woman, bi-monthly	Soviet Women's Anti-Fascist Committee and Central Council of Trade Unions	Russian, Chinese English, French, German, Spanish
New Times, weekly	Newspaper Trud	Russian, Polish Czech, Rumanian, English, French, German, Swedish, Spanish
News, monthly	Newspaper, Trud	English
VOKS Bulletin, bi-monthly		Numerous foreign languages

New Times advertises itself in frankly partisan terms as a magazine which informs its readers of the "people's struggle for democracy, security, and lasting peace [and] exposes the warmongers [and] the slander spread by the reactionary press and radio."

News aims at a less partisan audience, and describes its purpose as that of promoting "closer understanding between peoples of the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxon world" by a "truthful exposition of the issues...vexing relations between states." The publication of News was begun in July 1951 as one of a series of steps taken by Moscow to appeal primarily to British sentiment, in the probable expectation that the opening of truce talks in Korea would enhance the effectiveness of Soviet "peace" propaganda.

Soviet Literature also appeals on reasonable terms as a magazine dealing with "major world cultural developments" which "works to build up cultural intercourse with other countries and corresponds with readers on literary topics."

Soviet Women, an illustrated magazine devoted to "social and political problems, literature and art," seeks to capitalize on feminist sentiments in Western countries.

New Times announced in 1951 that all foreign language editions were "translations from the Russian edition and that the contents of all editions are identical." This apparently holds true for the other Soviet foreign language periodicals.

b. From Other Communist Countries. A number of periodicals are distributed from the East European satellites in translated editions. These include the journals of Communist organizations in various fields such as youth and labor. For example, the Press Service of the International Relations Department of the Central Committee of the Union of Working Youth in Hungary is published in an English-language edition; and the Polish Trade Union Review, organ of the Central Council of Trade Unions in Poland, comes out in an English edition which regularly lists the schedules of Warsaw Radio's English-language broadcasts. The journals of satellite friendship societies also go abroad, sometimes in translated editions.

Various periodicals are distributed from Communist China by the Foreign Languages Press in Peiping, including a Japanese-language edition of People's China which is distributed in Japan.

c. The Cominform Journal. The Cominform's weekly journal, For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy is published in 18 different languages including English, German, Spanish, French, Italian, Swedish, Dutch, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and Arabic. The other editions are in languages of the Soviet orbit.

d. Periodicals Published by International Communist Fronts. Each international front such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Democratic Youth has its own periodical journal which is published in a number of languages for international distribution. For a list of the periodicals of the major international fronts and the languages in which they are published, see Page II-25 of this study.

e. Periodicals Published Locally by Communist Friendship Societies. Most of the hundreds of Soviet and satellite friendship societies in Free World countries publish periodical journals extolling the virtues of Communist "culture" and propounding the Communist political line. In France, for example, the following monthly periodicals are published by friendship societies: France-URSS, by the French-USSR Friendship Society; France-Hongrie, by the Society France-Hungary; Paris-Bucharest, by the Society France-Roumania; and Peuples Amis, by the Society France-Poland.

f. Periodicals Published Locally under Foreign Auspices. Soviet and satellite embassies and legations in Free World countries are a source of numerous periodicals. At most such missions, periodic magazines, bulletins, and news sheets are published under the direction of the press and cultural attaches and are given local circulation.

The foreign offices of TASS, the Soviet News Agency, are also in the local publishing business in a number of areas. For example, in India TASS publishes a biweekly magazine entitled New Land in English, Urdu, and Hindi, as well as a bulletin called News and Views of the Soviet Union published daily in English, thrice weekly in Hindi, Urdu, Maratho, and Juijarati, and weekly in Punjabi. In Beirut, to take another illustration, TASS publishes Soviet News in Arabic, French, and English editions for circulation in the Near East. TASS also currently publishes a bulletin in Rome. Its Tokyo bulletin has been suspended, and the TASS-published Soviet Monitor of London was closed by the British Government in 1951.

g. Periodicals Published by Local Communists. In countries where the Communist movement is weak, locally published Communist periodicals of course are few. In countries where Communism is outlawed, the periodicals are covertly published and distributed, or are sponsored by front groups which still are legal. In countries where Communism is strong, there is a veritable flood of local Communist periodicals.

To take France again as an example of this latter category, a recent tabulation shows that a minimum of 32 Communist periodicals are currently being published, in addition to the daily and weekly newspapers, the crypto-Communist journals, and the friendship society organs already mentioned. These 32 periodicals are aimed at a wide variety of audiences with individual magazines for groups such as women, girls, children, mothers, farmers, philosophers, students, artists, psychologists, scientists, doctors, and lawyers. There are separate magazines in each of a wide variety of fields including fine arts, literature, photography, sports, the professions, politics, agriculture, forestry, and colonial questions. In short, no major group and no major field of interest is neglected, and each of these publications carries the Communist propaganda message with varying degrees of subtlety or blatancy.

6. Libraries, Reading Rooms, and Information Centers.

In almost every region of the world there are Communist-sponsored libraries, reading rooms, cultural centers, bi-national institutes, or information centers which serve as headquarters for the reading, loan, free distribution, or sale of Communist and Communist-front printed matter. Many of the larger centers also conduct elaborate programs of exhibits, film showings, and lectures.

These institutions are operated in some places by the press or cultural attaches of the Communist embassies, in others by the local Communist Party, and in a great many cases by the various front groups and friendship societies. No complete listing can be attempted here, but the following examples from widely separated areas are illustrative.

In Italy the Communist Book Center distributes the output of nine large publishing houses to scores of Case del Popolo (Houses of the People) throughout the country, promotes lectures on Soviet books, and conducts local book shows.

In Berlin the Central House of German-Soviet Friendship maintains a library of over 65,000 volumes and conducts a continuing program of lectures. In a recent lecture there, the United States Communist expatriate Gerhardt Eisler said that "the United States is still full of slaves."

In Vienna the large Austro-Soviet Social Center has a reading room and sponsors exhibits. The Russians run three other libraries in Vienna, one of which is housed in a plush building and has an extensive periodical collection and a book shop.

In Akureyri, Iceland the Soviet-Icelandic Friendship Society (MIR) maintains a reading room and sponsors lectures and film showings.

In India the Communist Delhi Book Center has both a reading room and a book shop. In Madras City the Indo-Soviet Cultural Association maintains a free reading room and library. During 1954 additional reading rooms were opened by the friendship societies.

In Tunis for two years the Communist-sponsored New University has held monthly cultural conferences at the Lycee Carnot.

In Israel the three USSR friendship leagues maintain libraries.

The Soviet minister to Egypt in 1954 submitted a note to the Egyptian Government expressing Russia's desire to establish a Soviet cultural institute in Cairo.

In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia there is a Russian Information Center which shows Communist films twice a week.

In Tokyo a Soviet Information Center is sponsored by local front organizations.

The Frederic Chopin Cultural Society, an organization of Poles in Argentina, maintains a library of Communist books and sponsors plays and exhibits.

In Chile reading rooms, books shops, lectures and film showings are operated by friendship societies such as the Chilean-Czechoslovakian Cultural Institute, the Chilean-Hungarian Cultural

Center, the Center of Friends of Poland, the Chilean-Rumanian Cultural Center, the Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute, the Chilean Committee of Friends of the Soviet Union, and the Chilean-Soviet Cultural Institute.

The Mexican-Russian Institute of Cultural Exchange maintains a library and reading room and sponsors lectures, art exhibits, and film showings.

C. Communist Film Activities in 1954

1. Production

The Communist world registered important gains in the field of movie-making and exhibition during the year 1954 both at home and abroad. Factors bringing about this increase were: (1) the construction of new studios and the reconstruction of old ones; (2) the entry of more trained workers into the cinema industries of the satellite countries as the film academies set up there began to graduate more students and as others returned from courses of study at the Institute of Cinematography in Moscow; (3) the gradual gearing in of these industries to the ideological requirements of the Kremlin and the extension by the latter of technical assistance and equipment; and, finally, (4) the gradual recovery of the Soviet movie industry from the paralysis that gripped it after Zhdanov launched the ideological crackdown on the arts in 1946.

The Soviets have been making technical advances such as the introduction of stereophonic sound, and Cinemascope-type screens. Moscow claims to have 15 years of experience with three-dimensional films. There is an increasing production of films, even documentary and other short films, in the excellent Soviet color process. These developments all bid fair to increase the attraction of Communist films, especially those where the propaganda element is minimal or nil.

The Communist-front World Federation of Trade Unions in 1954 sponsored the production of what WFTU propaganda calls an "epic" film, "Song of the Rivers." The picture has had initial European showings, and is likely to be given wide distribution by the WFTU. Most of this picture is devoted to working conditions along the Mississippi, Nile, Ganges, Volga, Yangtse, and Amazon rivers. The depiction of American working conditions is as usual

distorted, showing only such things as slums, policemen clubbing workers on strike, the Ku Klux Klan, and the "imperialist" Wall Street stock exchange. The pictures of Russia, however, show smiling workers and clean, modern shops. The pictures of China show re-distribution of land among the peasants.

On the debit side Communist movie-making appeared during 1954 to be still plagued by many of its traditional shortcomings and difficulties. The shortage of ideologically acceptable scenarios continues to be the main bottleneck to any great increase in production. Directors and other film people show extreme reluctance to making propaganda-message films. Thus, although each year the Soviet film plan calls for a picture devoted to "mother heroines"--those having 10 or more children -- no such picture has yet been made. Communist films, especially those designed specifically for international festivals and for gaining prestige abroad, have some very strong features in their favor. However, even the best retain certain faults. Audiences still complain about the slowness of the action, the garrulity of the heroes, and the stereotyped plots with their trivial conflicts.

While Communist output of films has been steadily rising, the output is still small in comparison to that of the leading non-Communist nations. Thus Soviet plans called for 28 feature films in 1953, and 35 for 1954. In Czechoslovakia some 18 feature films were completed in 1953 and probably a few more than that during 1954. The present combined annual output of all the satellite countries most probably does not exceed 100 feature films, though of course a great number of short films of various types are also turned out. Since World War II the Soviet Union has not been able to equal its pre-war production rate of 40 to 45 feature films per year. In contrast, the United States produces an average of 450 feature films a year, India 260, Japan 150, Italy 120, France 110, Germany and the United Kingdom 85 each.

2. Content of Communist Films

Communists have been showing an increasing awareness of the fact that they cannot impress foreign audiences with the propaganda-ridden films shown their own people. The result has been that they have been producing films to answer both requirements. At one end of the spectrum are viciously anti-American films such as Silvery Dust, at the other extreme are such films as "Boris Godunov," "Ilya Murometz," and "Romeo and Juliet,"

currently under production. In these latter films the only propaganda is excellent music and dancing, beautiful costuming and staging and a color process of pastel-like delicacy and sense of depth.

Excellent documentary films on science and successes in the production of animated cartoons and filmed puppet shows are also reported. While the non-propaganda films are also shown to Communist audiences, films such as Silvery Dust are carefully kept away from festivals and exhibitions in the non-Communist world. Films standing in between the two extremes are, however, exhibited abroad.

A TASS transmission of December 4, 1954 gave the following report on current Soviet activities in filming fairy tales:

> "A new color cartoon: 'The Golden Antelope,' inspired by a fairy tale of one of the peoples of India, is meeting with great success in the cinemas of the country. The workers of the Moscow Multiplication Film Studio are producing many such fairy tale films. Two films have been produced on the basis of Ukrainian fairy tales. A film has just been completed which is an adaptation of the popular Russian fairy tale: 'The Frog Princess.' Films inspired by Armenian, Georgian, and other fairy tales are under production. The producers of the studio are planning to film foreign fairy tales. At present preparations are in progress for the filming of the Rumanian fairy tale: 'The Hazel Twig,' the Swedish fairy tale: 'The Bewitched Boy,' the Hungarian fairy tale: 'Two Oxen the Size of a Pea,' the Finnish fairy tale: 'Poor Canut,' and the Albanian fairy tale: 'The Magic Wand.'
>
> "The studio is also working on films based on Russian and foreign literature, like adaptations of Pushkin's works. In connection with the 150th anniversary of the birth of the Danish writer Andersen, it is planned to produce three films: 'The Snow Princess,' 'The Ugly Duckling' and 'The Emperor's New Clothes.' Soviet writers Samuil Marshak, Lev Kassil, Venyamin Kaverin and others are taking part in the work. Films on the life and studies of the Soviet school children are being produced on the basis of their books and texts. In addition, the studio is producing short satirical films for adults."

3. Distribution of Communist Films

In 1954 the USSR concluded film exchange agreements with India, Argentina, Mexico, and a number of other countries. These agreements offered the Communists a propaganda advantage they were quick to exploit, namely that while American films were widely shown in these countries, the latter's films were not shown in the United States except on a small scale in a very few places.

Communist films continued to be shown in many places during 1954. The Soviet propaganda film "Fall of Berlin" was shown in such widely separated places as Japan and Cuba. Western Europe continued to see many Communist films. Soviet and satellite films were exhibited in increasing numbers in Latin America. There was a fairly large-scale distribution of Communist films in the countries of South Asia, with India and Ceylon receiving film imports from the USSR, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. At least 18 Communist Chinese films entered Japan as "gifts" in order to circumvent the import controls. Chinese Communist films also were shown in Indochina, Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia.

Many Communist films are shown commercially abroad, particularly in the larger cities. Supplementing the commercial showings are widespread showings by the Communist friendship societies and other Communist-front groups such as cultural centers and bi-national institutes maintained in the free countries.

Many of the journals distributed from the USSR and satellites or published under local Communist-front auspices advertise the latest Communist films. For example, the New World Review, a Communist-front organ published in New York, in its October 1954 edition carries an advertisement of Artkino Pictures, Inc. announcing the availability of "New Soviet Films -- All in Spectacular Sovcolor," including such titles as "Stars of the Russian Ballet," "Bride with a Dowry," "Adventure in Odessa," "The Mistress," and "The Inspector General."

While important gains have been made in the distribution of Communist films in other countries, particularly Soviet films, in many countries of the world the showing of Communist films is either barred altogether or severely restricted. In other countries, notably the United States, though Communist films are not barred

they have little commercial market owing to a lack of popular interest in such films. Even in countries such as England where Soviet films are shown regularly, the commercial showings are restricted generally to the large cities and even there usually do not attract any great attention.

4. Communist Participation in Film Festivals

Communist participation in international film festivals in the non-Communist world during 1954 was the most successful to date, with Communist entries winning many of the awards and receiving much favorable publicity.

Perhaps most striking was the success of Communist Czechoslovakia at the International Documentary and Experimental Film Festival in Montevideo, Uruguay. Czech entries won five out of the eight grand prizes awarded at this festival. In addition, three Czech films and one Hungarian film were among the festival's fourteen "honorable mentions."

At Cannes, the largest international festival, the USSR and its satellites received two out of eight international prizes awarded for full length films, two out of five prizes for shorts, and one out of four prizes awarded for technical accomplishment. Two Soviet film workers were among the several awarded the title "Laureat of the Festival."

Communist films were also shown successfully at the Mar del Plata International Film Festival in Argentina and the Edinburgh festival of documentary films.

As in past years festivals of Soviet films were held in all of the satellite countries and festivals of satellite films were held in the Soviet Union. Also, Communist film festivals were held in a number of non-Communist countries such as France, Great Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

In addition, the USSR and its satellites during 1954 turned increasingly towards the exhibition of films from capitalist countries other than the US, especially films made by "progressive" film makers. In these the main theme was either the portrayal of the "hard lot of the common people under capitalism" such as in the Indian film "Two Acres of Land," or the anti-American theme

carried in productions such as the Japanese film "Children of Hiroshima" or the French film "Before the Deluge." Perhaps the greatest attention was attracted by the festivals of Italian and Indian films in the USSR.

5. Forecast for 1955

Tendencies observed during 1954 would indicate that the following developments can be expected in Soviet cinema during the coming year: (1) continued increase in the output of films; (2) strong attention to films designed specifically to win acceptance abroad at festivals and with foreign audiences where Soviet and satellite artistic excellence and technique can be shown to advantage; (3) continued production of traditional Communist propaganda vehicles for showing primarily to home audiences; (4) more formidable competition at international festivals; (5) increase in film delegations leaving the Communist orbit and arriving there; and (6) further efforts towards increasing film exchanges with foreign countries.

D. The Communist Exchange of Persons Program in 1954

1. The USSR Program

Exchange of persons continued to assume an increasingly important position in the USSR's propaganda effort in 1954. Over 1,000 delegations from 63 countries were involved in these exchanges, a majority of which were outside the Soviet bloc.

The machinery for liberalizing the exchange of persons was blueprinted before the death of Stalin, but in the past two years the new leadership has implemented it on a scale unequaled in the postwar period. Between 1950 and 1953, the number of delegations entering and leaving the Soviet Union jumped an estimated 60 percent, while the 1954 program nearly doubled that of 1953.

In 1954, 1,046 delegations were reported in Soviet media. The program in 1954 continued its development as a two-way movement. Of the delegations between the years 1950 and 1953, those going into the Soviet Union outnumbered those leaving by nearly four to one. In 1954, the ratio of delegations entering the Soviet Union to those going out had been reduced to slightly over 2 to 1.

Technical, professional and scientific people dominated the total exchange with 353 delegations. Of the delegations sent out by the Soviet Union into the Free World, 42 percent were in this category while 30 percent of those invited into the Soviet Union were of this type. Professional people also formed the largest single category in inter-bloc exchanges.

This group tends less easily to assume the propagandist-agitator role usually expected by the Communists when sending people outside the bloc. However, the promotion of scientific and technical delegations assists the government by supporting its repeated assertions to the outside world that the Soviet Union is a leader in world science with something of value to export and be viewed. Also, internal considerations undoubtedly have had something to do with the increase in scientific exchanges. Lack of contact with outsiders has hurt Soviet science, and there are indications that the professional community is dissatisfied with the continued isolation. The regime apparently has decided to lessen former restraints on professional people and allow them to re-establish minimal scholarly contacts with the West.

The interest of the Soviet Union in attracting professional people to their country can in some measure be laid to the fact that within the professional fields there is a smaller area of disagreement between the East and West. Also, as specialists the visitors are apt to have their interests more narrowly confined and be less prone to extra-curricular exploring outside their fields.

Observers at international professional meetings in the past year where Soviet delegates have participated report few instances where the delegates strayed from approved decorum at such gatherings. There have been instances in which delegates presented papers heavily flavored with Marxist references, but on the whole there have been few efforts to stray from the approved agendas.

On the basis of reports received, Western delegations going into the Soviet Union have received the very best of treatment. However, the Soviet people have not been conditioned to having more foreign delegations travelling in their country; the government has made no effort to break down the officially-inspired suspicion of foreigners. This suspicion is apparently strongest in the lower bureaucracy. One of the students from Columbia University,

for instance, reported that she had been stopped by the police sixteen times during her three weeks trip in Russia for alleged violations, but that each time a higher authority had interceded in her behalf. The visitors are permitted to communicate with selected groups, but otherwise the Iron Curtain against person-to-person communication is still officially held in place.

The inability to actually get to know the Russian people and communicate with them is one of the outstanding complaints of visitors. A true exchange program would require some mutuality. This factor is totally missing in the Soviet program. The government makes no effort really to widen the paths of understanding between the peoples of the East and West. Instead, while professing for propaganda purposes that cultural exchange is a valued instrument in easing tensions between the people, internally the Soviet press keeps up its bitter denunciations of the culture and peoples of the West. It feeds its people interviews and favorable comments of visiting delegates from the West regarding their impressions of the Soviet Union, but provides them with no basis for getting a broader understanding of these visitors.

In short, the Soviet cultural program is not a true exchange program, but strictly an export program. The visitors into the Soviet Union are there to see the advancements and progress under Communism and are expected to go back and relate their impressions. The people the Soviet Union sends out are expected to expound the advantages of life under Communism. That the Communists should bring politics into international cultural exchange is not really surprising. In fact, no other type of cultural exchange is possible under Communism. The Leninist thesis denies the principle of "art for art's sake" and asserts that culture must serve politics. With art and culture in the USSR but the handmaidens of the Communist Party, the regime cannot afford to expose the Soviet people to other ideas through a true cultural exchange.

Another and most important factor regarding the current exchange program is its essentially anti-American tone. The delegations sent out from the Soviet Union, whether dancers or musicians or students continually inject anti- American themes into their talks and performances.

The cultural drive was only started after the Soviet Union, which had virtually cut off all traffic across the Iron Curtain, gave the signal to its front organization, the World Peace Council, at its meeting in Budapest in 1953. It immediately became WPC policy to promote cultural exchange and through its propaganda to portray the concept as a Soviet invention. Communist propaganda has continued to play the theme that it is the US which has a cultural Iron Curtain while the USSR is opening its doors to visitors throughout the world. The program can be viewed only as a cold war instrument in Moscow's attempt to isolate the United States in the eyes of the world.

Even with the expanded program, the USSR is still no free land of tourism. If the average delegation into the Soviet Union were as high as twenty in number, fewer people visited the Soviet Union in 1954 than any of the Low Countries of Europe. It should also be remembered that aside from invited delegations, very few individual travellers enter the country. In 1953, according to New Times, (February 27, 1954), there were only 42 private travellers enjoying the Soviet hospitality. No figures have been released for 1954, and although it may be presumed to have increased considerably, even a tripling of the figure would still yield an insignificant total.

As for a student exchange program with non-Communist countries, on the basis of available evidence, it is small or non-existent. A considerable number of students study in the Soviet Union from within the bloc, but their exact numbers cannot be determined. In 1953, a Soviet law student did spend a semester at Oslo studying, but no record has been found of a similar excursion by a Soviet student in 1954. As for students from the bloc studying in the Soviet Union, the evidence is that their work is primarily in the applied sciences. They are to be trained as technicians to help in operating the subsidiary economies in the satellites.

The tables which follow give the statistics on the USSR's 1954 exchange program in the following order: (1) worldwide totals to and from the USSR by type of delegation; (2) number and type of delegations from the USSR, by area; (3) number and type of delegations to the USSR, by area; and (4) total delegations to and from the USSR chronologically by month.

Data are not sufficient for establishing the size of the "average" delegation, but the average size is believed to be from 15 to 20 persons.

NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS TO AND FROM THE USSR IN 1954

Worldwide Totals by Type of Delegation

Type of Delegation	Number of Delegations to the USSR			Number of Delegations From the USSR			Total Number of Delegations to and From the USSR
	From Communist Countries	From Free World Countries	Total	To Communist Countries	To Free World Countries	Total	
Youth	23	55	78	7	10	17	95
Cultural	30	50	80	32	48	80	160
Sports	36	25	61	16	34	50	111
Women	4	11	15	5	5	10	25
Union and Cooperative	53	83	136	14	14	28	164
Business and Commercial	10	25	35	2	7	9	44
Technical, Scientific and Professional	118	84	202	70	72	142	344
Peace	19	33	52	13	14	27	79
Miscellaneous		24	24				24
	293	390	683	159	204	363	1046

NOTES: (1) These delegations range in size from three persons to forty or fifty persons. Data are not sufficient for establishing the size of the "average" delegation, but the average size is probably from fifteen to twenty persons. The 1046 delegations are those mentioned by Soviet media, and constitute a minimal listing.

(2) For purposes of this compilation Yugoslavia, although not part of the Soviet bloc, was included in the category "Communist countries."

DELEGATIONS FROM THE USSR TO WESTERN EUROPE, 1954

Country	Total	Youth	Cultural	Sports	Women	Unions & Coop.	Bus. & Commerce	Techn, Prof. Scient.	Peace
Austria	12	1		2		1	1	4	3
Belgium	3	1				1		1	
Canada	8		1	1				3	3
Denmark	6	2	2	1				1	
Finland	14	1	1	1		3	1	4	3
France	21	1	5	3		2		10	
Germany (West)	5		1	2				2	
Iceland	3		2					1	
Italy	17		2	2		1		12	
Netherlands	5		1	2				2	
Norway	6		2	1		1	1	1	
Sweden	11	1	2	4				1	3
Switzerland	17		2	6	2	1		6	
United Kingdom	31	2	6	6		4		13	
	159	9	27	31	2	14	3	61	12

DELEGATIONS FROM THE USSR TO EASTERN EUROPE, 1954

Country	Total	Youth	Cultural	Sports	Women	Unions & Coop.	Bus. & Commerce	Techn. Prof. Scient.	Peace
Albania	5		1					2	2
Bulgaria	21	3	6	1		1		8	2
Czechoslovakia	18		3	1		1	1	11	1
Germany (East)	29	1	4	2	3	5	1	10	3
Hungary	27		5	3		2		15	2
Poland	31		8	4		4		13	2
Rumania	4		2	1				1	
Yugoslavia *	3			3					
	138	4	29	15	3	13	2	60	12

* Although included here as an East European state, Yugoslavia since 1948 has not been a member of the Soviet bloc and is thus to be distinguished from the other countries here listed, all of which are Soviet satellites.

DELEGATIONS FROM THE USSR TO THE NEAR EAST, AFRICA, AND SOUTH ASIA, 1954

Country	Total	Youth	Cultural	Sports	Women	Unions & Coop.	Bus. & Commerce	Techn. Prof. Scient.	Peace
Afghanistan	5		2					3	
Arabia	1		1						
Egypt	1		1						
Greece	1		1						
India	8		4					3	1
Iran	2		1				1		
Israel	1				1				
Lebanon	2		1	1					
Pakistan	2		1					1	
Syria	1		1						
Turkey	4		2				1	1	
	28		15	1	1		2	8	1

DELEGATIONS FROM THE USSR TO THE FAR EAST, 1954

Free Asia	Total	Youth	Cultural	Sports	Women	Unions & Coop.	Bus. & Commerce	Techn. Prof. Scient.	Peace
Indochina	1								1
Indonesia	2				2				
Japan	2			1				1	
	5			1	2			1	1
Communist Asia									
China	16	2	3	1		1		9	
Korea	3	1			2				
Mongolia	2							1	1
	21	3	3	1	2	1		10	1

DELEGATIONS FROM THE USSR TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS, 1954

Country	Total	Youth	Cultural	Sports	Women	Unions & Coop.	Bus. & Commerce	Techn. Prof. Scient.	Peace
Argentina	6		2	1			2	1	
Chile	2		2						
Mexico	2	1						1	
Uruguay	2	—	2	—			—	—	
	12	1	6	1			2	2	

DELEGATIONS TO THE USSR FROM WESTERN EUROPE, 1954

Country	Total	Youth	Cultural	Sports	Women	Unions & Coop.	Bus. & Commerce	Techn. Prof. Scient.	Peace
Algeria	3	2						1	
Australia	2	1							1
Austria	7			1		3		1	2
Belgium	8	3						3	2
Canada	10	3	1			2		3	1
Cyprus	1	1							
Denmark	15	1	2	1		7	1	1	2
Finland	38	2	5	5	1	9	6	3	7
France	30	6	3	7	1	4	2	7	
Germany (West)	6		2			2		2	
Iceland	7	1	1		1	2	1		1
Italy	14	4	2		1	4		3	
Luxembourg	1					1			
Netherlands	8	1			1	1	1	4	
New Zealand	1							1	
Norway	15	2	1	2		3	1	4	2
Sweden	20		5	4	1	3	2	4	1
Switzerland	5		1	1				3	
Spain	1	1							
United Kingdom	45	6	8	2	1	7	6	13	2
	237	34	31	23	7	48	20	53	21

DELEGATIONS TO THE USSR FROM EASTERN EUROPE, 1954

Country	Total	Youth	Cultural	Sports	Women	Unions & Coop.	Bus. & Commerce	Techn. Prof. Scient.	Peace
Albania	17		2	2	1	3	1	6	2
Bulgaria	24	2	2	4		5	2	7	2
Czechoslovakia	42	3	5	8		10		14	2
Germany (East)	41	3	6	6	1	7	1	15	2
Hungary	35	3	4	3		4	2	18	1
Poland	39	3	4	5		5	1	18	3
Rumania	26	3	3	4		4		10	2
Yugoslavia*	4		1			2		1	
	228	17	27	32	2	40	7	89	14

* Although included here as an East European state, Yugoslavia since 1948 has not been a member of the Soviet bloc and is thus to be distinguished from the other countries here listed, all of which are Soviet satellites.

DELEGATIONS TO THE USSR FROM THE NEAR EAST, AFRICA, AND SOUTH ASIA, 1954

Country	Total	Youth	Cultural	Sports	Women	Unions & Coop.	Bus. & Commerce	Techn. Prof. Scient.	Peace
Afghanistan	2		1			1			
Ceylon	2					1			1
Egypt	3			1		1		1	
Ethiopia	1					1			
Greece	3		2			1			
India	32	2	8		2	4	1	11	4
Iran	3	1				1		1	
Israel	8	2			1	2	2	1	
Lebanon	3		1	1		1			
Pakistan	2							2	
Sudan	1	1							
Syria	4	1	1			1		1	
Tunisia	1	1							
Turkey	1	1							
Yemen	1					1			
	67	9	13	2	3	15	3	17	5

DELEGATIONS TO THE USSR FROM THE FAR EAST, 1954

Free Asia	Total	Youth	Cultural	Sports	Women	Unions & Coop.	Bus. & Commerce	Techn. Prof. Scient.	Peace
Burma	6	1	1			2		1	1
Indochina	9	1	1			2	1	1	3
Indonesia	9	1			1	1	1	4	1
Japan	11	1	1			3		4	2
Malaya	1	1							
	36	5	3		1	8	2	10	7
Communist Asia									
China	37	2	2	2		5	2	21	3
Korea	19	3	1	2	1	5		5	2
Mongolia	9	1			1	3	1	3	
	65	6	3	4	2	13	3	29	5

DELEGATIONS TO THE USSR FROM THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS, 1954

Country	Total	Youth	Cultural	Sports	Women	Unions & Coop.	Bus. & Commerce	Techn. Prof. Scient.	Peace
Argentina	6	1				3		2	
Bolivia	3	1	1					1	
Brazil	5	1	2			2			
Chile	3	1				1		1	
Cuba	2	1				1			
Ecuador	1	1							
Guatemala	1					1			
Mexico	3	1				2			
Paraguay	1					1			
Uruguay	1					1			
	26	7	3			12		4	

DELEGATIONS TO AND FROM THE SOVIET UNION

January-December 1954

January	40
February	48
March	60
April	81
May	68
June	138
July	132
August	160
September	90
October	92
November	92
December	45
Total	1,046

2. The Satellite Programs

Following the lead of the USSR, the East European satellites and Communist China have intensified their efforts in cultural exchange and the exchange of persons generally. Increases in the number of delegations travelling to and from the satellites doubtlessly stem from the same reasoning which has motivated the USSR. It is part of the general effort to picture Communist nations as seeking "normal" international relations and the relaxation of tensions, and to rid themselves of the Iron Curtain onus.

The satellite exchange programs seems to have followed in general the USSR pattern. Delegations in the scientific, technical, professional, and cultural categories are predominant.

It has not been possible to compile figures on satellite exchanges with free countries comparable to those given in the previous section on USSR exchanges. However, the previous section has covered satellite exchanges with the USSR, and the sections which follow cite representative examples of satellite delegations going to free world countries and free world delegations going to the satellites.

3. Recent Examples of USSR and Satellite Delegations to Free Countries

October. The hungarian national soccer team played a match in Brussels with a team from West Bromwich, Great Britain. It also played in France and in Scotland.

October. A Soviet delegation of cultural workers visited Finland to participate in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Finland-USSR Society.

October. The Czechoslovak commercial delegation visiting in Argentina had a meeting with officials of the Confederacion General Economica.

November. A Hungarian trade union delegation went to France to attend the congress of the Iron and Metal Workers Union.

November. A delegation of Soviet women visited Paris at the invitation of the Union of French Women. They attended the fifth national congress of the Union of French Women.

November. A Soviet troupe gave a series of concerts in England in celebration of English-Soviet Union Friendship Month.

November. A five-member youth delegation visited Sweden from the USSR at the invitation of the Sweden-USSR Society.

October. A Soviet agricultural delegation visited Afghanistan to attend a pest-control conference and to discuss other agricultural matters.

October . A delegation of five persons from the USSR attended the celebration of the 5th anniversary of the Amities Belgo-Sovietiques in Brussels. A geneticist, a teacher, an actress, and a scenarist were included in the delegation.

4. Recent Examples of Delegations from Free Countries to the USSR and Satellites

September. Three delegates from the Union of French Women were in Prague for a three-week visit.

October. Leaders of the Indian delegation of art and cultural workers paid a visit to Polish Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz.

October. A delegation from the Norway-USSR Society visited in Moscow to participate in the celebration of the 37th anniversary of the October Revolution.

October. A reception was held at the Moscow State University in honor of a delegation of students and professors from India. Professor Madan Mohan, principal of Meerut College, was the head of the delegation.

November. A 35-member Japanese trade-union delegation visited East Berlin in response to invitation of Chairman of the Free German Trade Unions Federation.

November. Cultural and economic officers of the Argentine Government were members of a delegation which visited the USSR from Argentina.

November. Italian Parliament members were a part of a delegation from the Italian Society for Cultural Cooperation with Poland which toured Poland for 10 days.

November. A Burmese trade delegation visited East Berlin. The delegation discussed the possibilities of GDR support for the eight-year program for the industrial development of Burma.

November. Three members of the Union of Danish Women visited Bulgaria.

E. Communist Participation in International Trade Fairs and Exhibits

During 1954 Communist nations increased their participation in the international trade fairs and exhibits held in Free World countries. At a minimum count, one or more of the Communist nations were represented at 45 such fairs or exhibits in 1954.

In previous years, Communist participation at Free World international trade fairs included representation at 15 such events during 1950 and 1951 combined, at about 25 in 1952, and at about 40 in 1953. Thus there has been a most significant increase in Communist activity in this field over the past few years, doubtlessly prompted by mixed motives, in which propaganda objectives are intertwined with other purposes.

One motive is economic. Although much of the Communist talk about increasing East-West trade is sheer propaganda, since in many cases the Communist states are not prepared to deliver the goods they advertise, it can be assumed that some of the talk is genuine. The Communists would certainly stand to gain by increasing their imports of certain products, and they are prepared to secure the necessary exchange by exporting certain products of their own. The trade fairs offer a means of advertising their wares.

Another motive is doubtlessly the Communist desire for intelligence on the production and products of Free World nations. Their presence at a fair or exhibit gives them the opportunity to observe, discuss, and learn; to acquire descriptive literature on new machines and processes; and often to acquire samples and models.

However, Communist participation certainly is dictated also by the propaganda motive. One of the great claims of the Communists is that their economic system is superior to the various

capitalist, modified capitalist, and socialist economies of the West. In the trade fairs and exhibits they generally try to put their best foot forward in support of such claims. Their success in this propaganda attempt is debatable. By Western standards many of their goods are inferior, yet in some areas the viewers of Communist products are probably impressed. The favorable impression may be heightened by explanations of Communism's late start in the industrial race, by Communist claims of rapid technological advances, and by Communist promises of still more rapid progress to come. At some fairs and exhibits the Communists have won the "show contest" by default, in the absence of first-rate Western participation.

A second aspect of the propaganda motive has already been mentioned. When the Communists exhibit goods which they cannot deliver, the propaganda motive is obvious.

There is a third aspect of the propaganda motive. More liberal Communist participation in trade fairs, like the freer cultural exchange, fits in with the general Communist propaganda themes of "relaxation of international tensions" and "peaceful coexistence." Similarly, it helps in some measure to rid the Communists of the "Iron Curtain" onus.

Following is a minimal list of trade fairs and exhibits held in the Free World during 1954 in which one or more Communist nations participated. The list is organized by geographic regions. Each entry gives in the order named the location, the name of the fair or exhibit, the date, and the names of Communist nations participating.

PARTICIPATION BY COMMUNIST NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE FAIRS AND EXHIBITS DURING 1954

(Note: This list includes only trade fairs and exhibits held in the Free World. Communist nations participating are indicated in parentheses.)

Western Europe

AUSTRIA

(1) Dornbirn, Export and Sample Fair, July 13-August 8 (East Germany)

(2) Graz, International Spring Fair, April 30-May 8 (Czechoslovakia)

AUSTRIA (continued)

(3) Vienna, Spring Fair, March 14-21 (East Germany, Soviet Zone of Austria)

(4) Vienna, International Fall Fair, September 12-19 (USSR and satellites)

BELGIUM

(5) Brussels, 37th International Auto & Cycle Exp., January 16-27 (USSR and Czechoslovakia)

(6) Brussels, International Fair, April 24-May 5 (Hungary)

(7) Ghent, 9th International Trade Fair, September 11-26 (Czechoslovakia)

(8) Liege, International Fair, April 24-May 5 (Czechoslovakia, East Germany)

DENMARK

(9) Copenhagen, USSR Exhibit, June 25-July 15 (USSR)

ENGLAND

(10) Camberly, 11th International Exhibit of Photography, August (Communist China)

(11) London, 3rd Britain Food Fair, September 7-18 (USSR and satellites)

(12) London, International Motor Show, October 20-30 (Czechoslovakia)

FINLAND

(13) Helsinki, Hungarian Exhibit, October-November (Hungary)

(14) Helsinki, East German Exhibit, May 10-31 (East Germany)

FRANCE

(15) Lyon, International Fair, April 24-May 3 (USSR)

(16) Marseille, 30th Annual Trade Fair, September 18-October 4 (Czechoslovakia)

(17) Paris, International Business Machine & Office Equipment Exhibit, October 13-24 (Czechoslovakia)

(18) Paris, 41st Salon d'Auto, October 1954 (Czechoslovakia, Hungary)

(19) Paris, International Fair, May 22-June 7 (Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland)

FRENCH MOROCCO

(20) Casablanca, International Fair, April 17-May 2 (Czechoslovakia, and Hungary)

GERMANY

(21) Frankfurt, Spring Fair, March 7-12, (Hungary and East Germany)

(22) Frankfurt, Fall Fair, September 5-9 (Hungary)

(23) Munich, Aircraft Exhibit, October 3-9 (Czechoslovakia)

ITALY

(24) Bolzano, 7th Bolzano Fair, September 17-27 (East Germany and Czechoslovakia)

(25) Padua, International Samples Fair, May 29-June 13 (USSR and satellites)

(26) Milan, 32nd International Samples Fair, April 12-28 (USSR and satellites)

(27) Verona, Trade Fair, March 7-15 (Czechoslovakia)

(28) Vicenza, 9th International Fair, July 10-25 (Czechoslovakia)

LUXEMBOURG

(29) Luxembourg, 6th International Fair, July 10-25 (Czechoslovakia)

NETHERLANDS

(30) Amsterdam, 33rd Exp. of Neth. Bicycle and Auto Assn. (R.A.I.) February 26-March 7 (USSR, Czechoslovakia and East Germany)

(31) Utrecht, 62nd International Industries Fair, March 30-April 8 (East Germany)

(32) Utrecht, 63rd International Industries Fair, September 7-16 (Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary)

SWEDEN

(33) Stockholm, St. Eriks, August 28-September 12 (Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany)

AUSTRIA

(34) Innsbruck, Export and Samples, Tourism & Sports, May (Czechoslovakia)

American Republics

ARGENTINA

(35) Mendoza, Fair of the Americas, December 53-March 54 (Czechoslovakia)

BRAZIL

(36) Sao Paulo, International Fair, October 12-January 25 (Czechoslovakia and Hungary)

Near East and Africa

EGYPT

(37) Cairo, Hungarian Exhibit, January 29 (Hungary)

(38) Cairo, East German Exhibit, March 10-30 (East Germany)

EGYPT (continued)

(39) Alexandria, Rumanian Folk Crafts Exhibit, October, (Rumania)

GREECE

(40) Salonika, International Fair, September 5-26 (USSR and satellites)

IRAN

(41) Tehran, Czech Industry Fair, November 25-December 24 (Czechoslovakia)

SYRIA

(42) Damascus, International Fair, September 2-October 1 (USSR and satellites)

TURKEY

(43) Izmir, Trade Fair, August 26-September 20 (USSR and satellites)

Far East

INDONESIA

(44) Djakarta, 2nd Indonesia International Fair, August 21-October 10 (USSR and satellites)

MALAYA

(45) Singapore, Trade Exhibition, July-August (Czechoslovakia)

F. Increased Soviet Emphasis on International Scientific Contacts

Increased Communist attention to international science has been mentioned above in connection with book and periodical exchanges, exchange of persons programs, and participation in international trade fairs and exhibits. Since the emphasis on scientific and technical matters pervades these various media, there is obviously a planned Soviet effort in this field and the subject deserves some special attention.

As with the trade fairs discussed above, the increased participation of Communist nations in international scientific affairs probably stems from a combination of factors, including the propaganda motive of seeking to impress others with Communist scientific knowledge and achievements, the dissatisfaction of Communist scientists with their near-isolation from foreign science, and the desire of Communist governments to obtain intelligence on Western scientific developments. The propaganda motive, which is our concern here, is also designed to tie in with the general Communist campaign of "relaxing international tensions" by furthering "normal" interchange with foreigners.

The propaganda advantages which the Communists seek to reap are made obvious by commentaries in press and radio which point to the progress of Soviet science and laud the Communist programs of scientific exchange with foreign countries. The last such commentary noted in 1954, a TASS transmission of December 30, provided a convenient summary in the form of a lengthy interview with Academician Alexander Nesmeyanov, President of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The chief points made in the interview were as follows:

(1) Past developments and future prospects "for strengthening the creative collaboration between Soviet and foreign scientists" are reviewed. Since scientific development is "made more fruitful only on the basis of creative collaboration among the scientists of various nations," the USSR Academy of Sciences "attaches great significance" to international scientific contacts.

(2) During 1954 Soviet delegations attended the following international scientific conferences:

The Eleventh International Congress of Ornithologists in Basel
The meeting of the executive committee of the International Astronomical Union and the International Astrophysics Conference in Liege
The International Conference of Meteroic Physics in Manchester
The International Conference of Neurchemistry in Oxford
The 23rd International Congress of Orientalists in Cambridge
The International Congress of Philosophers in Zurich
The International Conference on Population in Rome
The International Congress on Agrarian Law in Rome
The 10th General Assembly of the International Geodetic and Geophysical Union in Rome

The International Mathematics Congress in Amsterdam
The Third International Congress of Crystallographers in Paris
The Eighth International Congress of Botanists in Paris
The International Council for the Study of the Seas in Paris
The Fourth World Congress on Forestry in India

(3) During 1954 the USSR was visited by delegations of the Czechoslovak and of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, the Arab Academy of Sciences in Damascus, as well as by scientists from India, Norway, Britain, and Albania. Geographers from abroad are being invited to attend the Congress of the USSR Geographical Society scheduled for February 1955 in Moscow.

(4) "The USSR Academy of Sciences is exchanging scientific literature with the research establishments of 84 countries of the world. During 1954, more than 350,000 copies of books and periodicals have been sent abroad by the International book exchange arrangement alone."

(5) "In 1955, the USSR Academy of Sciences will be publishing 55 scientific periodicals and will be glad to publish in them, in addition to the work of Soviet research workers, the works of foreign scientists."

VI. MAJOR ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST FRONTS IN 1954

HIGH LIGHTS

Communist international fronts were active propagandists in 1954, particularly through a multitude of publications and through many meetings held for propaganda purposes.

The World Peace Council has in effect become a "super-front" in its planning and coordination of the Communist "peace" campaign. The WPC includes in its own Executive Bureau officers of other Communist fronts, in a system of interlocking directorates, and sets the themes which are in turn echoed by these other organizations.

Three major meetings were held by the WPC in 1954: full meetings of the Council in May at Berlin and in November at Stockholm, and special "Conference for the Relaxation of International Tensions" at Stockholm in June. All meetings spread the standard Communist lines, with great emphasis on the "peaceful coexistence" theme, and supported every detail of USSR policy in the year's negotiations.

The World Federation of Trade Unions and its various subordinate Trade Departments held numerous meetings during the year. Solely for propaganda purposes the WFTU sponsored a "European Trade Union Conference" held in Berlin on June 20-22, and attended by about 500 delegates. The Conference adopted resolutions which tallied with all the propaganda themes of the USSR.

The World Federation of Democratic Youth held its annual meeting in Peiping. Delegates were feted by Premier Chou En-lai and some were given trips to North Korea or Southeast Asia. The Communist press claimed that 200 delegates attended from 68 countries. The meeting adopted resolutions which repeated all current Communist propaganda slogans.

The WFDY also sponsored an International Gathering of Rural Youth in Vienna on December 9-15. The Communist press claimed an attendance of 356 delegates from 69 countries. Speakers contrasted the struggles and hardships of workers in the "capitalist" world with the alleged benefits enjoyed by workers in Communist countries, and tied this argument to other propaganda themes.

The International Union of Students held its annual meeting in Moscow and also sponsored the World University Summer Games in Budapest, attended by 2000 athletes from 32 countries. WFDY and IUS will jointly sponsor a Youth and Student Festival to be held in Warsaw in July and August, 1955.

VI. MAJOR ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST FRONTS IN 1954

A. Introduction

A full discussion of the 1954 activities of the various international Communist front organizations and their numerous bureaus, councils, subordinate organizations, and various national affiliates would require several volumes and has not been attempted here. However, from the maze of international front activities certain meetings and conferences stand out as being of particular significance. It is these developments, particularly of the major international fronts, which this chapter seeks to summarize.

B. The World Peace Council

1. Organization

In the past few years the Communist-front World Peace Council has emerged as probably the most active and influential of the international fronts. It is in a sense a "super-front," in that its Executive Bureau includes officers of the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the World Federation of Scientific Workers, and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. The WPC in effect coordinates the "peace" campaigns of these and other Communist organizations, setting the major themes which in turn are echoed by the other organizations. There is, of course, close coordination with the Cominform.

The "Council" itself is patterned after a representative legislative assembly and has 417 seats, of which 77 are filled by representatives of Communist countries. The actual governing body is the 50-member Permanent Executive Bureau, whose President (Joliot-Curie) and Secretary-General (Lafitte) are known Communists, and whose other members are generally either from Communist countries, are known Communists, or are closely associated with the Communist Party.

2. Meeting of WPC Executive Bureau in March

The WPC Executive Bureau met at Vienna on March 28-30, 1954 and issued three propaganda documents, a resolution on Europe, an "Appeal to the Peoples of Europe," and a call for international

agreement on banning all radioactive weapons. The resolutions endorsed the USSR's proposal to substitute a general European security treaty for the EDC, hinted at a similar proposal for Asia, and called for an immediate cease-fire in Indochina. They offered Europe a "Choice" in familiar propaganda terms: EDC, division, accelerated rearmament and war -- or a European treaty, unity, national independence, and reduction of armaments. The Bureau also announced that a meeting of the full WPC would be held in Berlin during May.

3. Berlin Meeting of WPC in May

At the Berlin meeting of the WPC, May 24-28, there was a notable absence of non-Communists and attendance was considerably less than the total membership of 417. In five days of propaganda speeches, the delegates harangued against the United States and adopted resolutions on atomic weapons, security, and cultural exchange. The resolution against atomic weapons asked for a ban on tests as well, and marked the start of a sustained WPC campaign to discredit U.S. policy and to exploit popular fears of the H-bomb. The "Resolution on Security" urged that EDC be scrapped, called for "peaceful settlements" in Korea and Indochina, and attacked U.S. proposals for an Asian security pact. The cultural resolution, proposed by the WPC's cultural commission, urged greater cultural exchange implied that non-Communist governments were blocking such efforts. The Council also announced the award of peace prizes to Charlie Chaplin and Dimitri Shostakovich.

4. The International Conference for the Relaxation of International Tension

On June 19-23 the WPC sponsored in Stockholm an "International Conference for the Relaxation of International Tensions," and had some success in getting attendance from non-Communists and others not previously associated with the WPC. The general resolution of the conference covered the current propaganda themes: peaceful coexistence, admission of Communist China into the UN, resumption of negotiations on Korea and Germany, a ban on tests and use of atomic weapons, limitation and control of armaments, expansion of East-West trade, and cultural exchange. An "Appeal to the Participants of the Geneva Conference" called for a cease-fire in Indochina. An "Appeal to the UN on the Events in Guatemala" condemned the assistance given the "aggressors" and called on the UN Security Council to restore the previous Guatemalan government.

5. Stockholm Meeting of WPC in November

The WPC Bureau met again in Vienna on September 13-15 to chart its course after the Indochina armistice and the French rejection of EDC. It called a full meeting of the Council, which was held in Stockholm on November 18-23. There the WPC followed the agenda laid down by the Bureau in September and passed resolutions in the following fields:

(1) "Cooperation of all European countries in organizing common security." Here the Council played on European fears (and particularly French fears) of a rearmed Germany, and offered as an alternative "negotiations which can lead to a reasonable agreement."

(2) "Conditions in various parts of Asia arising from pressure and systems of powers groups and military pacts." Here Nehru's "five principles" of peaceful coexistence were affirmed 1/, and the Council called for the termination of "foreign domination" and "intervention" in all parts of Asia, and for a ban on atomic tests in the Pacific.

(3) "The situation in Latin America caused by foreign interference in inner political life of Latin American nations." Discussions and resolutions were aimed primarily against the regional security arrangement "dominated by America" and the Guatemala issue was exploited further.

(4) "Campaign of the peace forces in favor of disarmament and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction." The Council called for a ban on nuclear tests and for an agreement outlawing nuclear weapons, as preliminaries to the general reduction of armaments and the outlawing of all weapons of mass extermination -- atomic, bacteriological, and chemical.

1/ "Mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; equality and mutual benefits; and peaceful coexistence."

(5) "Preparation of an international meeting of representatives of the peace forces throughout the world early in 1955". The Council scheduled a World Peace Congress for May 1, 1955.

In addition to its discussion of these items, the Council found time both to congratulate itself and to criticize some of its affiliates. Delegates credited themselves with having played a major role in bringing the truces in Korea and Indochina, and congratulated the Council for being able to force governments to take action by creating pressures "from the peoples" below. The European resolution declared that "it is not in the power of any government, of any parliament, to decide the destiny of a people against their will. The peoples will not allow the irreparable to happen."

As to the self-criticism, the Council's national affiliates were charged with failure to adapt international campaigns to local conditions, with a bandoning their own programs for the sake of securing new support, and with neglecting mass activity in favor of getting the support of well-known persons and organizations. It was recommended that the affiliates seek more joint action with other local groups and that they do a better job of fund-raising.

C. The World Federation of Trade Unions

1. Organization

Until 1949 the WFTU was a broadly representative international organization of both Communist and non-Communist trade unions with representation from labor organizations in both Communist and non-Communist countries. However, in the post-war years it came increasingly under Communist control and on January 19, 1949 the free trade unions withdrew and later formed their own non-Communist organization, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The WFTU has since operated as a completely Communist-dominated organization, though like the other "fronts" it seeks to put on the appearance of representing non-Communist elements as well.

The WFTU maintains a Secretariat at its Vienna headquarters, with Press and Information, Economic and Social, and Trade Union International sections. Nominally the WFTU is governed by the World Trade Union Congress, which is composed of delegates from all affiliated organizations. However, this body has only met three times since the founding of the WFTU. The real power rests with

the Executive Bureau, which is made up of the President, Secretary-General, 12 Vice-Presidents, and four Departmental Secretaries.

Within the WFTU are about 12 subordinate "Trade Departments" which are internationals in particular fields such as petroleum workers, metal and engineering workers, etc. The trade departments hold their own international meetings, in addition to those of the WFTU proper, and serve chiefly as propaganda adjuncts of the main body.

2. Meeting of WFTU Executive Bureau in March

This meeting was largely concerned with stepping up the WFTU's organizational and propaganda activity along the lines which had been marked out at its World Congress at Vienna in October 1953. The Congress had called for an intensive campaign to subvert affiliates of the non-Communist trade union internationals, while at the same time appealing to the latter for "international trade union unity." It had also urged the organization of agricultural workers in underdeveloped areas. The Bureau developed plans in these directions, called for a cease-fire in Indochina and a "general agreement on collective security among all European countries without exception," and put out a statement informing workers outside the Soviet orbit that their living conditions had grown worse during the past year.

3. The European Trade Union Conference

On June 20-22 in Berlin the WFTU sponsored a "European Trade Union Conference" solely for propaganda purposes. The meeting sought to bring pressure to bear against the ratification of EDC. Its propaganda themes tallied with those of the USSR: a general European security treaty to include the USSR, opposition to rearmament of West Germany, unification of East and West Germany, expansion of East-West trade, and a ban on tests and use of atomic weapons. The meeting was attended by about 500 delegates and the WFTU claimed that many trade union representatives were present who had never before participated in WFTU activities.

4. Seventh Session of the WFTU General Council

The Seventh Session of the WFTU General Council was held in Warsaw on December 9-14. Professional trade union matters were given little attention as the Council pursued its propaganda

objectives. Delegates criticized the London and Paris agreements, German rearmament, "war preparations," and the "sowing of hatred among nations." They passed resolutions supporting the "relaxation of international tensions," and endorsing increased economic and cultural cooperation between nations, and also one asking the "release of Polish and Soviet sailors from Kuomintang bondage." The meetings were given considerable publicity in the Communist press.

5. Trade Department Meetings

On July 3-7 the Trade Union International of Metal and Engineering Workers, a trade department of the WFTU, held its Second International Conference in Vienna. It was claimed that 213 delegates and observers from 33 countries represented 10,166,959 workers in the metal trades. (WFTU membership claims almost always are grossly exaggerated.) It was also claimed that 76 of the participants represented organizations not affiliated with the WFTU.

On September 22-25 the WFTU sponsored in Bucharest a World Conference of Chemical and Petroleum Workers. The primary purpose apparently was to affiliate the previously separate Communist-dominated petroleum unions with the WFTU's Trade Union International of Chemical Workers in a new combined international. The Communists claimed that 111 representatives from 33 countries attended the Congress.

The Miners' Trade Department of the WFTU held the Second International Miners' Conference in Prague on December 3-7. It was claimed that the 174 delegates and guests represented over five million miners. The Communist press reported that there were 59 delegates from "capitalist" countries, 28 from colonial and semi-colonial countries, 48 from Communist countries including Communist China, and 37 from trade unions not affiliated with the WFTU. Czechoslovakia made the new parliament building available to the meeting and a Czech minister welcomed the delegates.

At these and other meetings the standard line of Communist union propaganda was continued, alleging that standards of living in the Free World were deteriorating, and appealing for cooperation from non-Communist unions.

D. The World Federation of Democratic Youth

1. Organization of the WFDY

The WFDY was founded in 1945 and at first was supported widely by non-Communist as well as Communist groups, since it claimed to be non-political. However, it soon showed its bias in favor of Soviet policies and by 1949 most of its non-Communist members had resigned to form their own non-Communist organization, the World Assembly of Youth (WAY).

The Council of the WFDY is composed of one representative from each affiliated organization. It meets every year, usually behind the Iron Curtain. The Executive Committee consists of 23 officials elected from the Council -- the President, the Secretary-General, seven Vice-Presidents, 13 secretaries, and the Treasurer. Of these 23, four are members of Communist-controlled organizations and 11 are either known Communists or representatives of Soviet bloc countries. The Secretariat of the WFDY is in Budapest, having been expelled from Paris in 1951 for subversive activities.

2. Annual Meeting of WFDY Council

The WFDY Council held its annual meeting in Peiping on August 9-15, 1954, with Communist propaganda claiming 200 participants from 68 countries. Apparently Communist China was chosen as the site of the meeting with the deliberate purpose of indicating to the delegates that "the era of colonialism" in the Far East has passed. The delegates were banqueted by Premier Chou En-lai and many were given trips to Korea and Southeast Asia as well.

The Peiping meeting was strictly for Communist political and propaganda purposes, and adopted all of the current slogans on peaceful coexistence, a negotiated peace in Korea, a general security treaty in Europe with the USSR as a member, and appeals to ban nuclear weapons.

The Council was also concerned with plans for sponsoring an "International Gathering of Rural Youth," described below, and for staging the Fifth World Festival of Youth and Students in Warsaw during July and August of 1955, in cooperation with the IUS. It was announced that a "most representative international preparatory committee" would be chosen to plan the 1955 Warsaw Youth Festival.

3. The International Gathering of Rural Youth

The most important event sponsored by the WFDY in 1954 was an "International Gathering of Rural Youth" held in Vienna on December 9-15. Organizing and propaganda for this event had been going forward during the year, as the WFDY intensified its drive to organize rural youth.

The Communist press claimed an attendance of 356 delegates from 69 countries at the "Gathering," broken down as follows: 310 men and 46 women; 254 farmers, agricultural workers, and tenants; 62 officers of youth organizations, rural trade unions, and rural youth organizations; 28 teachers and agricultural engineers; 31 industrial workers; and 9 deputies. The largest delegations were reported to be from Germany (28), France (23), Communist China (18), Japan (14), India (10), Argentina (10), Brazil (5 to 15), and Indonesia (2 to 7).

The conference propaganda was what might have been expected. The speakers contrasted the struggles and hardships of rural workers in the "capitalist" world with the growing benefits which rural workers allegedly enjoy in Communist countries. Other current Communist themes were brought in by arguing that the plight of rural youth in non-Communist countries was caused by high taxes to support military expenditures, by "colonialism," and by lack of trade with the Communist world.

The conference adopted the usual "appeals" for disarmament, a ban on nuclear weapons, action to prevent the rearming of West Germany, more East-West trade, and the "peaceful solution" of international disputes.

In addition, the gathering adopted a "World Charter of Rural Youth," which is to serve as the basis for future action by the national groups represented at the meeting. The charter calls on rural youth to fight for

". . .national independence, abolition of feudalism, land, work and better pay, recognition of all civil rights and democratic freedoms, equal pay and working conditions regardless of race and nationality, a lowering of taxes, long term loans, irrigation and land improvement, health protection, and access to health facilities, recreation, cultural and sports activities and entertainment. . ."

E. The International Union of Students

1. Organization of the IUS

Although the IUS claims to represent "the democratic students of the whole world," in reality it is dominated by the Soviet bloc and Communist youth organizations elsewhere. Since 1947 student unions of 14 non-Communist nations have disaffiliated with IUS in protest against its pro-Soviet policies, and have set up the Coordinating Secretariat of National Unions of Students (COSEC). Today only nine student unions which are representative and non-Communist remain in the IUS, and all other national affiliates are Communist or Communist-dominated.

The World Students Congress is nominally the highest body of the IUS, but it has met only twice since 1946. Actual power is wielded by the Communist-dominated Council and its smaller Executive Committee. The Secretariat is located in Prague. IUS is an "autonomous associate member" of the WFDY and works closely with that organization.

2. Annual Meeting of the IUS Council

The IUS Council held its annual meeting in Moscow on August 20-26. Strenuous efforts had been made to obtain the attendance of non-Communist delegations and representatives of non-affiliated student groups. These efforts resulted in the presence of a number of non-Communist representatives, some of whom took advantage of the occasion by denouncing the IUS as a Communist body and otherwise criticizing its obvious political bias.

Although the IUS meeting promoted certain Communist propaganda themes, it also devoted a great deal of earnest attention to problems of its organization and program, as reflected in the printed report of the meeting's resolutions and recommendations. A number of IUS commissions on particular subjects made their reports to the Council, including the Commission on the Academic and Economic Problems of Students, the Commission on Student Faculty and Cultural Cooperation and Educational Travel, the Commission on Physical Education and Sports, the Commission on Problems of Students of Colonial, Dependent and Underdeveloped Countries, and the Press Commission. The printed report of the IUS indicates that the general resolutions, and the reports of the

various commissions, were for the most part adopted unanimously except for abstentions by the National Student Union of Finland on a number of particular sections and paragraphs.

The IUS made it clear that it will continue to strive for "unity of action" with non-Communist student groups, particularly in selected fields such as music, medicine, architecture, or sports.

As already noted, the IUS plans to cooperate with the WFDY in sponsoring the 1955 Youth and Student Festival in Warsaw.

3. World University Summer Games

Among its other activities the IUS sponsored the holding of the World University Summer Games in Budapest from July 31 to August 8. This event was attended by over 2,000 athletes from 32 countries including East Germany, Britain, Egypt, Holland, India, China, North Korea, Lebanon, Poland, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay and Chile. At the opening ceremony the word "Peace" appeared on the scoreboard in various languages, and 5,000 pigeons were released. Speeches at related ceremonies stressed that the University Games "marked a new stage in the friendship of the peoples."

F. Meetings of Other International Fronts

1. The Women's International Democratic Federation

The WIDF sponsored a Conference of American Women held in Rio de Janeiro on August 27-31. TASS stated that over 360 delegates representing nine of the Latin American republics attended. The conference sent a message of solidarity to the Women of Guatemala.

The WIDF Executive Bureau met in Berlin on November 2-3, and issued statements saying that "the ending of the war in Asia and the defeat of the European Defense Community were a triumph of the spirit of negotiation over methods of violence." The meeting attacked the London and Paris agreements and made appeals for banning atomic weapons. It also proposed the convening of a "World Conference of Mothers in Defense of Their Children, Against War, For Disarmament, and Friendship Between the Peoples."

2. The International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR)

The FIR, a Communist-front war veterans' organization, sponsored as its major activity of the year an International Resistance Rally in Vienna on November 24-27. Official announcements claimed attendance by 610 delegates from 19 European countries. The meeting adopted a manifesto against the rearming of Western Germany.

3. The International Association of Democratic Lawyers

The IADL opened 1954 with an international conference in Vienna on January 4-7, with a total claimed attendance of 300 delegates from 31 countries. Austrian delegates constituted about one-third of the participants, with the largest foreign delegations coming from Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Under the guise of discussing legal problems, the conference in fact was a propaganda forum against alleged western "colonialism" and against the alleged lack of justice and liberty in the non-Communist world.

4. Other Organizations

Other international Communist fronts active during the year were the Committee for Promotion of International Trade (CPIT), the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW), and the International Broadcasting Organization (OIR). These held various meetings, particularly of their councils and executive bureaus, but none seemed to attract major attention.

The rapid establishment and successful development of the Communist-front "Friends of Guatemala" in Latin America showed how quickly the Communists are prepared to act in a particular instance, and how successfully they are able to appeal on issues connected with real or imagined grievances of native populations.

VII. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

HIGH LIGHTS

Communist strength remains impressive in Western Europe in spite of set-backs since the period of their peak strength prior to 1947. Communist Parties of the area have about 3 million members and in national elections the Communists poll about 13 million votes. Their electoral strength is particularly great in Italy, where the Communists in 1953 polled 6.1 million votes in addition to the 3.4 million votes which went to the Communist-allied Socialist Party.

Primary objectives of Communist propaganda are to drive a wedge between Western Europe and the United States, and to undermine efforts in Western Europe toward integrated military, economic, and political defense measures.

Communist propaganda bitterly attacked, in sustained campaigns, Western moves to integrate a rearmed Germany into the European defense system, and threatened dire consequences. This was fitted into the "peaceful coexistence" context, with Communists arguing that the USSR stands for peace and disarmament whereas the United States stands for war and imperialism.

East-West trade was also the subject of a sustained propaganda drive, with the Communists urging that Western Europe increase its trade with the Soviet bloc.

Broadcasting by the East European satellites to Western Europe was increased significantly in 1954. The combined Soviet orbit schedule to Western Europe was increased by 74.5 hours per week, to a total of 649.5 hours per week at the end of the year. In addition, Communist East Germany broadcasts 15.5 hours per week of programs intended for West Germans, and the clandestine station "Radio Espana Independiente," positively linked with Moscow, broadcasts 39 hours per week to Spain. Communist broadcasts to Western Europe thus were totalling 704 hours per week at the end of 1954.

Trade, technical, and cultural delegations travelling to and from Soviet orbit countries increased substantially in 1954. In particular, there was a much greater flow of delegations coming into Western Europe from the orbit.

Communist press and periodical production continued at a high level. The proliferation of Communist-dominated front groups and friendship societies, which are particularly numerous in Western Europe, were active as usual in support of all Communist programs.

VII. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

A. Communism in Western Europe

1. Strength

The Communist Party is legal in all countries of Western Europe with the exception of Ireland, Portugal and Spain, where it is a clandestine organization. The Communist Party membership in Western Europe is estimated to be about 3 million out of a total population of some 275 million. Two-thirds of all the Western European Communists are located in a single country -- Italy, and half of the remainder in France. The remaining half million Communist Party members are unevenly distributed among the other countries of Western Europe, ranging from a low of 3,000 in Luxembourg (total population, about 300,000) to a high of about 150,000 in Austria (total population, about 7 million).

At the most recent general elections the various legal Communist parties polled about 12.9 million votes -- 16.3 million, if the votes of the Italian Socialist Party which is closely allied with the Italian Communist Party are included -- out of a total poll of slightly more than 100 million Italy accounted for about half of this Communist vote -- almost two-thirds if the Italian Socialist Party vote is included, and France for another third. The remaining two million Communist votes were unevenly distributed among the other Western European countries, ranging from a low of about 22,000 in the United Kingdom to a high of more than 433,000 in Finland.

During 1954 there were national general elections in only two countries -- Finland and Luxembourg. In Finland the Communist Party increased its popular support from 23.4% to 29.2% of the popular vote and its parliamentary representation from 21.5% to 22.5% of the seats. In Luxembourg the Communist Party's popular support declined from 10.0% to 8.9% and its parliamentary representation from 7.7% to 5.8% of the seats.

The table on the following page, based largely on the November 17, 1953 issue of the London Times, gives estimates of the strength of the various national Communist parties in order of the percentage magnitude of their popular support in the last national election. The figures for Finland and Luxembourg, where

general elections have been held since publication of the Times article, have been revised to reflect the new situation.

Estimated Strength of Communist Parties in Western Europe
(Based on Latest National Elections)

Country 1/	Estimated party membership	Vote in most recent election	% of total poll	Representation in legislative house	
				No.	%
Finland 2/	50,000	433,452	29.2	45 (200)	22.5
France 3/	400,000	4,260,300	25.0	96 (627)	15.3
Italy 4/	2,093,500	6,120,709	22.6	143 (590)	24.2
Iceland	1,500	12,396	16.0	7 (52)	13.5
Saar	7,000	41,000	9.0	4 (50)	8.0
Luxembourg 5/	3,000	211,472	8.9	3 (52)	5.8
Netherlands	25,000	328,641	6.0	6 (100)	6.0
Austria	150,000	228,228	5.4	4 (165)	2.4
Norway	8,000	89,900	5.1	3 (150)	2.0
Belgium	25,000	234,325	4.8	7 (212)	3.3
Denmark	21,000	83,706	4.3	8 (151)	5.3
Sweden	28,000	164,000	4.3	5 (230)	2.2
Switzerland	8,000	25,100	3.0	5 (196)	2.6
W. Germany	80,000	607,413	2.2	0 (487)	0.0
N. Ireland	600	1,207	0.5	0 (52)	0.0
United Kingdom	35,700	21,642	0.1	0 (625)	0.0

1/ Officially there is no Communist Party in the Republic of Ireland, only the Irish Workers' League "with a few Communist members." In both Spain and Portugal the Communist Party is illegal and exists only as an underground movement.

2/ March, 1954

3/ Exclusive of the associated Groupe des Republicains Progressistes, who polled 146,000 (0.7%) votes and returned 4 members to parliament.

4/ Exclusive of the closely associated Nenni Socialist Party (P.S.I.) which polled 3,441,014 (12.7%) votes and returned 75 members to the lower chamber.

5/ May 1954. Due to the Luxembourg system of weighted proportional representation the popular vote (2,369,574) is a multiple vote which is far in excess of the actual population (about 300,000). Hence the 211,472 Communist votes would actually represent about 4,100 Communist voters.

Electorally, the Communists are important in four countries -- Italy, France, Finland and Iceland. In Italy the Communist Party polled 22.6% of the popular vote and obtained 24.2% of the seats in the last general election -- 35.3% of the popular vote and 37.0% of the seats, if the Italian Socialist Party be included with the Italian Communist Party. In France the Communist Party polled 25.0% of the popular vote and obtained 15.3% of the seats in the lower house. In Finland the Communist Party polled 29.2% of the popular vote and obtained 22.5% of the seats. In Iceland the Communist Party polled 16.0% of the popular vote and obtained 13.5% of the parliamentary seats. In the other Western European countries the local Communist parties polled less than 10% of the popular vote and obtained fewer than 10% of the parliamentary seats -- no Communists were elected to the parliaments of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and Western Germany.

2. Objectives

Despite the current Communist stress on the Lenin-Stalin theme of "peaceful coexistence" of the Communist and capitalist worlds, the fundamental Communist objective vis-a-vis Western Europe is its eventual communization and subordination to the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the long-and short-range Communist policy towards Western Europe is, on the one hand, to foster those conditions which would facilitate a Communist take-over, and, on the other hand, to prevent the emergence or development of situations inimical to the realization of this goal.

Currently the major Communist emphasis is directed towards preventing the creation of a viable European economy and an effective military deterrent to the further spread of Communist imperialism. Specifically, the Communist policy is to weaken the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to prevent the rearmament of Western Germany and its adherence to the western alliance, and to obtain the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe -- in short to undermine and obstruct the Western European will and ability to create in conjunction with the U.S. a powerful political, economic and military deterrent to Soviet aggression.

3. Tactics: Political, Industrial, Cultural, Mass Communications, Organizations

To implement these objectives the Communists have adopted a variety of tactics which are pursued with varying degrees of emphasis in virtually all of the countries of Western Europe.

a. Political. On the political plane, the local Communist parties seek representation on the national, provincial and municipal levels. In support of their political activities they hold mass rallies, parades and demonstrations whenever feasible. In view of their general inability to elect enough representatives to form purely Communist governments they have intermittently resorted to the tactic of the "united front" -- offering to support other parties, usually socialist or labor, for the achievement of certain limited objectives, primarily those desired by the Communists. In addition they seek to infiltrate the civil service, particularly in the most sensitive government areas.

b. Industrial. On the industrial plane, Communists seek control of the trade union movement through infiltration -- concentrating their major efforts on trade unions in the strategic industries and major transportation facilities. Once they have gained a position of power in a trade union they have not hesitated to use it for purely Communist purposes -- encouraging slow-downs, wildcat strikes and even one-or-two-day "general strikes" ostensibly for purely economic trade union reasons but actually to impede economic recovery and the rearmament effort.

c. Cultural. On the cultural plane, the local Communist parties emphasize the superiority of the native cultural heritage to that of the "materialistic" and "barbaric" United States and in conjunction with the local Soviet friendship society sponsor selective "cultural" exchanges between the Soviet Union and their own countries.

d. Mass Media. On the mass communication media plane, Communists establish daily newspapers, weeklies, and monthly journals of opinion, wherever possible, in order to spread dissension and advance the Communist cause. Although nowhere do they control radio or television stations, they seek to influence their programs through subtle infiltration of their personnel.

e. Organizations. On the organization plane -- be they women, youth, consumer, civil rights, educational, cultural, scientific, literary, etc., organizations -- the Communists seek to organize their own fronts and to infiltrate existing organizations with the object of transforming them into "mouthpieces" of thinly disguised Communist causes.

B. Communist Propaganda in Western Europe

1. Major Objectives

The fundamental objective of Communist propaganda in Western Europe is to create a climate of opinion favorable to the eventual communization of Western Europe and its subordination to the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the immediate underlying objectives of the Communist propaganda effort in Western Europe are, on the one hand, to encourage the development of situations favorable to the realization of their long-range objective, and on the other hand, to prevent the emergence of situations deemed detrimental to the eventual communization of Western Europe.

On the premise that this fundamental objective is currently endangered by the U. S.-sponsored economic rehabilitation and military rearmament of Western Europe, the Communists have tailored their propaganda toward the immediate objective of driving a wedge between the U. S. and its European allies and of undermining and obstructing the Western European will and economic ability to construct a powerful economic and military deterrent to the Communist threat, both internal and external.

Specifically, Communist propaganda in Western Europe seeks the disbandment of NATO and its replacement by a general European security system including the Soviet Union and its satellites; rejection of the proposed Western European Union (formerly EDC) with its concomitant of West German rearmament; international prohibition of both the manufacture and use of nuclear and fissionable weapons, accompanied by an equal percentage reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons; disbandment of U. S. bases in Western Europe and its dependencies and the withdrawal of U. S. troops -- in short, the abandonment of all internal and external policies which could strengthen Western Europe and its overseas possessions against the threat of both internal and external Communism.

2. Major Themes

Basically, Communist propaganda in Western Europe (whether it be of domestic or foreign origin) stresses three major themes, but with countless local variations.

(a) That the Soviet Union stands for world peace, disarmament and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen bombs, the "peaceful coexistence" of the Communist and capitalist worlds, national independence (political, economic, cultural and military), the ending of colonialism, and unrestricted East-West trade.

(b) That the United States stands for world war, rearmament and the atomic and hydrogen bombs, a "capitalist crusade" against Communism, the subordination of national interests and aspirations to those of the United States, colonialism and imperialism, and the stifling of Western European economic development by denying access to both the U. S. and Communist markets.

(c) That by aligning itself with the United States through the medium of NATO, WEU, Mutual Assistance pacts, East-West trade restrictions, etc., the countries of Western Europe are increasing the danger of an atomic world war, bankrupting their economies, lowering their standards of living, and sacrificing their national independence and aspirations to those of the United States.

In picturing the United States as aggressively seeking world domination, Communist propaganda characterizes NATO, the projected rearming of Western Germany under WEU, U. S. military bases in Western Europe and its dependencies, the various U. S. mutual defense pacts both in Europe and Asia, the U. S. refusal to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs without a rigid system of international inspection and control, the U. S.-sponsored restrictions on trade in strategic materials with the Soviet and Communist Chinese bloc, etc., as thinly-disguised aggressive moves in the overall U. S. strategy for a "capitalist crusade" against the Soviet Union and international communism.

In depicting the current Western European rearmament program as an "arms race" which is bankrupting the Western

European countries and lowering their standards of living, Communist propaganda stresses that it was "imposed" by an imperialistic-minded United States on a "reluctant" Western Europe and without any consideration of its repercussions upon the Western European economy.

In alleging that Western Europe has foolishly and needlessly aligned itself with the U.S. anti-Communist camp, because the Soviet Union has no aggressive designs upon Western Europe or its overseas dependencies, Communist propaganda stresses that in the process of subordinating its national interests and aspirations to those of the United States, Western Europe has lost its "independence" on all levels of national existence -- political, economic, military, and cultural. This national independence, Communist propaganda subtly suggests, could be easily regained if the various countries of Western Europe were to sever their military alliance with the United States and "revert" to the earlier system of bilateral non-aggression pacts with the Soviet Union -- in short, by adopting essentially a program of neutralism.

Communist propaganda against the U.S.-Spanish military pact and WEU is illustrative of how the Communists work both sides of the propaganda street without foregoing their ultimate objective. Whereas WEU is represented in France as a U.S. plot for the rearming of military-minded West Germans seeking revenge for their defeat in World War II, in West Germany it is denounced as a U.S. plot for keeping Germany permanently divided and ensuring French domination of the European continent. Similarly, whereas in Spain the U.S.-Spanish military pact is described as a device for embroiling innocent Spaniards in a quarrel which is no concern of theirs, in the rest of Western Europe it is offered as patent proof of the fascistic and totalitarian tendencies which have engulfed the United States and determine its foreign policies.

To achieve their immediate objective, the creation of a climate of opinion hostile to Western European-United States collaboration in world affairs, Communist propaganda relies heavily on the technique of constant repetition and three major psychological stimuli -- the sentiment of nationalism and patriotism, the instinct of fear and suspicion, and the desire to select the carrot in the "carrot-and-stick" alternative.

By evoking a strong nostalgia for the days when individual Western European nations dominated the world, Communist propaganda hopes to induce a sharp revulsion to its present "ignoble dependence" upon the "upstart," "brash" and "crude" United States. By stressing the sharply defined antithesis of the Soviet dove of peace and survival, on the one hand, and of the U.S. sword of atomic destruction, on the other hand, Communist propaganda hopes that the Western European will-to-survive and its fears of another "liberation" will rip apart its military alliance with the United States. By couching their propaganda in a "carrot-and-stick" format, Communists hope that a narrow interpretation of self-interest will induce Western Europe to make the "correct" choice between Soviet and U.S. world policies

3. Recent Developments

During 1954 there have been at least three important developments in the Communist propaganda offensive against Western Europe -- a greater emphasis upon the theme of "peaceful coexistence," an intensified East-West trade campaign, and a decided step-up in the number of Soviet cultural exchanges with Western Europe, all designed to split off Western Europe from the United States.

With the calling of the Geneva Conference in the spring of 1954, "peaceful coexistence," which has always been a Communist propaganda theme, was refurbished and made a major plank in the current Communist propaganda campaign in Western Europe.

Ever since the adoption of the US Battle Act in 1951 Communist propaganda has stressed the advantages to Western Europe of an increased volume of trade with the Soviet bloc, and since the Geneva Conference the Communist Chinese market has been increasingly dangled as bait before the export-hungry eyes of Western Europe. In the past year official Communist Chinese trade delegations have not only visited the UK and a number of other Western European countries, but formal invitations have been extended to them to send similar trade delegations to Communist China to explore the prospects of an increased two-way trade between Western Europe and China.

Up to the beginning of 1954 Communist "cultural exchanges" with Western Europe were largely a one-way flow -- from Western Europe to the Soviet Union and its orbit on special invitation.

Lately the Soviet Union has not only tended to be less selective as to its invitations and the composition of these visiting delegations, but has increasingly reciprocated in kind. Cultural missions of all kinds are now being sent to countries where formerly none had been sent in the recent past. For example, during the past year the UK, which had been persistently by-passed by Soviet cultural delegations in the past, has been visited by the Moscow ballet, Soviet athletic teams, Russian teachers and students, etc.

C. Local Communist Propaganda

Indigenous Communist propaganda in Western Europe is the shared responsibility of the local Communist Party, its various front organizations and the local Soviet and satellite friendship societies.

1. Propaganda Apparatus

The vehicles for the dissemination of domestic Communist propaganda (which is basically similar in nature to that originating abroad) are, in descending order of importance, (a) political activities of the local Communist party -- even where it has no political representation it is able to publicize its views by means of mass meetings, parades, demonstrations, publicity handouts, public agitation, house-to-house canvassing, etc.; (b) local Communist press -- without exception the local Communist parties publish at least one daily newspaper (in the UK there is one Communist daily with an estimated circulation of some 87,700: in Italy 9 with a combined circulation of some 570,000: in France 14 with a combined circulation of about 750,000: and in West Germany 16 with a combined circulation of about 125,000), a number of weekly and monthly periodicals, and occasional tracts and monographs, all of which are ordinarily published by Communist printing concerns and distributed through Communist bookstores and other outlets; (c) trade unions -- although most trade unions are not Communist-dominated (except in France and Italy), some of the more important ones are, and even those which are not Communist-controlled do provide occasional public forums for the airing of Communist views and causes; (d) Communist front organizations -- even in a country like the United Kingdom where the Communist Party is weak there are at least 50 known Communist front organizations; (e) Soviet and satellite friendship societies -- there has been a sharp rise in their activities during 1954, particularly on the cultural and exchange levels, and there are growing indications (particularly in

Italy and the United Kingdom) that increasingly these friendship societies are functioning as the vehicle for the local Soviet information, cultural and propaganda program; and (f) individual contacts -- all Communist parties carry on a vigorous proselytizing campaign on all levels of society.

2. Propaganda Expenditures

No firm data on Communist propaganda expenditures in Western Europe are available -- Communist finances are a closely-guarded secret. However, the Italian government has estimated that the Italian Communist Party has an annual budget of at least $40 million and possibly as high as $48 million. A recent estimate by the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. places the "calculable expenditures by and for the Communist Party of Great Britain and its causes" at half a million dollars per year. This estimate it labelled as a "conservative" one.

D. External Communist Propaganda to Western Europe

1. General

External Communist propaganda to Western Europe is the shared responsibility of the Soviet Union, its satellites, and their various international front organizations such as the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, etc.

The vehicles for the dissemination of the foreign-origin Communist propaganda are: (a) Soviet and satellite radio broadcasts in the language of the recipient country, as discussed below; (b) travel of "cultural groups", other delegations, and individuals both to and from the Soviet orbit; (c) Soviet and satellite periodicals in the language of the recipient country, such as News, New Times, Soviet Literature, Soviet Union, Soviet Woman, etc.; (d) Soviet and satellite films, shown commercially in the "art" theatres of some countries, and entered in international film festivals such as the Cannes Festival in 1954 and the Edinburgh Festival of documentary films in 1954; and (e) translations in the language of the recipient country of Soviet and satellite books and scholarly or professional articles.

2. Communist Broadcasting to Western Europe

The table which follows shows the distribution of Communist broadcasting to Western Europe by languages and by the origin of broadcasts.

Weekly Hours of Communist Broadcasting to Western Europe
(December 31, 1953 Compared with December 31, 1954)

Languages	Originating Countries					
	USSR		European Satellites		Total USSR and Satellites	
	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954
English	31:30	31:30	66:05	75:15	97:35	106:45
French	21:00	21:00	75:40	90:30	96:40	111:30
German (Aust.)	7:00	10:30	5:50	14:00	12:50	24:30
German (Germ.)	35:00	31:30	60:40	68:30	95:40	100:00
Italian	21:00	21:00	78:15	96:00	99:15	117:00
Spanish	14:00	14:00	38:30	38:50	52:30	52:50
Danish	7:00	7:00	11:30	12:00	18:30	19:00
Dutch	7:00	7:00	-	-	7:00	7:00
Finnish	20:30	18:00	13:50	22:30	34:20	40:30
Norwegian	10:00	10:00	3:30	3:30	13:30	13:30
Portuguese	3:30	3:30	-	-	3:30	3:30
Swedish	8:30	10:00	21:20	21:50	29:50	31:50
Other (Yiddish, concerts, etc.,)	8:00	8:00	5:50	12:30	13:50	21:30
W. Eur. Total	194:00	193:00	381:00	456:25	575:00	649:25

NOTES:

1. Figures represent total transmission time, including repeats, as no exact differentiation between original program hours and repeat transmissions is available.

2. USSR figures include output of Radio Moscow as well as all other USSR stations originating broadcasts for abroad.

3. The international broadcasting of Communist China does not include any programming to Western Europe.

4. In addition to the figures shown, East Germany broadcasts 15 1/2 hours per week intended primarily for West German audiences.

5. In addition to the figures shown, the Communist clandestine station "Radio Espana Independiente" broadcasts 39 hours per week in Spanish.

During 1954 there was a significant increase of 74 1/2 hours per week in broadcasts to Western Europe from the USSR and the satellites, from 575 hours per week as of December, 1953 to 649 1/2 hours as of December, 1954. (These figures do not include 15 1/2 hours per week of East German broadcasting intended primarily for West Germany, and 39 hours per week broadcast in Spanish by the clandestine "Radio Espana Independiente." The inclusion of these latter figures would bring the overall total of Communist broadcasting to Western Europe, as of December, 1954, to 704 hours per week.)

The 1954 increase in Communist broadcasting to Western Europe took place in satellite output, while USSR output remained constant. The increase was spread mainly over the following language services: English, French, German (to Austria), Italian, and Finnish.

In connection with the emphasis on Finnish output, it should be noted that until 1952, satellite broadcasting to Scandinavia was almost nonexistent. Now satellite broadcasts to Scandinavia amount to an impressive total of 60 hours per week, which is more time than USSR broadcasts devote to that area.

The figures for French and Italian language broadcasts include programs prepared by the French and Italian Communist Parties under the direction of the Cominform. These broadcasts are transmitted over the facilities of several satellites. While the transmitters are technically identifiable, the source of the programs is not announced. This fact, coupled with the style used, creates the illusion of a "home service" broadcast and the average listener is probably not aware of its foreign origin.

East Germany has no international service, yet certain of its propaganda broadcasts are intended mainly for West Germany. The content and duration of these broadcasts are subject to frequent change.

Overt broadcasting to Spain has undergone no significant change. Also, the clandestine station "Radio Espana Independiente" controlled by the Spanish Communist Party in exile, has maintained its output to Spain at the level of about 39 hours per week for quite a few years. Technical clues positively link this clandestine station with Radio Moscow.

E. A Case Study: Communist Cultural Activities in Italy

1. Introduction

Although Communist countries do not through their embassies conduct extensive overt cultural programs in Italy, Communists sponsor a large number of front organizations which are designed to convince Italians of the superior aspects of life in Communist countries and to provide them with proper guidance on ideological matters. Parallel to these organizations are a large number of indigenous cultural groups, supervised and co-ordinated by the Central Cultural Commission of the Italian Communist party.

2. Organizations and Programs Sponsored by the Soviet Union

a. Overt Cultural Activities of the Soviet Embassy in Rome. The Soviet Embassy's cultural program includes the operation of a library in the Embassy; traveling exhibits of art, books, films, photographs, (and industrial products), which are sent to the more important Italian cities; the publication of an illustrated fortnightly, Soviet News, which is directed toward the well-educated; and the sponsorship of outstanding Soviet concert and ballet artists at Italian musical festivals. In addition the Sovexport Film Company, which has offices in seven large Italian cities, rents films to commercial theatres and lends them to Communist organizations.

b. The Italian Association for Cultural Relations with the USSR. The Italian Association for Cultural Relations with the USSR is the principal Soviet sponsored cultural organization operating in Italy and functions as the Soviet Union's chief propaganda agency in Italy. Not only do Soviet diplomats participate prominently in its public meetings, but the common suspicion is that it is likewise subsidized by the Soviet Embassy in Rome.

Established shortly after the war, the Association which had a reported membership of about 150,000 in November 1953, directs its activities toward educated persons through twenty-two centers, located principally in large cities where Italian universities are situated. Each center supervises the activities of a number of affiliated clubs in its area.

The Association's programs include lectures on the Soviet Union; the showing of Soviet films; the publication of a Monthly

Review of the Soviet Press, a Quarterly Review of Soviet Scientific Publications, and a weekly publication entitled Soviet Reality, which emphasizes Soviet "peace" activities. In addition, the Association sponsors an extensive two-way exchange of persons program, which consists of sending selected Italian university professors, labor leaders, youth leaders, doctors and scientists, etc., to the Soviet Union for guided tours, and the sponsorship of Soviet groups in Italy.

3. Cultural Relations with Soviet Satellites

a. Poland. In April 1952 the Italo-Polish Cultural Association was established to "publicize and diffuse Polish literary, artistic and scientific works". The organization published Poland Today, compiled by the Press Office of the Polish Embassy in Rome and subsidizes the publication in Italian of some Polish books. The Association likewise sends political leaders and businessmen to Poland, holds a "Polish Art Show" and a "Polish Folklore Show" yearly, and encourages the showing of Polish films at Italian trade fairs.

b. Rumania. The Italo-Rumanian Association was formed in January 1951 with headquarters in Rome. The organization publishes a monthly review covering developments in Rumanian industry, agriculture, sanitation, education and art.

c. Other. Albania, Communist China, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have all established friendship associations in Italy, but to date their activities have been relatively unimportant. The Italy-Albania Association, with headquarters in Rome, publishes and distributes a magazine, New Albania; the Italy-Popular China Association's efforts have been limited to date to the publication of a periodical - Study Center for the Development of Economic and Cultural Relations With China; the Italo-Czechoslovakia Association was formed in January 1953; and late in 1951 a group of Communist parliamentarians formed the Italy-Hungary Association.

4. Cultural Activities Sponsored by the Italian Communist Party and its Fronts.

The Central Cultural Commission of the Italian Communist Party supervises a vast cultural program involving the publication

of magazines and books, the promotion of theatrical and cinematographic artists and performances, and the direction of numerous subsidiary organizations which are immediately responsible for these programs.

a. Magazines Three "cultural" magazines are published by the Italian Communist Party and are considered to be vitally important vehicles in reaching Italian intellectuals. Sociata' (Society), the most important of these is a theoretical quarterly designed for scholars and intellectuals. Rinascita' (Renaissance), a monthly, is personally edited by Palmiro Togliatti, Secretary of the party, and it contains political cultural articles aimed at the educated who read it widely. Vie Nuove (New Ways) is edited by Luigi Longo, Vice-Secretary of the party.

b. Books and Libraries The popular Book Center is the national Communist organization responsible for the selection, publication, and distribution of Communist-approved books. Nine large publishing houses print books for the organization, which are distributed to both its own local book centers and to scores of Case del Popolo (Houses of the People) libraries throughout Italy. In addition, the center promotes lectures on Soviet books; trains activists to stimulate the sale of its books; conducts neighborhood book shows for children; and presents thousands of its books free to workers in target areas.

c. Theatre and Cinema The Communist party's activity in the field of theatre and cinema is limited to promoting those artists and productions which follow the Communist line. These efforts are supervised by the Center for Theatre and Popular Spectacles which, in addition to promoting plays through the Cooperative of Italian Spectacles, publishes its own periodical Theatre of Today. The Popular Cinematographic organizes movie showings for workers in industrial areas. The Charlie Chapin Clubs, another unit of Communist cultural activity, include university students and present films of approved ideological character to university student groups. The Italian Federation of Cinema Clubs, although now formally separated from the party, is directed by Communist sympathizers and is subject to Communist influence. These clubs promote attendance at specified movies, often those specifically approved by the Party.

d. Fronts In addition to the organizations directly controlled by the Italian Communist Party, a number of its youth, women's and labor fronts engage in fairly extensive cultural programs of their own, particularly in the fields of publications, films and exchange of persons - all of which are designed to promote closer cultural relations with Soviet Union and its satellites.

VIII. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND AFRICA

HIGH LIGHTS

The goal of Communist propaganda is to end Western influence in countries of this area, eventually to align them with the Communist bloc, and in the interim to increase the already widespread neutralism

Front groups are numerous and are of particular importance in this area, carrying on propaganda and infiltration in countries where the Communist Party itself has been outlawed.

"United Front" tactics are widely employed by Communists in this area, who are willing to create temporary alliances with moderate or even conservative political elements when they can agree on a program. Nationalist and anti-Western views of numerous non-Communist groups provide a common ground for cooperation with the Communists, and are exploited to the hilt by Communist propaganda. Infiltration of non-Communist organizations and governments supplements the "United Front" approach. Communist infiltration of Iran's civil service was exposed in 1954. The motion picture industry in India has been infiltrated by Communists.

The coexistence theme has had heavy treatment in Communist propaganda, which attacks all Western defense efforts in the area and contrasts the "warlike and imperialistic" policy of the West with the "peace" policy of Communism. The "five principles" enunciated by Nehru and Chou En-lai are used to complement the "peace" theme, and Nehru's policy of non-alignment is praised along with his role as "peacemaker."

Communist broadcasting to the Near East from the USSR and the East European satellites in Arabic, Greek, and Turkish was increased significantly in 1954.

Communist publications, both imported and domestic, continued to flood the area. Communist pamphlets and journals are often distributed free, and books are sold at a small fraction of their actual production costs.

Communist motion pictures, imported from the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Communist China, are shown in the area and get their greatest distribution in India and Ceylon.

Exchanges of trade, technical, professional and cultural delegations with Communist nations increased markedly during 1954.

VIII. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND AFRICA

A. Communism in the Area

1. Communist Strength

The strength of the Communists in the countries of the Near East, South Asia and Africa is based not so much on large membership in the party as it is on their adoption of slogans with wide popular appeal. Communist party membership is relatively small, the largest being in India where there are an estimated 40,000 members, and the party is banned* in most countries of the area. The Communists develop and rely on front groups to appeal to the people in terms of their specific dissatisfactions, or identify themselves with the national movements that express those dissatisfactions.

With increased intensity during the past year the Communists have emphasized the indigenous cries of nationalism and anti-imperialism, shrewdly capitalizing on existing fears of economic exploitation by Western powers and military involvement with them. Their concentration on these slogans -- along with the growing impression that the USSR has shifted to more peaceful tactics in its international dealings and that local Communists are more moderate in their tactics -- has undoubtedly contributed to wider acceptance of Communist propaganda, particularly by intellectuals and students, and in some measure has allayed previous misgivings about Communist intentions. This more favorable impression could in the future be converted into increased Communist strength.

2. Communist Objectives in the Area

Communist objectives are to end the influence of the West, particularly of the United States, in the countries of the area and to align them more closely with Communist countries. The USSR and other Communist countries have sought to undermine present military arrangements with the West and forestall future ones by diplomatic and other pressures, to strengthen their economic ties with the area by trade agreements and offers of economic and technical aid, and to increase confidence in the Communist countries by a generally more friendly approach. In this context, these developments during

*In the Near East, South Asia and Africa, the party is either non-existent or illegal except in Tunisia (where most Communist leaders are in jail), Algeria, Israel, India and Ceylon.

the past year are noteworthy:

a. A significantly increased number of trade agreements between Communist countries and some countries of the area has been signed, several providing for Communist economic or technical assistance.

b. Tentative additional offers of economic assistance are said to have been made, such as the offer to Egypt of aid in the Nile high-dam project.

c. The USSR has presented notes to Iran warning that country not to associate with the Turkish-Pakistani military arrangement, to Egypt warning that reentrance of Western forces to the Suez base would be considered an unfriendly act, and to Pakistan protesting its acceptance of United States military aid.

d. India and Communist China in their agreement on Tibet incorporated a broad statement of principles for "coexistence" which is used by both China and the USSR to encourage establishment of a strictly Asian security system and to block United States efforts to establish a Southeast Asian defense arrangement.

e. The USSR has assigned service attaches to India and Pakistan and has requested accreditation of a service attache to Greece.

f. Visits of trade, cultural and other delegations between Communist countries, particularly the USSR, and the countries of the area have significantly increased under Soviet stimulation, many of them obviously designed to make Soviet technical assistance more attractive.

3. Communist Tactics in the Area

The united front tactic of the Communists as practiced today seeks the support not only of leftwingers but of all elements of the population -- even including such members of the "bourgeoisie" as employers and employees -- who are for nationalism and against imperialism. They exclude only those who have "sold out to the imperialists" (e.g., the "ruling group" in Iran and Greece).

For the Communists, nationalism and anti-imperialism are intended to serve the broad aims of Soviet foreign policy by concentrating on ousting Western -- particularly United States -- influence, rather

than bringing genuine native groups to power. The usual Communist demand for social reform, though now given secondary place, is neatly fitted into the present Communist tactic by associating the need for certain social reforms and civil rights with the alleged economic and political subservience of existing governments of Western imperialist powers.

In the Arab States, Communists are attempting to infiltrate other opposition groups, or to make working agreements with them or with individual non-Communist political leaders. A few Communists have been found helping to create unrest among workers in Western oil installations, specifically in connection with the major strikes that took place in 1953 in the oil fields of Dhahran (Saudi Arabia) and Basra (Iraq), and evidences of Communist activity are turning up in Kuwait and other parts of the Persian Gulf area. The Dhahran strike was the largest in Arabia's history and showed that even this basically nomadic tribal society is no longer free from the type of unrest which invites Communist exploitation.

An illustration of the successful infiltration of a government by the Communists was the exposure of the Tudeh organization in Iran in August. More astonishing than the large numbers of people involved are the positions of trust and influence these Tudeh members had been able to achieve within the armed forces, the bodyguards of the Shah and the Prime Minister, and the military, judicial, communications, and crytographic branches.

B. Objectives, Themes, and Trends of Communist Propaganda in the Area

1. Major Objectives

The major objectives of Communist propaganda in the Near East, South Asia and Africa are to estrange the countries of the area from the West, particularly from the United States, and to increase their confidence and reliance on Communist countries.

In the long-range view, the Communist objective is to convince the countries of the area that by reducing their cooperation with the West their national interests will be served in the following ways:

a. Their security interests will be served by refraining from military arrangements with the United States which wishes only to advance its own interests, is commited to

policies that will lead to war, and is at the same time weakened by differences with its allies.

b. Their economic interests will be served by ceasing to rely on a country whose capitalist economy can be maintained only by exploiting the underdeveloped countries of the world, and therefore supports the colonial policies of other great powers and supports reactionary regimes all over the world.

The reverse side of the medal is the Communist objective of convincing the countries of the area that closer ties with Communist countries will aid them in the following ways:

a. It will strengthen their security because the Communist powers are united in their commitment to peace;

b. It will advance their economic interests because the Communist countries alone have had the experience of remaking their economies to serve the interests of all the people; and

c. It will hasten the ending of colonialism because the Communist countries alone are sincere in approaching the problem.

From the short-range point of view, Communist objectives are to:

a. establish the picture of the Communist powers as conciliatory, non-aggressive and anti-imperialist, but (in propaganda to some countries) at the same time militarily superior to the West and willing to support "liberation" of countries under colonial domination;

b. isolate the United States as the outstanding "war-monger" nation and as the major "imperialist" power;

c. promote regional consciousness and regional arrangements for security and against imperialism where such regionalism will thwart United States plans;

d. encourage neutralism in situations where public opinion cannot be swung to the Communists;

e. belittle American aid and assistance;

f. demonstrate that the USSR has much to offer the countries of the area through closer cooperation in the economic field;

g. entice people of all groups and classes (in the Arab States, particularly the political opposition) under the "united front" umbrella;

h. in certain countries, discredit present governments, particularly those with close relations with the West.

2. Major Themes

Communist propaganda during 1954 has played up increasingly peace themes and the conciliatory tactics of the USSR and Communist China in international dealings. At the same time it has intensified attacks on the United States as the major obstacle to peaceful solution of all international disputes and to the realization of nationalist, anti-imperialist aspirations.

The major targets for Communist propaganda are United States-sponsored military arrangements in the area (United States military aid to Pakistan, the Turkey-Pakistan pact and the inclusion of any additional countries in it, the Manila Pact); the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of the Suez; United States inflexibility and lack of conciliatoriness in international negotiations (e.g., at Geneva); United States lack of good faith in ending imperialism; and United States H-bomb experiments. A strong supporting theme is the benefits that will accrue to the countries of the area by full implementation of existing trade agreements and concluding others, and by increased exchange of persons.

The Soviet and Communist Chinese shift to more conciliatory diplomacy and international Communist identification with nationalist, anti-imperialist movements throughout the area have their counterpart in the propaganda approaches of local Communists within their countries. Communists support and play up government leaders' statements against the militarism and imperialism of the West, they are less demanding of radical changes in the social structure, and they appear to be identifying themselves with majority viewpoints wherever possible. Communist propaganda is shifting away from emphasis on

domestic and intraregional conflict and reforms in favor of emphasis on the need for unity against the West. This switch is obviously made easier by existing anti-Western feelings in the area generally, puts the Communists in the position of sympathizing with indigenous ways of solving problems, and results in a reassuring reduction of stridency in propaganda themes and tones except when the West is condemned.

The major themes for the area as a whole are, as stated above, directed against the United States. They are varied and supplemented in regions or countries to suit local Communist purposes and take advantage of special situations.

In North Africa, Communist propaganda emphasized (a) the struggle for national liberation and attempts to increase hatred for the French "imperialists" while at the same time not closing the door to further negotiations with France; (b) United States-French rivalry for dominance of the area; and (c) Soviet support for Tunisia and Morocco in the UN; and (d) the identity of interest of indigenous nationalists and Communists.

In the Arab countries Communist propaganda attacks (a) the Turkish-Pakistan alliance and the possibility of including Iraq in it; (b) the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, on the Suez on the ground that it does not give Egypt real freedom from British control; and (c) British control over Jordan and British support for the unity of Iraq and Syria. Propaganda also claims good treatment by the USSR of Muslims and Armenians, and charges that the ruling groups are subservient to the West and are acting contrary to the interests of their countries.

In Israel the Communist press has pursued a desultory anti-Western campaign. It has attacked the Anglo-Egyptian Suez agreement as not providing full independence from UK control, and has made random anti-Western comments in connection with Guatemala and Brazil. For some time Communist propaganda has played up West German rearmament as a threat to Jews, and recently, the good treatment Jews are alleged to receive in the Soviet Union.

In Greece Communist propaganda attacks the colonialism and militarism of the Western Powers, charges that the "ruling class" in Greece is subservient to the West, and stresses the peaceful intentions of the Communist countries. Issues which might embarrass the Greek, United States or United Kingdom governments, such as the Cyprus issue, are played for all their worth.

In Iran Communist propaganda plays up charges that (a) the United States dominates the present government which is "persecuting" democratic Iranians; (2) the United States is constructing air bases in Iran for aggressive operations against the USSR; (c) the United States is trying to bring Iran into the "aggressive" Middle East pact and to use Iranians as cannon fodder in "the next war"; (d) the Zahedi regime is fascistic and is acting as a tool of the Unites States and United Kingdom; (e) the oil settlement will entrench British and American imperialistic influence in Iran and Iran's struggle for independence will have been for naught; (f) oil workers are exploited in Western oil companies. It also plays up the USSR as the ideological leader of the "people's democracies", and since the coup of August 1953 has sought to bolster members' morale.

In South Asia Communist propaganda (a) encourages the concept of "Asia for the Asians" to weaken ties with the West, capitalizing on widespread feelings of anti-racialism and anti-imperialism; (b) cites the Nehru-Chou En-lai "coexistence" agreement as a pattern for the area approach to the problem of security; (c) gives China an increasingly prominent role in area affairs; (d) cites United States policies as threats to the area's neutralism, and therefore to peace; and (e) stresses the desirability and benefits of closer cultural and economic ties with Communist countries.

In India the Communists give strong support to Nehru's policy of non-alignment, praise his role as peacemaker, and, at last acknowledging India's freedom from British domination, have pushed into the background the campaign for domestic reforms related to British imperialism and give full priority to attacks on "United States imperialism", calling for solidarity against United States "interference" (the Manila Pact, United States military aid to Pakistan), disarmament, and bans on the use of nuclear weapons and experimental explosions.

In Pakistan, now considered by the Communists to have gone over to the Western camp, Communists aim to drive a wedge between the government and the people, discrediting the government as a reactionary tool of the American imperialists, spreading doubts about the usefulness of United States military aid, and the Manila Pact, and stressing the failure of the government to meet urgent economic needs.

In Ceylon, though the usual themes of Western militarism and imperialism are played, Communist propaganda is aimed particularly

at the government and its alleged failure to deal with such pressing domestic problems as the low standard of living and the enfranchisement of some 1,000,000 stateless Indian Tamils now in Ceylon.

In Nepal, the Communists are attempting to minimize Indian and Anglo-American influence, particularly American, by charging that the Nepal Government is corrupt, is a puppet of Indian advisors, is pro-American, ignores the plight of peasants and urban workers, and allows business to be captured by Indians.

In Afghanistan, where there is no overt Communist propaganda, the significantly increased trade with the USSR and the provision of Soviet funds and technicians to aid in the economic development of Afghanistan is allowed to speak for itself.

C. Indigenous Communist Propaganda

1. The Propagandists

a. In India the Communist Party attaches great importance to its work in social, cultural, and professional organizations. It attempts to put its members in key positions in organizations established by non-Communists, and has organized its own front groups which it uses as propaganda vehicles. Most of these front groups have branches in the major cities and large towns of India and have international affiliations or channels. A partial list follows:

Indo-Soviet Cultural Society
Indo-China Friendship Association
All-India Kisan Sabha (peasants' front)
All-India Students Federation (affiliated with World Federation of Democratic Youth)
All-India Peace Council (associated with World Peace Congress)
All-India People's Theater Association
All-India Progressive Writer's Association
All-India Association of Democratic Lawyers (recently formed and affiliated with International Association of Democratic Lawyers)
Film Writers Association (recently organized)
National Conference of Women (recently organized)
All-India Trade Union Congress (labor front)
All-India Agricultural Laborers Association (recently organized)

b. In Pakistan, the Communists have organized front groups for students, peasants, and women, and such cultural organizations as the Pakistan Peace Committee, the All-Pakistan Progressive Writers Association, the All-Pakistan Theater Association, the Pakistan-Soviet Cultural Association and the Pakistan-China Friendship Society. One of the two principal trade union federations, the Pakistan Trade Union Federation, is Communist-dominated. This group, which is affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions, claims 90,000 members though actual membership is probably much smaller. The banning of the Communist Party in Pakistan in July 1954 resulted in a reduction of Communist and Communist-front activities in Pakistan. The Azad Pakistan Party, the Communist-front party, has recently been concentrating on district level organizations in the hope of obtaining sufficient provincial-wide strength to participate effectively in the national elections.

c. In Nepal the Communist Party has also been outlawed and Communism operates mainly behind the Kisan Sangh, a peasant front organization. Other front organizations are the All-Nepal Students Federation, Baypar Sangh (businessmen's union), Mahila Sangh (women's front), and the League for Protection of Civil Liberties.

d. In Ceylon the Communist Party is legal, and in addition to its own activities works through the Ceylon Trade Union Federation and the United Federation of Ceylonese Youth in reaching its primary targets, labor and youth.

e. In Israel, the Communist Party is legal, and works as a party as well as through front organizations such as:

Israel-USSR Friendship Society
Israel-Rumania Friendship League
Israeli Tarbut La'am (Popular Culture, an international front)
Communist Club (has offices in Jaffa, Haifa, and Ramat Gan, and offers free legal aid.)

f. In all of the Arab States the Communist Party is either outlawed or not tolerated by the existing government. The party works through front organizations with more or less freedom in Syria, Lebanon, and the Sudan, and with considerably less freedom in Egypt and Iraq. The most prominent front organizations are the

"Partisans of Peace," who are affiliated with the World Peace Council. There are various other front organizations designed to appeal to lawyers, labor, peasantry, women, youth, teachers, intellectuals, and students. Many of these organizations are affiliated with international front groups. There is no single Communist Party in Egypt or the Sudan, and no party in Saudi Arabia, although Communist activities have been observed there.

g. In Greece, the Communist Party (KKE) has been outlawed since December 1947. However, its front organization EDA (United Democratic Left) functions as a Communist political party. EPON (United Panhellenic Youth Organization) has been quite active in spreading Soviet propaganda among student organizations. PEOPEF (Political Committee of Families of Political Exiles and Prisoners) has been active in obtaining financial and moral support for Communist exiles and prisoners.

h. In Iran, the Communist Tudeh Party has been outlawed, and its front organizations were heavily suppressed during 1954. Communist activities have had to be confined to attendance at meetings outside Iran of international Communist front organizations. These organizations in Iran and their international affiliates were (1) CUCTU, affiliated with the WFTU, (2) Society of Democratic Lawyers, affiliated with the International Association of Democratic Jurists, (3) Partisans of Peace Society, affiliated with the World Peace Council, (4) Tudeh Youth Organization, affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and (5) Women's Organization of Iran, affiliated with the Women's International Democratic Federation.

i. In Turkey, the influence and activity of indigenous organizations diffusing Communist propaganda is very limited. The spreading of Communist propaganda is a criminal offense and the government enforces this law severely. The trials concluded on October 7, 1954 of leading Turkish Communists and Communist sympathizers, with sentences of up to ten years at hard labor being imposed, are reported to have broken up the party organization in Turkey.

2. Local Media

a. Newspapers and periodicals.

(1) In India, the New Age weekly and New Age monthly are the official organs of the Communist Party, and Blitz is an

important weekly which follows the Communist line. An addition to these national publications, which are in English, as of late 1952 the following numbers of party organs were issued in the provinces, mainly in vernacular editions: 6 dailies, 12 weeklies, 1 fortnightly and 2 monthlies. As of 1952, 11 of the 16 provinces in India had at least one local Communist newspaper. It is very likely that the number and geographic coverage have increased since that time. Communists have also infiltrated the editorial staffs of some of the non-Communist press, and some papers, particularly the vernacular press, use translated Soviet News Agency (TASS) handouts

(2) In Pakistan, although the Communist Party was outlawed and therefore has no official organ, the newspapers Pakistan Times (English) and Imroze (Urdu) continue as the principal proponents of the Communist Party line. Both are run by Miam Iftikharuddin, a leading fellow traveler.

(3) Since Ceylon has a higher literacy rate than most other Asian countries, the Communists rely heavily on printed matter. The Communist Party of Ceylon publishes four journals in vernacular languages (Maubima, a Sinhalese weekly; Desabhimani, a Tamil weekly; Navasakthi, a Malayalam weekly; and Navalkarya, a Sinhalese monthly) whose combined circulation was about 11,000 in 1953, and one in English (Forward). Large quantities of pamphlets and leaflets are also put out. Some Communist sympathizers have infiltrated the non-Communist press.

(4) In Nepal, as of August 1953 Janamat was reported as the organ of the Communist Party, but there is no information as to whether it is currently in publication.

In Iran, because of active government suppression, the Communists have been able to utilize the printing press only to a very limited degree.

(5) In Greece, each of the two Communist front organizations mentioned above (EDA and EPON) publishes a newspaper, one called Avgi (Dawn) and the other Floga (Flame). Toward the end of the year there was evidence that the publisher of Avgi was becoming increasingly concerned over the low circulation of the newspaper. EDA and EPON have occasionally published pamphlets and books.

(6) In Israel, Syria and Lebanon, Communist newspapers and periodicals circulate freely. In Iraq, newspapers must be licensed by the anti-Communist government to operate, and in Egypt, overt Communist publications have also been suppressed. A few of the more or less overt Communist publications are as follows:

Al-Tariq (The Way), published by the Partisans of Peace, comes out weekly, and circulates in Syria and Lebanon.
Al-Tali'ah, published daily by the Partisans of Peace for Syria and Lebanon
Frei Yisroel, Yiddish weekly published by the Israeli Tarbut La'am (Popular Culture)
Kol Haam, published in Tel Aviv

These are a few newspapers chosen to serve as examples. There are at least a half a dozen more published in Syria and Lebanon alone by the Communist Party and front organizations. There are also substantial numbers of periodicals, pamphlets, leaflets, and tracts throughout the area that follow the Communist line with varying regularity. Beirut is the center of Communist literature publication and distribution in the Arab world and this activity is carried on mainly by front groups, especially the Partisans of Peace. Libraries are maintained mainly by VOKS; there is more emphasis on the sale of literature through bookstores than on libraries.

b. Publishing, Books, Libraries, Exhibits, Information Centers.

(1) In India, the Communists are utilizing all these channels in line with the increased Communist emphasis on Indo-Soviet and Indo-Chinese cultural ties. The Peoples Publishing House in New Delhi with branches in other cities in India reportedly has listed 163 Communist books and periodicals, two-thirds of which could be purchased for less than 21 cents, and 89 for less than 10 cents each. New reading rooms have been opened by the friendship societies, and it has been reported that CPI was preparing a mobile bookshop to visit colleges and universities. The party has recently conducted several drives to distribute its literature among the peasants. In one recent "sales week" drive in 3 districts of Madras State, more than 6,000 publications valued at nearly $630 were sold, with domestic books in Tamil reportedly

in greater demand than Moscow or Peking publications. The friendship societies have arranged several exhibits and lectures in the past few months, and have served as hosts of various cultural delegations from the Soviet Union and China. The Indo-Soviet Cultural Society also issues a monthly journal entitled Iscus containing articles mainly of a cultural nature written by both Indians and Russians.

(2) In Pakistan, the ban on the Communist Party in July 1954 resulted in the closing of the People's Publishing House, which printed Communist materials, and a number of bookstalls that sold Communist books and pamphlets.

(3) In the Arab States, book publishing was an important means of spreading Communist line propaganda during 1954. For example in Iraq, a country of approximately 5,000,000 people and a 90% rate of illiteracy, more than 52,000 pro-Communist books were sold. Of these, 20,000 volumes in 10 titles were published by the following Levant companies: Dar al-Yaqzhah Al-'Arabiyah (Damascus), Dar Al-Qalam (Beirut), Dar Al-Baydawi (Beirut). The Iraqi companies ar-Rabitah (League) Press and Al-Ma'rifah (Knowledge) Press accounted for 32,000 sales. The subjects treated in these volumes were translations from the Russian novelists, documents, and anti-American propaganda. They found an audience primarily among students, teachers, petty officials, lower middle class, lawyers, and workers.

(4) In Israel, there are at least two libraries offering Communist literature to the people. Tarbut La'am (Popular Culture) has a library of Hebrew and Yiddish books in Tel Aviv. In Tel Aviv there is a Workers Library with books in Yiddish, Hebrew, Polish, and Russian. A pro-Communist spokesman at the recent meeting of the Israel-USSR Friendship Congress stated that 30 Russian books have been translated (presumably into Hebrew or Yiddish) during the year.

c. Local Radio Activities The Communists carry on no local radio activities in the area so far as it is known. In India they have probably infiltrated All India Radio, the government-controlled radio monopoly.

d. Motion Pictures. The Communists in the area have no known independent resources for producing motion pictures.

In India the Communists have infiltrated the film industry at all levels - writers, directors, actors, and labor - and some pictures have been produced that favor the Communist cause.

e. Cultural Activities Not Covered Above. The Communists have made a special effort to influence entertainment in India, and some of the more important folk forms have been adapted by them for dissemination of propaganda. Dances, plays and dance-drama are used in rural as well as urban areas, and the party members encourage the composition of propaganda songs by staging competitions. There is some evidence that fellow travelers have infiltrated a victrola record company and have put out Communist songs.

In Nepal the Communists show lantern slides and teach people pro-Communist songs.

f. Other. The importance of personal contact is not overlooked by the Communists in South Asia where a low literacy rate and other barriers to formal communication exist. Communist party workers go out into the villages and carry on propaganda by word of mouth, enhancing their appeal by helping the villagers in many ways. In India the party seems to be actively carrying out a literacy campaign in the villages by setting up reading classes. A Russian delegate to a recent conference of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society recommended the organizing of Russian-language courses, possibly via radio.

3. Expenditures

With the exception of India there are not even rough estimates available for this area. A writer in Organiser, an Indian publication, estimates that the Communist Party of India budget for propaganda runs up to $2,000,000 a month.

D. External Communist Propaganda to the Area

1. Communist Broadcasting

In broadcasting to the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, during 1954 the Communist bloc significantly increased its output in Arabic, Greek and Turkish.

Moscow's broadcasts in Arabic to the Near and Middle East were increased by about four hours per week. In addition, a quasi-clandestine station, utilizing Hungarian transmitters and calling itself "The Voice of National Independence and Peace," began broadcasting in May in Arabic transmissions specifically announced for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. At the end of 1954 this station was broadcasting 10 hours and 30 minutes per week of news, commentary, and talks in simple, classical Arabic, occasionally supplemented by North African dialects. The programs do not reveal their true origin. It is believed that the programming is controlled by the Cominform, since the technique of trying to give it the appearance of Arab origin is quite similar to that used in the Cominform-controlled programming to France and Italy described in the West European chapter.

Communist output in Greek and Turkish was increased appreciably during 1954. Again it was the satellites, and not Moscow, which registered the increase.

In addition to the Soviet bloc's output in Greek as shown in the accompanying table, the clandestine station "Free Greece" has been broadcasting for many years. The station is controlled by the Greek Communist Party (KKE) in exile, is allegedly located in Rumania, and plays an important role in complementing the overt broadcasting of the Communist bloc. It currently broadcasts 13 hours and 15 minutes per week in Greek, and 30 minutes per week in Slav-Macedonian.

Broadcasts to South Asia in Hindustani and Bengali have undergone no change. There has been a slight increase in English-language broadcasts to that area.

WEEKLY HOURS OF COMMUNIST BROADCASTING TO AFRICA, THE NEAR EAST, AND SOUTH ASIA

(December 31, 1953 compared with December 31, 1954)

Languages	Originating Countries					
	USSR		European Satellites		Total USSR, Sat. and Comm. China	
	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954
Arabic	9:55	14:00	-	10:30	9:55	24:30
Greek	14:00	14:00	68:50	75:45	82:50	89:45
Persian	34:25	33:15	-	-	34:25	33:15
Turkish	25:40	26:15	7:35	18:45	33:15	45:00
English	12:15	14:00	-	-	12:15	14:00
Bengali	5:15	5:15	-	-	5:15	5:15
Hindustani	3:30	3:30	-	-	3:30	3:30
Yiddish (to Israel)	-	-	3:30	3:30	3:30	3:30
Tadzhik*	7:00	7:00	-	-	7:00	7:00
NEA Total	112:00	117:15	79:55	108:30	191:55	225:45

*This transmission is announced as intended for Tadzhiks abroad, but the speech is carefully chosen from language understandable to Afghans and Persians as well.

NOTES:

1. Figures represent total transmission time, including repeats, as no exact differentiation between original program hours and repeat transmissions is available.

2. USSR figures include output of Radio Moscow as well as other USSR stations originating foreign broadcasts.

3. In addition to the figures shown, the Communist clandestine station "Radio Free Greece," allegedly in Rumania, broadcasts 13 hours and 15 minutes per week in Greek and 30 minutes per week in Slav-Macedonian.

4. The 10.5 hours of new Arabic transmissions shown under the European Satellites are broadcast from Hungary, but seek to put on the appearance of an Arab service.

5. Communist China does not broadcast to the NEA area.

2. Communist Newspapers and Periodicals Coming into the Area.

Large quantities of newspapers and periodicals come into India from the USSR and China, and probably from other Communist countries. They are either given away or sold at extremely low prices. The TASS office puts out a daily news bulletin. Among the popular magazines available is Soviet Land which is edited, printed and published in India in English, Hindu, Urdu, Bengali, Tamil and Telugu. TASS News Agency announced that "a short course of the Russian language, consisting of about 100 lessons" was to begin in the New Year, 1955 issue of Soviet Land and will continue for approximately two years.

The Soviet Embassy in Pakistan recently announced the issuance of an illustrated bi-monthly publication Soviet News, available without cost in English and Urdu.

Periodicals published by the Soviet legations and those imported from Bucharest and the USSR circulate in the Levant states and elsewhere in the Arab world.

In Syria and Lebanon the following have been seen:

al-'Anba as Sufiyatiyah (Soviet News, Arabic edition, also in English and French editions, published by TASS)
Temps Nouveaux (French edition of New Times)
al-Adab as Sufiyatiyah (Soviet Liberation)
For a Lasting Peace, For a Lasting Democracy (published by the Cominform in Bucharest)

At least one third of Soviet publications in Syria and Lebanon are in Armenian on such subjects as Soviet Armenia, Communist doctrines, and the USSR.

3. Communist Books, Libraries and Exhibits Coming into the Area

Books, pamphlets and magazines are imported into South Asian countries from the USSR and Communist China. Communist books are available in Pakistan and India for fantastically small sums. Selected works of Karl Marx and Engels in cloth bound editions sell for about 45 cents a volume. Indicative of the value which Communists place on anti-American propaganda emanating from American sources, a Moscow edition of Howard Fast's book

"Peekskill, U.S.A." has been widely publicized by the Communists in India and is offered for sale at the equivalent of 7 cents. Communist bookstores in Calcutta have recently put on sale for 5 cents a viciously anti-Japanese picture-story book in English published by the Foreign Languages Press in Peiping. Books are also given to libraries and universities. There are some Communist art exhibits, and usually rather extensive Communist participation in exhibits at industrial and trade fairs. The Soviet Union and China are planning large exhibits at trade fairs to be held in India and Pakistan in 1955.

Communist books are shipped into the Arab States and subsidized locally in Arabic translations. They deal with anti-American themes, Communist doctrine, Russian classics, children's books, etc. A substantial number of them in the Levant States are published in Armenian.

The USSR, Red China, and all of the other satellite states, including East Germany, had exhibits at the recent Damascus International Trade Fair. While most of these exhibits were not for the purpose of selling Iron Curtain manufactured goods, some of them were very well done and created a favorable impression. The USSR exhibit has remained in the area, presumably to be maintained as a permanent exhibit.

The Rumanian Legation in Egypt sponsored an exhibit of Rumanian hand craft that was shown in Alexandria and Cairo late in 1954. Another showing of Rumanian artistic achievements was planned for early 1955.

4. Communist Motion Pictures Coming into the Area

Films are imported into India and Ceylon from the USSR, China, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. They constitute a small part of the total film imports, but are prominently played up by the Communists, frequently in non-commercial showings. Arrangements were completed in the fall of 1954 for the regular commercial showing of Soviet feature films for one year at a Calcutta theater. The Soviet Union also made arrangements for the purchase of Indian films for use in the USSR, and organized an Indian film festival in several Russian cities which received considerable publicity in India, illustrating the Communist tactic of playing up to the Indians' sensitivity and pride in their own culture.

Motion pictures were not a significant medium for the Communists in the Arab States and Israel in 1954. Some Soviet pictures were shown in Syria and Israel, but not in a volume comparable to Communist publishing activities. There are indications that the showing of Soviet motion pictures may increase in 1955, at least in Israel.

5. Travel to and from Communist Countries

An outstanding development during 1954 was the increased emphasis the Communists gave to the exchange of delegations and, to a lesser extent, individuals. The Communist exchange of persons program continues the familiar pattern of visits by artists and intellectuals, but in recent months it has shown a marked tendency to bring to the USSR industrialists, agriculturists and officials who, given a favorable impression of Soviet achievements in the fields of their special interests, might be expected to urge more trade with the USSR and greater use of proffered Soviet economic and technical assistance. It is obvious that the USSR is making a concerted drive to end the near-monopoly of the United States in providing technical assistance.

Greater attention has also been paid to students, and there are indications that there will be an even greater expansion of this activity in the future, including a scholarship program to attract students for extended college training in the Soviet Union.

An example of the type of program carried on by cultural delegations is the visit to India in December by a Chinese Communist troupe who put on a dance drama of the Monkey King, an ancient tale shared by the Indians and Chinese but with carefully built-in and at times not-so-subtle propaganda about the working class struggle. The theme of the identity of the Indian and Chinese cultural background kept running through the performance. About 50,000 residents of New Delhi, including Nehru and many other Indian leaders, saw the performance, which was sold out for all four nights in New Delhi. The troupe also toured other parts of India, including Bombay, Madras and Calcutta.

Delegations of all types, cultural, sports, religious, economic, and scientific, went to and from the Soviet Union to the Arab States and Israel during 1954. More Arabs and Israelis visited the USSR and the satellites than came from the Iron Curtain countries.

Soviet Muslims came from the USSR to make their pilgrimage to Mecca. They also stopped at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. A Soviet bloc athletic team visited Lebanon and Egypt.

Communist-front representatives from the Arab States and Israel attended most conferences held by international front organizations during the year, attended October Revolution celebrations in Moscow, and attended the Fifth Anniversary of the Chinese Peoples' Republic in Peiping. A group of Syrian scientists visited the Muslim areas of the Soviet Union. Prominent Israelis such as Mrs. Chaim Weizmann and several journalists toured the USSR and satellites.

IX. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE FAR EAST

HIGH LIGHTS

Communist strength in the Far East continues to grow. With the cessation of overt hostilities after the Indochina truce, Communists began to emphasize the weapons of subversion, infiltration, and propaganda more strongly.

Mainland China, as the center of Communist power in the area, furnishes a stable base, leadership, and direction for the lesser Communist movements in other Far Eastern countries. It also takes the propaganda lead, though its efforts are strongly supplemented by those of the USSR.

Overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries offer particular opportunities to Peiping's propagandists, and also a recruiting ground for students. It is estimated that 5,000 Chinese students from Indonesia went to Mainland China for training in 1953.

Communist China has emulated the USSR in the great stress it places on both domestic and foreign propaganda. Peiping budgets the equivalent of 1.5 billion dollars annually for propaganda and education.

Communist China's propaganda speaks softly of peace and "coexistence" to Asians, and particularly woos uncommitted nations like India, Indonesia, and Burma. Toward the West it adopts a truculent tone with blasts directed particularly against the United States, which is accused of "aggressive plots." Peiping continually reiterated its threats to "liberate" Formosa.

The "imperialist" theme is stressed heavily in an effort to capitalize on Asian suspicions of the West, and Communism is pictured as a liberating force. Appeals to "ban the bomb" are used, with particular application to Japan.

In other Asian countries "united front" tactics are in use generally where the Party is legal. Where the party is illegal, propaganda is spread by covert means.

International broadcasting in Far Eastern languages by the USSR, Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the clandestine "Radio Free Japan" now totals 263.5 hours per week.

TASS and the New China News Agency serve the area with the Communist interpretation of world events. Books and periodicals from Communist China and from the USSR receive general distribution, and a number of Communist films are shown.

IX. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE FAR EAST

A. Communism in the Area

1. Communist Strength

Communist strength in the Far East is great and continues to grow. During 1954 the most notable Communist advances were those surrounding the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the consolidation of the Viet Minh's forces in North Vietnam. Communist China, which strongly supported the Viet Minh successes, also achieved greater prestige and stature in the area as its diplomacy was marked by apparent successes.

a. China. The center of Communist power in the Far East is of course mainland China, where Mao regime governs a population of about 585,000,000 persons according to the Communist count in 1954. With the help of Russian technical aid and machinery, Communist China is making rapid advances in industry and transport. Politically the country, although operating under the facade of a "people's democracy," is a dictatorship ruled by the Communist Party leaders. The Party has a membership of over 6,000,000.

b. Japan. The membership of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) is estimated at approximately 80,000 - 85,000. In addition, there is a large number of "fellow travellers" and sympathizers who support Communist-inspired or pro-Communist activities to varying degrees. It is estimated that altogether approximately one million persons are influenced by or are directly under Communist party control.

The Japanese Communist Party is a legal political entity in Japan, but in addition to its recognized overt apparatus the party also established a covert apparatus at the time of the outbreak of the Korean war in order to circumvent the increasing restrictions on the party's activities. Within the frame work of the covert apparatus, the party has attempted to build up para-military units. In recent months, the party has placed increasing emphasis on the overt organization, presumably in anticipation of the forthcoming general elections.

c. Korea. The Communists exercise full control over the population of north Korea, now estimated to be less than 8 million persons. The government of the Republic of Korea (ROK), all the major parties, and the over-whelming majority of the 21 million people of south Korea are vigorously anti-Communist, but a few hundred Communist guerrillas remain active in mountain areas and scattered remnants of an old Communist underground still exist.

d. Indonesia. The Communist Party (PKI) now claims 49,042 members and 116,164 candidate members. In addition, the PKI controls the largest and strongest Indonesian labor federation, SOBSI, with a claimed membership of 2,500,000. PKI has 17 votes in Parliament, plus 13 votes from satellite groups, and can usually count on about 7 more votes from non-party sympathizers for a theoretical maximum of 37 votes out of 212.

e. The Philippines. The Communist Party (PKP) is illegal in the Philippines. With its military arm (the Huks), the PKP numbers perhaps 4 to 5,500, Chinese Communists probably number 2 to 3,000. Communist strength has been reduced to very limited capabilities both as to organization and terrorist activities.

f. Malaya. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) is illegal. Its membership is from 3 to 5,000, more than 90% of which is Chinese. Its military arm is the Malaya Races Liberation Army (MRLA). Its ranks are supplied with food, funds, shelter, information and recruits by the Communist-sponsored undercover Min Yuen organization, whose membership (Chinese) may well be over 50,000. MCP recruitment among the Min Yuen keeps the terrorist forces at a steady level of approximately 4-6,000.

g. Thailand. Total membership of the several Communist parties which operate in Thailand cannot be determined. Estimated membership in the Thai and Chinese Communist parties (of which the Chinese is the strongest) varies up to 5,000. In addition, Indochinese Communists of undetermined number are also operative in northeast Thailand. Popular apathy and governmental repression have heavily circumscribed Communist power and influence.

h. Burma. Communist strength in Burma includes both the illegal insurgent movement and the above-ground Communist elements. While no accurate figures are available, the underground Communists have claimed over 25,000 members. Overt Communist strength (Burma Workers and Peasants Party - BWPP) is unknown but may

total a few hundred. The Communist insurgents no longer pose a great threat to the Burmese government and it is also likely that local Communist political activities will continue to be less effective than Soviet or Chinese Communist diplomatic and propaganda moves.

i. Vietnam. Communist strength in Vietnam is concentrated in those areas controlled by the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam", which now includes some 14,000,000 of the country's 25,000,000 inhabitants. Although reliable data on actual Communist Party membership is lacking, Communist sources claim a membership of 715,000 in the Lao Dong (Worker's) Party.

j. Cambodia. Cambodian Communists probably number less than 5,000 and there is no overt Communist activity in areas controlled by the Royal Government.

k. Laos. The Communist "Pathet Lao" movement continues to control two of Laos' northern provinces with a population of some 100,000 inhabitants. Communist strength is believed to be below 6,000.

2. Communist Objectives in the Area

The ultimate Communist objective is to dominate the entire Far East by the establishment of Communist regimes in every country. Short-run objectives vary from one country to the next according to local conditions and the degree of vulnerability to Communist military aggression, subversion, or propaganda.

There is no readily apparent difference between Russia and Communist China over Communist objectives in the Far East. On the surface, at least, relations between the two powers remain most cordial, with much mutual praise.

Following the pattern of Communist aggression in Korea and Indochina, the chief immediate role in realizing Communist objectives is borne by Communist China as the leading Communist power in the area, with Russia giving assistance and advice but seeking to remain largely in the background.

a. Communist China. The domestic objectives of the Chinese Communists are to consolidate their power and increase the industrial and military strength of mainland China. Externally, their objective is to enlarge the sphere of their domination of the Far East and to

attain greater status and recognition as a world power. The objectives of Communism in other countries of the area are largely a reflection of Red China's objectives, since China serves as leader and as base for the entire movement in the area.

b. Japan. The long range objective of the Communist movement in Japan is to overthrow the established government by armed revolution. The party is to create the broadest possible "united front" movement to be joined with the party's covert and paramilitary organization as the instrument for achieving its long term objective.

This objective follows from the JCP's "New Program" adopted in the fall of 1951. Under this program the party has been guided by the concept that Japan, because of its "traitorous" Yoshida Government, is a chattel of "aggressive United States imperialism" which, contrary to the interests of the Japanese people, is not only exploiting Japan economically but also seeking to "remilitarize" the nation as a "stepping-stone" and "instrument of expansion" in Asia.

Accordingly, the party's task is to generate a "serious revolutionary struggle of the people", organize a "national-liberation democratic united front" based primarily on the workers and peasants but including all other elements dissatisfied with the existing situation, over-throw the Yoshida regime and install a government that would sever Japan's close alignment with U. S. and establish close relations with the Communist-bloc. The task, it is explicitly declared, cannot be discharged by peaceful means only, and the "national liberation" movement will have to gird itself to counter in kind the forceful measures that the government will use in its attempts to suppress the party and those working for it.

The Soviet Union, to date, has not attacked the recently inaugurated Hatoyama Government. However, the Japanese Communist Party and Communist China have questioned the "sincerity" of the Hatoyama Government's professions that it desires to establish closer relations with the USSR and Communist China and the JCP has begun to bracket the new government with the former Yoshida Government in terms of the "1951 Theses".

The primary immediate objectives of Communism in Japan are to weaken the effectiveness of Japan's close alignment with the U. S. and to place in power a Japanese government which would be

willing to establish regular diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. During the closing months of 1954 Communist propaganda placed primary emphasis on the latter objective.

c. Korea. The basic Communist objectives in Korea appear to be: (1) to maintain control over North Korea, and (2) ultimately to extend their control over the whole of Korea. They are also endeavoring to obscure the set-back they suffered through U. S. and UN intervention against their aggressive action, to reduce the increased anti-Communist unity and strength in the Korea area and elsewhere that resulted from the Korean hostilities, and to obscure their responsibility for the continued partition of Korea.

d. Southeast Asia. Throughout Southeast Asia, the long-range Communist objective is the eventual establishment of Communist regimes. The timetable for such a takeover varies from country to country. Communist strategy in each country is geared to the local situation and permits considerable flexibility.

Indochina here plays a key role for all of Southeast Asia. It is a major source of Communist strength in the region and Communist fortunes there will have a vital effect throughout Southeast Asia. Viet Minh policies in Vietnam are geared to improving Communist control over the population and resources in order to maximize its total military and economic potential; to securing a more complete orientation of the populace in the Communist-controlled areas toward the Communist bloc; and to subverting the local population and improving covert Communist activities in the areas controlled by the legitimate Governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. With special reference to Vietnam, the Viet Minh seeks to sap popular support from the South Vietnamese Government, thus leaving itself as the only viable base for a united Vietnam.

The Viet Minh has now expanded its area of total control to almost half the total area of Vietnam, some 56% of the population, and the preponderance of Vietnam's fuel and mineral resources. The legitimacy of Viet Minh activities in Laos or Cambodia has been denied by the Geneva agreements. In those countries, elements sympathetic to the Viet Minh have the alternatives of either seeking favorable terms of incorporation into the body politic of their respective countries, or of violating the terms of the agreements by resisting dissolution. What the Communists have gained in the past by open warfare must now be sought through intensified political activity. Having been required to remove ostensibly its armed forces

from South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the Viet Minh is seeking to retain a maximum of subversive capability and political potential in South Vietnam and, with an eye particularly to the forthcoming elections scheduled for Vietnam, is striving to maximize its prestige throughout the area.

In Malaya and the Philippines, where Communist activity is illegal and armed "struggle" has either been stalemated or dealt grave setbacks, emphasis is placed on subversion of every type and at all levels of the society. In both areas, the Communists seek to exploit nationalism and implant distrust of the intentions of Western powers; e. g., in Malaya to impede progress toward self-government and in the Philippines, to poison friendly and close cooperation with the U. S.

In Thailand, where there is no armed struggle and where Communist activities are also illegal, the Communists' major preoccupation is the struggle for survival and a clandestine effort to expand its subversive potential.

In Burma and Indonesia, which maintain diplomatic relations with Communist China and seek to avoid involvement in the struggle between Communism and the Free World, Communist strategy is aimed primarily at reducing Western influence and at softening up the indigenous societies for Communist infiltration of the government, labor organizations and other key groups.

3. Communist Strategy and Tactics in the Area

a. Communist China. The strategy and tactics of the Chinese Communists sets the pattern and tone of Communist efforts in almost every part of the Far East. The general strategy is to maintain continuing pressure on free areas and to exploit every weakness in the opposition camp, to pose as the friends and "liberators" of all Asians, to establish "normalized" relations with Japan, and to push the campaign of subversion and infiltration in Southeast Asia.

As 1954 began, Communist China was not only using tactics of infiltration, subversion, and propaganda in neighboring areas, but was also supporting direct military aggression by the Viet Minh in Indochina. After the Indochina truce, the general strategy of Communist China seemingly shifted. Although military threats and military pressures were continued against Formosa, in other areas there was no overt aggression on the previous Korea and Indochina pattern,

and instead there was concentration on the tactics of subversion.

Liu Shao-chi made a speech to the Chinese Communist Central Committee early in 1954 in which he said that "a fortress is most pregnable from within." Although he was speaking of a local matter, this phrase seemed aptly to describe the next phase of the Communist operations guided and supported by Communist China, particularly in Southeast Asia. Thus Communist China began to push the tactics of subversion, infiltration, and propaganda, tactics in which it has shown past mastery of organization and operations.

b. Japan. It has been increasingly evident since mid-1952 that JCP strategists have considered the realization of the primary immediate Communist objectives to require the subordination of the strategy and tactics of armed revolution to that of non-violence and the broad extansion of the party's control and influence through the specific tactics of "united front" and "unified action". Recently, the JCP reportedly announced publicly through Akahata, the party's mass propaganda organ, that it was abandoning "extreme leftist adventurism".

Thus, overtly the party has concentrated its efforts on the two non-violent tactics. While both tactics have received increasing emphasis in an effort to recoup the damaging loss of popular support resulting from party-inspired violence during early 1952, that of "unified activity" has been of particular importance. Unlike the "united front" which implies and attempts by the Japanese Communist Party to impose party leadership and control over non-party groups, this tactic is designed to exploit for Communist Party advantage popular sentiments irrespective of political affiliation, ideological orientation, or politico-economic motivation. All forces of actual or potential disunion, controversy, or unrest, therefore, are to be espoused by the JCP directly or through its many front organizations. This has been the tactic of major Communist propaganda campaigns and activities through 1954.

At the same time, however, the JCP has attempted to strengthen the party's covert organization and para-military units. Specifically, JCP illegal tactics combine operations of espionage directed at Japanese and U.S. security focus, subversion of Japanese governmental agencies, and the incitement of disorder and mass violence with an ultimate reliance on para-military activity. For the present, the latter activity has been very limited.

c. Korea. The USSR, Communist China, and the Eastern European satellite regimes have made grants in aid to the North Korean regime representing the first Communist venture in foreign aid. Communist China, at least for the time being, is maintaining hundreds of thousands of troops in North Korea. The North Korean regime has in general resumed normal activity, is expanding its armed forces, and is launching, with foreign aid, an ambitious program of reconstruction and economic development.

At the same time, the Communists continue to frustrate efforts to reunify Korea through negotiations, in order to safeguard their control over North Korea, but try to retain their initiative in unification propaganda and to fix responsibility for failure to achieve unification on the U. S.

d. Southeast Asia. Communist tactics, with the important past exception of Indochina, have emphasized political infiltration, subversion, and cooperation in a "united national front" with any willing non-Communist parties and prominent individuals. Infiltration of political, labor and social organizations have high priority in Malaya and the Philippines in order to broaden the party's base. In Indochina, Communist tactics have now also shifted from the military to a primarily political plane. However, selected terrorism by armed Communist bands continues in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines. Except in Indochina, Communist insurgent and guerrilla movements have met with continuing military reverses and cease to present a major threat. Similarly, with the notable exception of Indonesia, Communist infiltration and 'united front' activities have had little success to date. In most cases international Communist developments and diplomacy, including events in Indochina, and various Soviet and Chinese Communist "peace' and trade overtures, overshadowed local Communist activities.

B. Objectives and Themes of Communist Propaganda

1. Introduction

The complexities of the present political situation in the Far East are reflected in a complex propaganda situation. Most Far Eastern countries are, to a greater or lesser degree, recipients of propaganda which emanates from the USSR. The governments of Communist China, North Korea, and the Viet Minh are themselves Communist and are international purveyors of Communist propaganda, not only to their other halves --Nationalist China, the Republic

of Korea, and South Vietnam--but also to other areas of the Far East. Local Communist parties and movements are also active propagandists.

In the overall Communist propaganda picture in the Far East, the chief role is that of Communist China. The consolidation of Communist power on the mainland has provided the Communist movements throughout Asia, for the first time, with a firm Asian base. Communist China's increasingly active role in international affairs has enhanced its prestige and influence throughout Asia, particularly among the local Communist movements.

Thus, although Communist China continues to acknowledge the Soviet Union's leadership (at least on the surface), and though it maintains a close alignment with the USSR, in the Far East it is Communist China rather than the USSR which takes the propaganda lead. The USSR effort complements the effort of Communist China and other Asian Communists.

Capitalizing on its position as the leading Communist power in Asia, Communist China has taken steps to provide firm direction and increased control over the lesser Communist movements in Asia which previously had been marked by factionalism, dissidence, and the lack of centralized leadership. To such lesser Communist movements, Communist China has been providing guidance and aid on matters of propaganda and ideology.

2. Propaganda Objectives

a. Communist China. The Chinese Communist regime has two fundamental propaganda objectives: (a) the indoctrination and education of China's population in the attitudes and skills required for the modernization and strengthening of Communist China's economy and military machine and for the reorganization of Chinese society after the Soviet model; and (b) the acceptance in Asia and the West of certain basic tenets regarding Communist China's "great power" status in Asia, its "peaceful" aspirations toward non-Communist Asia, its "fraternal" stance toward other Communist countries, regimes, and movements, and its opposition to the "aggressive" plots of the U.S. and its "puppets".

Chinese Communist propaganda is therefore directed at several major audiences: the population of China itself, including both the mass of the population and government and party leaders; the population of other Asian states, including Communists and pro-Communists as well as the uncommitted masses and anti-Communist elements; and the people of Western countries.

Foreign propaganda from Communist China is directed at Asian and Western countries, particularly those whose government or peoples Peiping feels are not fully committed to either side in the cold war and whom Peiping hopes to recruit into a Communist-influenced "area of peace." In addition, propaganda is directed at overseas Chinese, who constitute significant communities in Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaya, Burma, Cambodia, and the Philippines. This propaganda is designed specifically to elicit remittances to mainland China, to strengthen the bonds between the Chinese communities and mainland, and to establish the loyalty of overseas Chinese to Peiping. Finally, a large part of Chinese Communist propaganda is designed to provide guidance and leadership for Communist movements and sympathizers in Asian countries.

b. Japan. The chief present objectives of JCP propaganda--obviously geared to the broader objectives of the Soviet Union--are to undermine the alliance between the U. S. and Japan and simultaneously to develop attitudes favorable to an orientation toward the Soviet Union and Communist China. To these ends, an important propaganda objective is the channeling of dissident elements into a "popular front" movement that would serve the JCP as a political instrument for achieving its over-all objectives.

c. Korea. The following major propaganda objectives are both current and long range: (1) to propagandize the generosity of the Communist foreign aid program and reconstruction and economic development accomplishments in North Korea; (2) to disparage U. S. accomplishments and influence in South Korea; (3) to rally the people of North Korea in Support of the regime, particularly in reconstruction activities, a tightening of internal security, and continued military preparedness; (4) to encourage further North Korean movement toward the status of a "socialist state"; (5) to turn the people of South Korea against their government and to draw them to support the North Korean regime; and (6) to place the blame on the U. S. for breakdowns in the truce supervision machinery by highlighting alleged truce violations by the UN Command and apportion of the Republic of Korea to the Mutual Nations Supervisory Commission.

d. Southeast Asia. Throughout the area Communist propaganda seeks to increase the prestige and influence of the Communist bloc, to capitalize upon Asian fears of a third World War, to thwart western-sponsored Asian defense arrangements, and to exploit Asian suspicion of the West in order to weaken sources of Western strength and support in the area. Communist China, in particular, appears

intent upon picturing itself to Southeast Asians as the prime promoter and defender of Asian hopes and aspirations and as a leader in efforts to maintain Asian "peace".

Detailed propaganda objectives vary in each of the countries of Southeast Asia but, in general, support whatever tactical line is current, be it armed struggle, subversion and infiltration or united front tactics designed to gain political respectability and organizational mobility. Indigenous anti-Communist leaders are also vilified, and real and imagined abuses in local societies are blamed on indigenous governments as well as on Western "imperialists". A major effort is made by Communist China to retain the loyalties of the Overseas Chinese while, at the same time, attempts are made to assure the governments of Southeast Asia of Chinese Communist willingness to find a mutually satisfactory solution to the question of dual nationality.

3. Themes of Communist Propaganda

a. Communist China. The major themes of Chinese Communist propaganda are directed with minor adaptations to both domestic and foreign audiences. Generally, domestic themes are treated for the domestic audiences in great detail and with some frankness in regard to mistakes and shortcomings, while foreign audiences are restricted to generalities and reports of continuing "progress" with only an occasional note of self-criticism. Similarly, many international themes receive cursory treatment in domestic media and detailed coverage for foreign consumption. However, few major propaganda themes are restricted exclusively to one audience and most key documents are broadcast indiscriminately, even where they contain admissions of weakness or indications of future Communist plans.

Chinese Communist domestic propaganda during 1954 centered on the implementation of the five-year plan which was initiated in 1953. Except where it had a direct bearing on the five-year plan, social reorganization was deemphasized during the year; there was, for example, relatively little emphasis on "reform" of marriage and the family system. The principal propaganda themes related to:

(1) "Aggressive plots" by the US and its "puppets" which are designed to foment a new war and to encircle Communist China with hostile military bases.

(2) The need to "learn from the Soviet Union."

(3) The "liberation" of Formosa and other Nationalist-held islands.

(4) The reorganization of Chinese agriculture into mutual-aid teams, cooperatives, and collectives.

(5) The subordination of private enterprise to the state plan and its ultimate socialization.

(6) The need for rigid austerity in order to gain savings for investment.

(7) The exertion of ceaseless "vigilance" against spies, saboteurs, and other hirelings of Chiang K'ai-shek and the US.

(8) The maintenance of "unity" and discipline within the party and government and the implementation without "deviation" of policy decisions by party and government leaders.

(9) The implementation of policies, particularly those relating to agrarian reorganization, with a minimum application of force and a maximum use of persuasion.

Propaganda relating to these themes was, for domestic purposes, almost invariably related in turn to accomplishment of the goals of the five-year program. For example, discussions of the "liberation" of Formosa were used as exhortations for exceeding work norms; trials of "spies" or "saboteurs" were used to gain greater technical efficiency; diatribes against US "aggressive plots" were used to rationalize the necessity of industrialization and military modernization; etc.

To foreign audiences, the most important of Communist China's propaganda themes in 1954 were the following:

(1) The contrast between the continuing "plotting for war" on the part of the US and its principal "satellites" and the "striving for peace" by the Communist bloc, the Asian neutralists (the Colombo powers), and the "peoples" of the world generally.

(2) The need to broaden the "area of peace" --the buffer of uncommitted states on the fringes of the Communist bloc itself.

(3) The possibility of settling all international disputes through negotiations on the model of Panmunjom and Geneva.

(4) The desirability, in order to avoid war, of basing the relations between states on the "five principles" (mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence) which were first proclaimed in the agreement on Tibet between India and Communist China and were reaffirmed in the Chou En-lai - Nehru and Chou En-lai - U Nu communiques.

(5) The inseparability of Formosa from China, the need to drive the US "invaders" from the Formosa area, and the impossibility of any compromise settlement of the Formosa issue.

(6) Communist China's "right" to fully-acknowledged "great power" status and to a seat in the UN.

(7) The potentialities of unrestricted trade and cultural exchange between Communist China and non-Communist nations.

(8) The invincibility of the Sino-Soviet alliance as a "bulwark of peace."

b. Japan. In addition to world-wide Communist propaganda themes, the principal themes evident in Communist propaganda directed specifically toward Japan include the following:

(1) "Normalization" of Relations with the Communist Bloc: In keeping with the Communist line of "peaceful coexistence" and "negotiations to ease international tensions", both the Soviet Union and Communist China as well as the Japanese Communist Party have emphasized in recent months the feasibility of negotiations between Japan and the two major Communist powers. The Communists have indicated that such negotiations can be carried on even with a conservative government and that Japan's abandonment of its ties with the US is no longer a precondition for negotiations. Although this theme is an integral part of the broader Soviet- inspired "peace offensive", it has the specific objective of promoting an actual peace settlement between Japan and Communist China and the Soviet Union.

(2) Other "Peace Offensive" Themes: This category includes the following themes (a) Promotion of trade relations, (b) the possibility of settling such outstanding issues as the fisheries problem and further repatriation, (c) the "friendship" of the "peoples" of the Communist bloc for the "peoples" of Japan, and (d) promoting the idea that the Communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, are the leaders of the "peace forces" in the world. Various gestures and overtures on the part of the Soviet Union and Communist China have served as important vehicles for the above themes. Such Communist moves include the continued repatriation of Japanese nationals detained in Communist areas since World War II, the release of captured Japanese fishermen and their vessels, increased trade, and efforts directed toward facilitating further trade.

Although most of the above themes have been used for some time, they lend support to the current Communist emphasis on "normalizing" relations. In general, these themes as well as the gestures have been designed to stimulate favorable Japanese attitudes toward the Soviet Union and Communist China and to indicate the possibility of closer political and economic relations with the Communist bloc.

(3) Anti-Americanism: Since 1950 this has been a predominant theme and has pervaded virtually every facet of Communist propaganda efforts. The US has been depicted as an "imperialistic" nation engaged in "exploiting" Japan in its own interests and as a "base for further aggrandizement" in Asia. Anti-American propaganda has focused on the presence of US military bases in Japan and post war US-Japan agreements. Such propaganda has been designed to exploit Japanese sensitivity to any infringement, either real or imagined, on Japan's regained independence as well as apprehensions regarding involvement in another world war.

(4) Anti-Yoshida Themes: Both the foreign and domestic policies of the Yoshida government were the targets of a continual barrage of Communist propaganda. The Yoshida government was attacked as "moral and political pillar of US imperialism" and its pro-US alignment was generally cited as evidence of Japan's "semi-colonial" status and the government's subservience to US interests. At the same time, Communist-inspired propaganda emphasized the alternative of closer relations with the Communist bloc and places the onus for the absence of such relations on the Japanese government's subservience to US policies.

Domestically the Yoshida government was pictured as a "fascist" and "reactionary" regime serving the sole purpose of "exploiting" and "oppressing" the Japanese people. The primary targets in the sphere of Communist propaganda efforts were the so-called "oppressive" government agencies, particularly the internal security agencies, and so-called "reactionary" legislation, including the Anti-Subversive Activities Law, the recent laws restricting the political activities of teachers, and the proposed changes in labor legislation. The Yoshida government was also made the scapegoat for all local grievances including the problems arising out of the presence of US military installations.

Although the present Hatoyama Government has not been subjected as yet to the same scathing attacks, current Japanese Communist Party propaganda is moving toward a similar pattern in bracketing the present government with the previous Yoshida Government.

(5) Anti-rearmament: Until late 1954 Communist party propaganda opposed the re-establishment of any type of military organization in Japan. This theme was designed to exploit the

Japanese fear of involvement in another world conflict and the fear of resurgent "militarism". However, in line with Soviet pronouncements stating that Japan has a right to develop limited "defense forces," the Japanese Communist Party has backed away from its extreme position on rearmament.

(6) H-Bomb: Although the issue of atomic weapons had not been a major subject of JCP propaganda since the Stockholm appeal in 1950, recent events, and particularly the Fukuryu Maru incident, have provided Communist propagandists with an emotionally charged issue which has been exploited in terms of anti-US, anti-rearmament, and "peace" propaganda. Currently the JCP is actively promoting all types of anti-H-Bomb campaigns, particularly a nation-wide signature campaign.

c. Korea. The major themes of Communist propaganda in Korea during 1954 appeared to be:

(1) alleged US-UN violations of the truce, and ROK agitation against the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission;

(2) "aggressiveness of US policy in Korea" and the Far East;

(3) corruption in ROK armed forces and government and their control as "puppets" of the US;

(4) proposals for increased economic and cultural contacts between North and South Korea leading ultimately to conferences on political unification of the country by Koreans;

(5) grants of aid by the USSR, Communist China, and the Eastern European satellites to north Korea, and the arrivals of materials purhcased with such aid;

(6) reconstruction accomplishments and plans in north Korea;

(7) cultural relations of north Korea with Soviet Bloc countries and other indications of bloc solidarity and support of north Korea;

(8) military preparedness and vigilance against subversive activity and espionage;

(9) activities of alleged covert opposition groups in south Korea.

d. Southeast Asia. Major themes utilized in both domestic and international Communist propaganda in Southeast Asia generally during 1954 were:

(1) the possibility and desirability of "peaceful coexistence", international cooperation, and the promotion of an expanding area of "Asian peace";

(2) advocacy of the outlawing of atomic warfare and the recognition and admission to the UN of Communist China;

(3) charges of Western "economic and military imperialism" and US "aggressive intent" as allegedly personified by foreign investment, US aid and US attempts to establish a "military crescent" in Southeast Asia;

(4) deprecation of the US by encouragement of Asian misconceptions concerning US "capitalism", "materialism", and the racial problem;

(5) praise for the the "accomplishments" of Communist China and the Soviet Union and the urging of closer cultural and economic relations with these countries. To achieve this end, an exchange of "cultural missions" and active participation in international trade fairs and exhibitions.

In the special case of Indochina, major themes included the following:

(1) the allegedly growing "antagonisms" among the Western powers;

(2) US attempts to replace "the French in each of the Associated States so as to convert Indochina into a military base against Communist China and exploit Indochinese resources for its own advantage;

(3) Peace in Vietnam was attained through the efforts of the "world camp of peace" despite Western, and particularly US efforts to prevent a peaceful settlement;

(4) the US, with the collaboration of the Vietnamese Government and "certain" French circles, is now actively attempting to "sabotage" fulfillment of the Geneva Agreements to which the Viet Minh "scrupulously adheres".

C. Local Communist Propaganda in Far Eastern Countries

1. Communist China

Full-time propagandists in Communist China probably number between 4 and 5 million. About U.S. $1.5 billion is allocated yearly in the Chinese Communist budget to formal propaganda and education activities. These figures, however, are misleadingly low. In fact the Communists make no clearcut distinction between propaganda and other aspects of policy implementation. Most Communist programs, whether domestic or foreign, are associated with a propaganda or education campaign and propaganda is an important duty of vitually all officials and Communist cadres.

The Chinese Communist propaganda apparatus operates under the general guidance of the Chinese Communist Party's Propaganda Department and of the appropriate ministries of the State Council -- there is no propaganda ministry as such. Ministries and commissions of the Peiping government having important propaganda functions include those for agriculture, culture, education, foreign affairs, justice, and overseas Chinese affairs.

The propaganda policies and programs planned at the top of the party and administrative hierarchy are implemented by every conceivable information channel. Just as in the USSR, the population is literally deluged with propaganda through press, radio, films, loudspeakers on the public streets, public meetings, schools, and word of mouth. No citizen can escape the propaganda blare of this monolithic machine.

2. Japan

Propaganda is one of the most important functions of the Japanese Communist party. The party's propaganda apparatus is virtually coextensive with party organization, including both overt and covert structures, and propaganda activities are considered important at every level. Party propaganda is supplemented by that of a large number of "front" organizations which embrace almost every facet of Japanese life and interests. In addition, minority groups sympathetic to the Communist cause also carry on Communist propaganda activities.

Japanese Communist Party propaganda machinery as well as that of front groups is geared to exploit all available propaganda media. Publications, both overt and covert, including newspapers, periodicals,

pamphlets, leaflets, books, and posters are the principal media utilized by Communist propagandists in Japan. The party and its fronts also exploit such entertainment media as movies, dramatic troupes, exhibitions of various types, as well as musical organizations. Although the party controls no local radio facilities, it encourages the formation of "listeners clubs! and publishes foreign Communist broadcasts to Japan.

In addition, the party utilizes mass rallies and demonstrations, person-to-person contacts, local "struggle" campaigns, court trials, and election campaigns as media to get its propaganda message disseminated among the people.

3. Korea

Since the signing of the armistice in August 1953, the North Korean regime has largely reestablished the internal propaganda media that existed before the hostilities. The UN Command can no longer make leaflet drops, and the tightening of internal police controls in North Korea, coupled with the probable shortage of receiving facilities in private hands, has reduced the direct and indirect effects of anti-Communist radio broadcasts. Since early 1953 North Korean radio broadcasts on the truce, Panmunjom negotiations, the Berlin Conference, and the Geneva Conference have appeared to be closely coordinated with those of Communist China. This is evidenced particularly in broadcasts of commentaries by North Korean Central Press Correspondents paralleling those of NCNA broadcast over Peiping radio. Pyongyang radio also is increasingly making English language broadcasts.

4. Burma

The sources of Communist propaganda in Burma are the aboveground Burma Workers and Peasants Party (BWPP), which has small parliamentary representation, and the illegal insurgents comprising the Burma Communist Party (BCP) and the Communist Party (Burma) (CPB). In addition, Communist front organizations include the Burma Trade Union Congress (affiliate of WFTU), the Peasants United Organization (formerly the All-Burma Peasants Organization), a local branch of the World Peace Council, the Peoples Youth Organization (affiliate of WFDY), the All-Burma Students Federation (affiliate of IUS), the Students United Front, the All-Burma Women's Freedom League, the Sino-Burmese Friendship Society, and the Burma-Soviet Cultural Association.

Within the Chinese Community a major Communist front is the Burmese Branch of the Chinese Democratic League, and Communist influence is dominant in the Huian Young Men's Association, the Chinese Youth Society, the Chinese Student Union, the Fukienese Association, the Chinese Women's Association, the Women's Welfare Workers Society, and the Burma Chinese Relief Association, and the Burma Chinese Cultural Union.

There are at least three consistently pro-Communist newspapers - one Burmese and two Chinese language, and four major pro-Communist magazines - two Burmese language, two Chinese language. It is probable that clandestine publication activities are carried out by indigenous Communist organizations. Burmese Communists have no broadcast facilities. Major Communist film activity is supported by either the Soviet or Chinese Embassies. Aside from the information activities of the Soviet and Chinese Communist Embassies, Communist sponsored cultural activities of an overt nature continue to be limited to occasional functions such as art and handicraft exhibits and film showings sponsored by the Burma-Soviet Friendship Association and the Sino-Burmese Friendship Society. Recent press reports, however, indicate that a Chinese Communist cultural mission currently in India is planning a month-long stop-over in Burma prior to its return to Communist China.

5. Thailand

No overt organized Communist activity is permitted by the Government of Thailand. Covertly, however, Communist propaganda is carried on, especially through literature, and particularly within the Chinese community. Communist propaganda in Thailand emanates principally from the Chinese Communist Party, the Thai Communist Party, and from Communist leadership within the Vietnamese minority in Northeast Thailand. Apparently, the Chinese Communists are placing increasing emphasis on organizational activities among Chinese youth.

The Thai Communist Party became unusually vocal during August when it distributed manifestoes in opposition to the Manila Pact among members of the Thai Government, parliament, and the clergy. On the whole, however, overt Communist activity is minim

6. Indochina

No Communist party or front groups are permitted to operate overtly in South Vietnam. However, clandestine propagandizing by

Viet Minh agents, primarily through literature and personal contact, is widespread, especially in non-urban areas. Viet Minh voice transmitters formerly broadcasting in South Vietnam ceased operation in November 1954. However, regular voice transmissions beamed to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos continue to emanate from the Viet Minh-operated "Voice of Vietnam" now located in Hanoi. No information is currently available on the nature of the Viet Minh political arm in South Vietnam -- the "Administrative and Resistance Committee of Nambo" -- which is probably undergoing substantial reorganization as a result of Geneva Agreements requirements for the evacuation of Viet Minh troops.

In Cambodia, the major source of Communist propaganda -- the Viet Minh-controlled "Khmer Resistance Government" -- was theoretically dissolved with the cessation of hostilities. Its radio transmitter has not recently been heard. However, it is probable that Communist propagandizing will continue clandestinely under the aegis of small Viet Minh and Cambodian Communist cells.

In Laos, the Viet Minh-controlled "Pathet Lao" movement retains de facto control of two northern provinces from which it is conducting intensive propaganda operations, including the exhibition of Viet Minh-supplied films of Soviet origin.

7. Malaya and the Philippines

In both Malaya and the Philippines the Communist parties and all front groups are illegal. Party propagandists, however, circulate openly in remote areas or, without disclosing their identity, in some populous centers speaking to small groups. Very frequently force and intimidation by armed Communists are used to assemble audiences.

Former Communist dominated or controlled organizations have either been destroyed or driven deeply underground. On a clandestine basis in both countries, however, Communist parties are striving to infiltrate their members into any group where anti-Western and pro-neutralist sentiments may be spread. In the Philipppines, the major Communist propagandists include the Philippine Communist Party (PKP), the People's Liberation Army (Huks) -- the military arm of the PKP, and the Chinese Communist Party. In Malaya, Communist propagandists include the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), the Malayan Races Liberation Army - the military arm of the MKP, and Min Yuen - a clandestine civilian support organization for the MCP.

Heavily circumscribed by their illegal status and by governmental vigilance in detecting expressions of the Communist "line", the Communist parties of Malaya and the Philippines must rely on clandestine production and distribution of propaganda. In extremely infrequent incidents possibly Communist-inspired items have appeared in the local presses. In both areas Communist-produced newspapers or newssheets, study group booklets, and leaflets are prepared and circulated, but radio, television, and motion picture media are not available for Communist use. In the Philippines a lower level of output, cruder format, less differentiation for educational level of recipients, and a less extensive distribution system exists than in Malaya, but in both countries media output tends to be sporadic and spotty.

8. Indonesia

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its propaganda and front organizations are the primary sources of indigenous Communist propaganda in Indonesia. The PKI and its satellites control about 35 seats in the Indonesian parliament. The PKI supports the present Indonesian government of Ali Sastroumidjujo and espouses many nationalist causes, giving it a considerable degree of prestige and popular appeal. Principal Communist-front organizations are SOBSI (Central Organization of All Workers of Indonesia) affiliated with WFTU, and BTI (Indonesian Farmers Association). There is a Communist youth organization (Pemuda Rakiat), a women's organization (GERWAWI), a Sino-Indonesian cultural organization (LEKRA), and several veterans organizations, the most important of which is PERBEPSI. There is also a local branch of the World Peace Council.

Within the Chinese Community of some two million population the Chinese Communists control schools, newspapers and one of the principal Chinese organizations in Indonesia, the Djakarta General Association of Overseas Chinese Organizations (CHCTTH) which acts as a central headquarters for a variety of Chinese organizations throughout Indonesia.

There are about 15 Communist or pro-Communist newspapers in Indonesia with an over-all circulation of some 83,000. The principal Communist organ, Harian Rakjat, claimed a circulation of 15,000 in February 1954. The Communists also produce a number of periodicals and pamphlets. Both Chinese and Soviet Communist films are shown but must be passed by Indonesian Government censors.

D. External Communist Propaganda to Far Eastern Countries

1. Communist Broadcasting to Far Eastern Countries

No significant changes have taken place in the international broadcasting output of the USSR and Communist China to the Far East. The East European satellites do not broadcast to this area.

During the visit of a Chinese radio delegation to Moscow, an agreement of cooperation was signed on August 21, 1954 for the exchange of radio programs between the two countries. As of December 31, 1954 Moscow programs in Mandarin were on the Peiping home service twice a week, thus being available to a much larger potential audience even though the total transmission time of Moscow programs in Mandarin was reduced by 2.5 hours per week. According to a recent report, these Moscow programs in Mandarin carried on the Peiping home service were further increased on January 17, 1955.

The Peiping International Service includes broadcasts in various Chinese dialects, intended for Overseas Chinese. The relay of the home service national hook-up in Mandarin was discontinued on May 30, but on August 15 Peiping inaugurated a new series of broadcasts beamed to Formosa in Amoy and Mandarin, for a total of 28 hours per week. These programs consist of news, comment, talks and music, and on certain days messages are broadcast from relatives on the mainland to Nationalist armed forces and government personnel on Formosa, the Tachens, Kinmen and other islands.

Prior to the Geneva Conference, there were various Communist-controlled clandestine stations broadcasting from both North and South Vietnam. These have gradually suspended operations, and there is today only one official Viet Minh station at Hanoi, calling itself the "Voice of Vietnam." In its broadcasts to Southeast Asia, the Cambodian and Laotian language transmissions are quite recent, having been inaugurated on November 15, 1954.

The clandestine station "Radio Free Japan" broadcasts 21 hours a week in Japanese from a location apparently in North China. On May 15 it announced the discontinuation of broadcasting on short-wave frequencies, and began using medium wave exclusively. Since then it has been heard poorly in Tokyo, though it was announced that the power of the transmitter would be increased.

Radio Pyongyang broadcasts 3.5 hours per week in Japanese, as well as 7 hours a week in Korean to South Korea.

COMMUNIST BROADCASTING TO THE FAR EAST: TABLE I

Weekly Hours of Broadcasting by USSR and Communist China (December 31, 1953 compared with December 31, 1954)

Originating Countries

Languages	USSR 1953	USSR 1954	Communist China 1953	Communist China 1954	Total USSR and Communist China 1953	Total USSR and Communist China 1954
Amoy	-	-	5:15	7:00	5:15	7:00
Cantonese	5:15	5:15	8:45	7:00	14:00	12:15
Chaochow	-	-	5:15	5:15	5:15	5:15
Hakka	-	-	5:15	5:15	5:15	5:15
Mandarin	21:00	18:30	3:30	-	24:30	18:30
Mongolian	8:45	8:45	3:30	3:30	12:15	12:15
Uighur (to Sinkiang)	7:00	7:00	-	-	7:00	7:00
Tibetan	-	-	5:30	3:30	5:30	3:30
Burmese	-	-	7:00	7:00	7:00	7:00
Indonesian	7:00	7:00	7:00	7:00	14:00	14:00
Thai	-	-	7:00	7:00	7:00	7:00
Tonkinese	7:00	7:00	7:00	7:00	14:00	14:00
Japanese	21:00	21:00	10:30	10:30	31:30	31:30
Korean	17:30	17:30	7:00	7:00	24:30	24:30
English	-	-	10:30	10:30	10:30	10:30
F. E. Total	94:30	92:00	93:00	87:30	187:30	179:30

NOTE: 1. Figures represent total transmission time, including repeats, as no exact differentiation between original program hours and repeat transmissions is available.

2. USSR figures include output of Radio Moscow as well as all other USSR stations originating broadcasts for abroad.

3. See Table II, next page, for a listing of additional Communist Far Eastern Broadcasting by the clandestine station "Radio Free Japan," by Radio Pyongyang, by Radio Hanoi, and by Radio Peiping to Formosa.

4. The East European satellites do not broadcast to the Far East.

COMMUNIST BROADCASTING TO THE FAR EAST: TABLE II

Broadcasting by Stations "Free Japan", Hanoi, and Pyongyang; and Broadcasting by Peiping to Formosa

(Hours per week as of December 31, 1954)

Station	Language	Total Language Hours	Total Station Hours
"Radio Free Japan" (Clandestine)	Japanese	21:00	21:00
Hanoi to Southeast Asia	Cantonese	3:30	
	Mandarin	3:30	
	Thai	3:30	
	French	3:30	
	Cambodian	3:30	
	Laotian	3:30	
	Vietnamese to South Vietnam	3:30	24:30
Pyongyang to South Korea	Korean	7:00	
Pyongyang to Japan	Japanese	3:30	10:30
Peiping to Formosa	Amoy	14:00	
	Mandarin	14:00	28:00
TOTAL		84:00	84:00

NOTE: The hours reported in the above table are in addition to the regular broadcasts of the USSR and Communist China to Far Eastern audiences, for which see Table I on the preceding page.

2. Other External Propaganda to the Area

a. Japan.

(1) Communist Publications. Newspapers, periodicals and books from both the Soviet Union and Communist China are readily available in Japan either through private arrangements or regular commercial channels. A number of these foreign Communist publications, particularly periodicals, are in English and at least one, Peoples China, has a Japanese language edition. Books from the USSR and Communist China are readily available in Japan and frequently these are translated into Japanese and printed by "independent" publishing firms. In addition, Japanese press reports have indicated that there has been some exchange of publications on a private basis between Japanese universities and private organizations and their counterparts in the Soviet Union and Communist China. There is a Soviet information center in Tokyo, although it is sponsored by indigenous Communist front organizations.

(2) Communist Films. At least 18 Chinese Communist films have entered Japan as "gifts" to well known sympathizers in order to circumvent Japanese Government controls. One film from North Korea entered by the same procedure. Several Soviet propaganda films including the "Fall of Berlin" currently are being shown throughout Japan. These foreign Communist films apparently are shown privately by sympathizers or front organizations.

(3) Travel to and from Communist Countries. Until recently the Japanese Government has refused to issue passposts and visas to Japanese desiring to travel within the Soviet orbit with exception of official passports issued to a few delegations and at least one individual for special purposes, including the two repatriation missions to Communist China and the Soviet Union and a fisheries delegate to the USSR. Under increasing pressure at home, however, the Yoshida Government modified its position on the issue and in the fall of 1954 granted passports to a supra-partisan Diet group to travel to Communist China. The Hatoyama Government, primarily for political reasons, has publicly announced a more liberal policy on travel to and from the Soviet orbit and already has issued the necessary passports to several groups and individuals. Moreover, during the past two years an increasing number of Japanese groups and individuals have visited Communist China and the USSR without valid passports. The Communist bloc has encouraged, by invitation and otherwise, the travel of Japanese to the area.

From the late fall until the end of the year over a hundred Japanese visited Communist China either officially or otherwise. Many of these also entered the Soviet Union. Currently, at least two Japanese delegations are in Communist China with Japanese government sanction. Among those Japanese who have visited the Soviet Union and Communist China were representatives of all political parties. Recent Japanese groups that have visited Communist China include a group of labor delegates from Sohyo (Japan's largest federation of labor), a 14-woman cultural delegation, a fisheries delegation and a trade mission, as well as the delegation of Diet members.

Although most of the Japanese visiting Communist-controlled areas were non-Communists and a majority were not even sympathetic to the Communist cause, in general they were convinced of the inevitability of closer relations between Japan and the Communist bloc, particularly Communist China. On returning to Japan, the stress which these visitors placed on the strength and progress noted in Communist countries, particularly Communist China, and their apparent acceptance of the Communists' expressed desire for cooperation and peace have strengthened certain immediate Communist objectives in Japan.

During the past six months, only two delegations, one each from Communist China and the Soviet Union, have been permitted official entry into Japan. The Soviet delegation included three trade representatives (to be supplemented by several technicians) who presently are in Tokyo attempting to work out the details of a provisional barter trade agreement. A ten-member Communist Chinese Red Cross mission headed by Mme. Li Te-chuan, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Red Cross, visited Japan in the late fall. This group entered almost a year after it had been promised an invitation by the Japanese repatriation delegation to Peiping. Possibly because of its close association with the issue of repatriation, the Communist Chinese delegation was given an enthusiastic reception and received widespread publicity. The delegates' adeptness in their roles as ambassadors of good will left the Japanese with a favorable impression. On the other hand, the Soviet trade group has stirred up little general interest, possibly because the negotiations to date have not been particularly fruitful.

b. Burma.

Overt Communist publishing and distribution activities in Burma have been stepped up during the past year with the increasingly

widespread distribution by the Soviet and Chinese Communist Embassies of low-priced books and pamphlets, accompanied by an expanded book program which includes the free distribution of high quality publications to reading rooms and study groups. The Soviet Embassy has recently begun issuance of a Burmese-language version of the USSR Information Bulletin, formerly issued only in English. In December, a new pro-Communist Chinese language magazine appeared featuring non-political features on Burma and China.

With the exception of a visit by the Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai following the Geneva Conference, no political, cultural, sports, or other Communist delegation has visited Burma during the past year. However, Burmese delegations to Communist bloc countries during the past year have included: 1) an agricultural mission to the USSR; 2) a labor mission to Peiping; 3) a visit to Peiping by Prime Minister U Nu, and 4) a medical mission to the Soviet Medical Academy at Tashkent.

c. Thailand

There is no available evidence as to the nature or content of externally-produced Communist publications or films which may have been introduced into Thailand. No known delegations have either departed for or arrived from Communist bloc countries.

d. Vietnam.

Although publications and films of Soviet and Chinese Communist origin are widely utilized within Viet Minh zones in Vietnam and to some extent in the "Pathet Lao"-controlled provinces of Laos, there is no evidence that such media have been introduced into areas not under Viet Minh control.

e. Malaya and the Philippines.

In both Malaya and the Philippines, government authorities ban the entry of Communist propaganda materials, and the illegality of the Communist parties denies Communists travel rights to or from these areas. The Philippines Government in addition bans all travel between Communist areas, while Malaya, with its much larger Chinese population, allows travel to and from Red China but does not admit known Communists into Malaya. Neither country

has accepted delegations from Communist countries whose purpose might be considered largely propagandistic. Although some Communist literature may be smuggled into these countries, probably the most significant external propaganda contact is the increasing number of Malayan Chinese youth who go to Communist China for study.

f. Indonesia.

The principal Communist external propaganda activity affecting Indonesia is the program for indoctrinating Indonesians through study tours in Communist countries and participation in meetings of Communist international front organizations. An estimated 5,000 Chinese students from Indonesia went to Communist China for training in 1953.

The USSR maintains a TASS representative in Indonesia. An effective Soviet propaganda effort was its display at the 1954 Djakarta international trade fair. Other European Communist countries also participated.

The Chinese Communist diplomatic mission in Indonesia includes cultural officers. Chinese Communist films and literature are distributed.

X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA IN LATIN AMERICA, 1954

HIGH LIGHTS

Membership in Communist Parties grew, with the bulk of the increase occuring in key countries.

New Communist publications appeared, both foreign and domestic. More Communist films were shown. Several hundred Latin Americans travelled to the Soviet bloc under Communist sponsorship, and an increasing number of "cultural" delegations from the Soviet Bloc visited Latin America.

Communist broadcasting to Latin America from the USSR and the satellites increased from 31.5 hours per week to 33.25 hours per week in 1954. In addition, during the first week of 1955, Czechoslovakia increased its Spanish programming to Latin America from seven to 14 hours per week.

The Guatemala rebellion received extensive treatment by the Communists, with Radio Moscow broadcasting more than 300 commentaries on the subject from June 18 through June 27. Other Communist media throughout Latin America gave the rebellion the same emphasis, describing it as an "invasion" of Guatemala by "mercenaries" of the US and the United Fruit Company.

A propaganda success was scored by the Communists on the Guatemalan issue, in the sense that many non-Communist newspapers in Latin America and abroad accepted the Communist interpretation of developments.

Front organizations continued to be built by the Communists. The quick rise and growth of the Communist-front "Friends of Guatemala", which organized pro-Arbenz appeals and demonstrations in many countries of Latin America, illustrated the success which Communists have in manipulating non-Communists on issues with nationalistic and emotional appeal.

Economic difficulties and Latin American fears of economic distress were played upon widely by Communist propagandists, particularly during the Rio Conference. Communists blamed "Yankee imperialism and exploitation" for Latin America's economic problems, and urged that Latin America expand its trade with the Soviet bloc.

X. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

A. Communism in Latin America

1. Strength

During 1954 overall membership in the Communist Parties of Latin America increased. The bulk of this increase occurred in important key countries of the area. In Argentina, for example, the Communists claimed an enrollment of over 10,000 new members in the Party, a figure which represents a rise of about 30 percent over 1953 membership figures. In addition to membership gains, the Communists also acquired many new sympathizers. In Guatemala, until the fall of the Arbenz Government in June, the Communists enjoyed important direct participation in politics. In other countries, Communists continued to build front organizations, often in alliance with non-Communists, thus providing substitute means of political action.

The rise and proliferation of the Communist front, Friends of Guatemala, which sparked and organized pro-Guatemalan activities in many Latin American countries during the Guatemalan crisis in June, illustrated the success with which the Communists are able to manipulate non-Communists on issues having great emotional and nationalistic appeal for Latin America.

These front groups -- and the national party organizations behind them -- continued to benefit from considerable subsidization from international Communism. One of the ways in which this generosity was manifested was in the number of Latin Americans who traveled outside the hemisphere under Communist auspices during the year. During 1954 there were no non-hemisphere Communist front meetings as large as the 1953 youth and labor front congresses which had attracted nearly 800 out of a total of about 1,000 Latin Americans who had traveled abroad under Communist auspices in that year. Nevertheless, several hundred Latin Americans traveled abroad under Communist sponsorship in 1954.

The Communist menace in Latin America stems not so much from the numerical strength of the Communist Parties themselves as from situations which permit them to identify themselves

more closely with non-Communist extremist interests and dissident groups in generating and capitalizing upon anti-US sentiment in the area.

2. Objectives

The Communist movement has as its major immediate objective in Latin America the location of political power in the hands of groups hostile to the US. With this end in view, Latin American Communists continued to support any and all anti-US groups, including some formerly denounced by the Communists as "Fascist". They continued their long-range strategy of seeking to organize "National Liberation Fronts". They appealed not only to urban workers, the lower middle class and intellectuals, but to industrialists through demands for protective tariffs, and to small farmers and rural workers through proposals for agrarian reform.

During the past year or so the Communists have made a more systematic effort to organize pro-Communist or neutralist intellectuals in support of Communist objectives, and to link them with the agrarian reform movement.

3. Propaganda Vulnerabilities in the Economic Field

During 1954 economic difficulties, especially in the field of foreign trade, accented underlying factors of instability in Latin America. As economic problems loomed, extremist solutions based on ultra nationalist and radical doctrines made a stronger appeal and gained a wider audience in key countries. Governments committed to economic and social reform and heavily dependent on popular support showed special vulnerability to opposition attack.

Communist propagandists were able to play upon widespread fears of economic distress, to allege, as during the Rio Conference, Yankee exploitation as a major cause of such distress, and thus to promote interest in trade with the Soviet bloc. Trade deals effected or in negotiation during 1954 between Latin American countries and the bloc yielded significant propaganda gains for the Communists in several countries, and many Latin American governments were under increasing popular pressure to expand their foreign trade by dealing with the USSR and its satellites.

B. Objectives, Themes and Trends of Communist Propaganda in Latin America

Communist propaganda seeks to alienate Latin America from the US by presenting the US as the "exploiter" and Latin America as the "victim". Moreover, Communist propaganda denounces those groups in Latin America which cooperate with the US and praises those most active in the struggle against "Yankee imperialism".

During 1954 the volume of Communist propaganda continued to rise. The most striking propaganda development was the extensive and intensive attention given by Communist media -- Soviet, satellite and local -- to the Guatemalan case, especially in the period between June 18, the date of the Castillo Armas uprising, and June 27, the date of the fall of the Arbenz government. Radio Moscow alone broadcast more than 300 commentaries on the subject during this period, and Communist propaganda media in Latin America gave top place to the "invasion" of Guatemala by the "mercenaries" of the US and the United Fruit Company. On the other hand, the Arbenz regime was described as a "democratic" government seeking only to free itself from US "economic imperialism" by a "progressive" policy of social reform.

The major Communist themes used in 1954 included the following:

1. Peace: Campaigns for petitions favoring world "peace".

2. Labor Unity: Necessity for labor unity in the face of US "imperialism"; calls for the formation of alliances between farmers, workers and intellectuals to resist imperialist expansion, to struggle against fascism and aggressive war, and to fight for the peaceful solution of international controversies.

3. US Military Domination: Bilateral military assistance pacts are pictured as instruments to ensure continued US domination militarily of Latin America.

4. Cultural Exchange: Necessity for freedom of cultural exchange; need to free Latin American countries from US "cultural penetration".

5. National Liberation Fronts: These are needed to "save" the Latin American countries from US "imperialism" and from oppression by the domestic allies of the US; the elimination of US influence from Latin America is presented in Communist propaganda as the essential step to the attainment of economic independence and social reform.

6. Agrarian Reform: Communist propaganda on this theme promises the peasants free land, cancellation of all debts, and cheap, long-term credits, and promises the rural workers a minimum wage equal to that of the unskilled urban worker. It says these reforms can be realized once US influence, allegedly responsible for the maintenance of the system of large landholdings, is eliminated.

7. East-West Trade: Trade with the Soviet bloc is represented as a way to liberate Latin America from economic domination by the US. In many countries campaigns are in progress calling for the establishment (or re-establishment) of diplomatic and economic relations with the USSR.

The Soviet delegate to the Economic and Social Council of the UN invited all the Latin American states to send representatives to Moscow for trade talks in September. The Soviet Union, declared its delegate, could accept delayed payment for goods purchased and would agree to using the currencies of the Latin American purchasers. Soviet organizations would pay all costs for two or three delegates from each country. The visiting officials would be able to spend a month in the USSR in travel and in familiarizing themselves with the latest developments in Soviet industry and agriculture.

More recently, the Soviet Union repeated this invitation to the delegates attending the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) session in Chile. During the Rio Conference (November, 1954) Radio Moscow held the US responsible for Latin America's economic difficulties and denounced the US for "imposing" bi-lateral trade agreements which prevent Latin America from trading with the "democratic camp".

8. Yankee Intervention in Internal Affairs: Communist propaganda prior to and during the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas (March, 1954) concentrated on the alleged Yankee plot to convert the Conference into "an instrument of imperialism

to accentuate intervention in the internal life of Latin America"; Guatemalan Communists attacked the US-sponsored anti-Communist resolution and declared that the US was attempting to intervene in Latin America under the pretext of countering the "intervention of Communism in the American Republics".

Communist propaganda during and subsequent to the Conference harped on inter-American "disunity", and the new Communist front, the Friends of Guatemala, pushed for Latin American solidarity with Guatemala in its struggle against US "intervention". The Castillo uprising on June 18 and the alleged role of the US therein produced a voluminous stream of Communist propaganda devoted to the "intervention" theme. Communist propaganda also linked US "intensified intervention" in Latin America with its alleged preparations for a new war.

C. Indigenous and External Communist Media in Latin America

1. Party and "Front" Activities

Latin American Communist Parties were very active during the past year and many of them held national party congresses from which emerged, among other things, new propaganda plans. The number of Soviet and satellite "cultural" societies of one kind or another increased, while the activities of those already in existence expanded.

A variety of other Communist fronts, especially in important key countries, engaged in extensive propaganda activities. Perhaps the most successful of these fronts was the Friends of Guatemala which was initially organized in Mexico in December 1953 and quickly spread to other countries of Latin America. The "Friends" took the lead in organizing anti-US demonstrations in many Latin American countries during the Guatemalan crisis of last June. They succeeded in whipping up pro-Guatemalan and anti-US feelings among Latin Americans of varying political points of view.

The hemisphere Communist-front meeting which attracted the largest attendance in 1954 was the Latin American Conference of Women held in Rio de Janeiro from August 27 to 30. The Communists claimed that more than three hundred and fifty delegates representing eight Latin American countries attended the sessions. The great bulk of these delegates, however,

represented Brazil, the host country. Attendance from the rest of Latin America was poor. From both the point of view of attendance and propaganda, the Conference could hardly be termed a success.

2. Press and Publications

During 1954 new Communist publications, both foreign and domestic, appeared in the area. Indigenous Communist newspapers continued efforts to increase their circulation and the Mexican Communist organ, La Voz de Mexico, attempted to secure enough money to enable it to publish daily instead of weekly. It did not succeed in attaining this objective, however.

During the Sixth Mexican Book Fair held in November-December the Communist front Universidad Obrera constructed a pavillion and the Communist book publisher Fondo de Cultura Popular occupied a stall in the heavily attended new-books section of the Fair. In addition to these exhibitors, two stalls in the used-books section displayed Communist literature. All four establishments had books by Stalin, Lenin and Marx -- in translation and in Russian -- plus the usual series of books on the "new" China, the novels of workers fighting against "exploitation", and a variety of Soviet Union "culture" magazines in color.

3. Films

Soviet and satellite films apparently were shown in increasing numbers in Latin America during 1954. Many Soviet and satellite films were shown at both the Uruguayan and Argentine film festivals, and the USSR took advantage of the latter festival to exhibit some of its best films. Many Soviet artists appeared in person during the course of the festival and were well received by Argentine audiences.

In Cuba, the Soviet propaganda film, "The Fall of Berlin", was shown to fairly large audiences at three downtown theaters in Havana from November 29 to December 4. On December 5, however, the Cuban police picked up the film and it was not shown thereafter. "Glinka" and "Sadko" were also exhibited in Cuba.

Communist front groups in various Latin American countries held private showings of Soviet and satellite films.

4. Delegations to and from Communist Countries

As already noted, several hundred Latin Americans traveled outside the hemisphere under Communist auspices during 1954 and most of these went behind the Iron Curtain. While the bulk of these persons traveled for the usual Communist purposes, such as visits to Moscow and satellite capitals for political indoctrination and attending Communist front meetings, a number of artists and sporting groups traveled to perform behind the Iron Curtain.

With respect to Soviet, Satellite and Communist Chinese travelers to Latin America, an increasing number of "cultural" delegations visited the area in 1954. Ilya Ehrenburg, for example, and a delegation of Communist Chinese intellectuals visited Chile in connection with celebrations in honor of Pablo Neruda and then passed on to other countries. Soviet artists, chess teams, and sporting teams also visited a number of Latin American countries and a delegation of five scientists attended the World Power Conference in Rio de Janeiro. These "cultural" groups usually expressed a desire for cultural exchange between Latin America and the Soviet Union.

5. Communist Broadcasting to Latin America

Of all areas of the world, Latin America receives the least attention in terms of Communist bloc international broadcasting. The USSR broadcasts to Latin America in Portuguese and Spanish, while Czechoslovakia and Hungary broadcast to Latin America in Spanish.

There has been no change in output during 1954 except for the addition of a daily concert by Hungary. However, Moscow now devotes a total of eight transmitters to this service, in contrast to the five transmitters used prior to the beginning of the winter schedule in October. This may well indicate greater attention to Latin America, in the combined Communist programming, because of increased interest in recent Latin American political developments. [This suggestion seemed borne out when Czechoslovakia increased its Spanish output to Latin America from seven to fourteen hours per week, during the first week of 1955.]

Weekly Hours of Communist Broadcasting to Latin America
(December 31, 1953 Compared with December 31, 1954)

	Originating Countries							
	USSR		Czechoslovakia		Hungary		Total	
Languages	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954	1953	1954
Portuguese	7:00	7:00	-	-	-	-	7:00	7:00
Spanish	14:00	14:00	7:00	7:00	3:30	3:30	24:30	24:30
Concerts	-	-	-	-	-	1:45	-	1:45
Total	21:00	21:00	7:00	7:00	3:30	5:15	31:30	33:15

NOTES:

1. Figures represent total transmission time, including repeats, as no exact differentiation between original program hours and repeat transmissions is available.

2. USSR figures include output of Radio Moscow as well as all other USSR stations originating foreign broadcasts.